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INTRODUCTION
Political and economic transformation in Central European countries (CECs) 
coincided with speedy globalization founded on innovations and technological 
progress. On the one hand it created great opportunities, but on the other, glo-
balization threatened the position of various sectors of the economy and their 
stakeholders who suddenly found themselves exposed to stiff  competition.
In the post WWII years, despite their apparent comparative underdevelop-
ment and general low productivity, the CECs built up a rudimentary egalitarian 
welfare state. Th ere were high economic and social diff erences, but these ine-
qualities were not openly exposed. Basically the economic fate of the man in the 
street was modest, but highly predictable. Political and economic aspirations of 
Polish society organized in the fi rst Solidarity movement clashed in 1989 and in 
the years that followed with the reality of a rapidly globalized economy. Liber-
alization, compression of time and distance due to swift  technological changes – 
being the main building blocks of globalization – led to profound changes in the 
labor market. It brought higher income and wealth dispersion, and consequently 
led to wide-ranging uncertainty. Th ese trends were even more magnifi ed by the 
entrance of the People’s Republic of China and other Asian developing countries 
into world trade and capital fl ows. Th e demand and supply shocks related to their 
new economic presence sent shockwaves to the whole global economy and made 
CEC economic transformation more complicated and diffi  cult.
Th e social and economic transformation of the 1990s and 2000s, even without 
the implications of the latest stage of globalization, would be hard task. In each 
case the reforms and their implementation was embedded in specifi c economic, 
social, cultural, political and institutional frameworks. Generally, the transfor-
mation of societies and economies has had a double and contradictory character. 
On the one hand in its core was the need to replace the authoritarian and inef-
fective system of a command economy by a democratic market-based structure, 
on the other, in some parts of societies, there were instinctive expectations and 
oft en open demands to retain some elements of the earlier rudimentary welfare 
state and in particular social functions of enterprises.
An individual, skeptical perception of the transformation typically neglected 
the objective consequences of globalization. It stemmed from disappointment 
with regard to the end of the generous social functions of fi rms, disillusionment 
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with domestic politics and macroeconomic negative externalities of transfor-
mation, such as high infl ation and unemployment and growing and visible in-
come and wealth disparities. A high level of social frustration, especially at the 
beginning of market and political reforms, was aimed at the state, that in a new 
economic environment could not fulfi ll the overexpectation of the signifi cant 
parts of society.
In the global context with a dominant liberal approach the role of modern 
states had been reduced and its role became focused on the provision of a stable 
monetary and regulatory framework facilitating economic agents’ expectation 
formation. In this context regional, economic and political integration was seen 
as a viable strategy for national interests protection. Consequently CECs, at the 
outset of structural reforms expressed their willingness to join the European Un-
ion (EU) and its Single European Market (SEM) that was launched in mid 1980s 
and completed at the beginning of 1990s.
Each country of Central and East Europe had entered the 1990s with a diver-
sifi ed heritage of dictatorship and oppression and with a highly diff erent experi-
ence and costs of its rejection. Poland, with its long history of anti-system protests 
dating as back as to 1956,1 step by step gained a unique position regarding social 
and cultural life. In economic terms its relative situation, aft er almost 10 years of 
stagnation, was the most unfavorable. Consequently, at the outset of pro-market 
reforms, macroeconomic conditions varied and refl ected both structural features 
and specifi c versions of central planning and economic governance.
Th e selection of Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics, and Ukraine as 
Central and East European countries for comparative analysis with Poland was 
based on the following grounds. Hungary was a country that had been reforming 
and transforming its economy since the end of the 1960s. Examination of Hun-
gary allows comparison between the results of long-lasting Hungarian gradual 
reforms and the results of the radical alternative of the quick pro-market shift  
implemented in Poland. A comparison with Czechoslovakia,2 which had consid-
erably higher economic development, a relatively good initial macroeconomic 
situation, and where reforms were introduced one year later than in Poland allow 
the assessment of the signifi cance of initial structural diff erences and the specifi c 
premium from the opportunity of following Polish pioneer experiences during 
the fi rst months of transformation. Ukraine at the outset of transformation had 
signifi cant structural similarity to Poland, i.e. high importance of the agricultural 
sector and natural resources to the economy. Moreover, the Ukrainian GDP level 
per capita in 1990 was the same as in Poland. Furthermore, Ukraine, as a post-
 1 In 1956 Hungarian eff orts to liberalize the political and economic system was crushed 
by the Soviet Army.
 2 1st January 1993 Czechoslovakia ceased to exist. In its place, came into being the Czech 
and Slovak Republics.
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soviet economy shed some light on the soviet-type institutional and social herit-
age and its impact on business and macroeconomic performance. Incorporation 
of Ukraine into the analysis allows verifi cation of whether this country took ad-
vantage of a delay premium, since it had started its political emancipation pro-
cess in August 1991. Consequently, Ukraine had an opportunity to launch full 
market transformation as an independent state and could base its actions on the 
experience of Hungary, the then Czechoslovakia and Poland.
Th e choice of South European countries (SECs), namely Greece, Portugal, 
Spain and Turkey, for comparative analysis with Poland stems from the fact, that 
the fi rst three joined the EU relatively late and the fourth, with European Union 
membership aspirations is generally seen as one of the most promising fast grow-
ing market economies. Greece and Turkey3 both applied to become associated 
states in 1959. Greece was accepted as member state in 1981. Portugal and Spain 
joined the then European Economic Community in 1986. Th ese EU countries 
were much less developed that the Northern countries, and in the case of Spain 
and Portugal, for many years had non-democratic polity. Also Greece, in 1970s 
had military coup and rule. Th us, they were not only relatively poorer but, basi-
cally being market economies, entered the European integration with institutions 
infl uenced by authoritarian heritage. Th us, to some extent they had a number of 
similarities to Poland and other CECs. Comparing Poland’s, case with the SECs 
growth, reactions to the pace of globalization and the ways their economies re-
sponded to recent crises, would shed light on Poland’s and their relative perfor-
mance and sustainability.
Th e fi rst Chapter identifi es and assesses the interplay between liberalization 
and the course of events in the contemporary globalization stage. General lib-
eralization in terms of economic policy meant an emphasis on deregulation and 
a gradual withdrawal of the state from various areas seen to be ineffi  cient and 
thwarting development of market-based competitiveness. Th e Chapter is di-
vided into four Sections. Th e fi rst concerns the notion of globalization and the 
understanding of liberalism. Th e second is devoted to relations between Schum-
peterian constructive destruction and globalization. Th e third Section deals with 
economic and fi nancial dimensions of global economic disequilibria, and the 
fourth revolves around possible reactions of a contemporary state to the pro-
cesses of globalization.
Th e second Chapter is devoted to post WWII economic policy. It shows the 
economic policy experience and theory available for CECs both at the outset of 
their market transformation and intellectual climate preceding the economic 
and fi nancial events that erupted in 2007-2008. Following the fi nding of the 
fi rst Chapter it focuses on the evolution leading to reduction of the scope of 
 3 Th e 1999 Helsinki EU summit declared that Turkey obtained recognized candidate sta-
tus.
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discretionary economic policy and replacing it with rules. Th e Chapter is di-
vided into three Section. Its fi rst Section reviews economic trends aft er 1945. 
Th e second deals with the theory and practice of economic policy. Th e third 
Section assesses implications of the global fi nancial crisis for economic policy 
theory and practice.
Th e third Chapter reviews and assesses literature on fi nancial crises. On 
the one hand they stemmed from human errors, on the other their pace of de-
velopment and scope of contagion they caused should be seen as negative ex-
ternalities of globalization. Both crises, but in particular the global fi nancial 
crisis that began in the US in 2007 had harmful consequences for CECs. Th e 
fi rst Section off ers classifi cation of contemporary fi nancial crises. Th e second 
deals with the 1997 Asian crisis. Th e third is devoted to the 2007-2009 crisis 
and its evolvement.
Following the fi rst three Chapters the aim of the fourth Chapter is an empiri-
cal evaluation and comparison of Poland’s economic performance during market 
transformation against the background of results achieved in the same period, 
on the one hand by Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics and Ukraine, and 
on the other by SECs. Th e background for empirical analysis were macroeco-
nomic stabilization frameworks of CEC economies, the growth mechanisms and 
the conditions of competitiveness of CECs and SECs. Th e fi rst Section presents a 
theoretical background of transformation. Th e transformation process is divided 
into two phases: a phase of stabilization and implementation of fundamental in-
stitutional changes, and a phase of growth and development. Th e second Section 
discusses the initial conditions of the transition in Poland and the other CECs 
under examination. Special attention is paid to structural and macroeconomic 
conditions on the threshold of transformation. Th e third Section is devoted to 
analyses of selected growth factors and their barriers. Th e fourth Section focus-
es on general outcomes of transformation in terms of GDP per capita and com-
monly used measures of international competitiveness.
Th e fi ft h Chapter, linked with the fourth is devoted to the major institutional 
aspect of economic transformation: privatization in Poland. Th is case study is 
divided into three Sections and Conclusions. Th e fi rst contains a brief review of 
privatization theory. Th e second is devoted to a presentation of the role of pri-
vatization in the Polish political and economic reforms of 1989/1990. Th e third 
section discusses the nature of Polish privatization.
Th e aim of the sixth Chapter is twofold. Th e fi rst is to empirically assess the 
macroeconomic performance of the Polish consecutive democratic account-
ability terms against the background of economic results achieved in CECs and 
SECs in 1990-2012. Th e second aim, referring to fi ndings of Chapter three, is 
empirical evaluation and comparison of economic performance of Poland and 
CECs and SECs during the Asian and global fi nancial crises. Th e book is closed 
with Aft erword.
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In writing this book I drew on my recent publications and lectures. I bene-
fi tted from advice from many individuals.4 In particular I want to thank Anna 
Zielinska-Glebocka for reviewing the entire text. Th e detailed comment and cri-
tiques provided guidance that helped me to improve the book. I also thank John 
Hogan, Witold Jurek, Roman Kiedrowski, Steve Letza, Renata Stawarska, Louis 
St. Peter, Clas Wihlborg and Staff an Zetterholm for reading parts of the draft  and 
for their comment. Any errors in the text are entirely my own.
 4 I am grateful to Anna Grześ and Anna Bogajewska for their editorial work on the man-
uscript, Robert Peter Parry for English language edition and Aleksandra Wojciechowska-Re-
fermat for statistical work and preparing fi gures.

1
CONTEMPORARY GLOBALIZATION AND 
LIBERALIZATION
Th e contemporary stage of globalization has continuously attracted the attention 
of the general public, business people and politicians.1 It also remains the main fo-
cus of academic economics. On the one hand this common attention stems from 
the need for positive analysis of the recent decades of turbulent economic and 
social changes, and on the other arises from spectacular events that occurred in 
the global economy aft er 2007. Th e years of 2008–2009, commonly referred to as 
the Great Recession or fi nancial and economic crisis, can be considered a specifi c 
symptom of the contemporary stage of globalization. In this respect, there is a 
need for not only diagnosing the causes of the crisis and its subsequent slowdown, 
but also developing new recommendations for sustainable economic policy.2
Th e aim of this Chapter is to identify and assess the interplay between liber-
alization and the course of events in the contemporary globalization stage. Th e 
intellectual foundation of liberalization in the normative sense in Europe was 
based on social, political and economic liberal concepts [Nederveen 2012]. In 
terms of economic policy these concepts brought in deregulation and a gradual 
withdrawal of the modern state from areas that were seen to be ineffi  cient in the 
1970s or those hindering the development of market-based competitiveness (see 
Chapter 2). Following the experience of the 1970s the general attitude of mod-
ern developed states towards globalization challenges was mostly passive; it was 
oft en a delayed reaction to prevailing economic and social factors and condi-
tions. Th ese conditions were under the major infl uence of technological trends. 
As a whole, the combination of subjective and objective factors had an impact on 
the real economy, the fi nancial sector, and their short-term fl uctuations, as well 
as structural changes at the level of nation states, regional integration organiza-
tions and fi nally global. Th e interplay of these factors led to the 2007 crisis in the 
US that eventually triggered the Great Recession of 2008–2009, which is still far 
from being resolved.
 1 Th is Chapter draws on and develops my lectures and paper [Kowalski 2012].
 2 See: [Studia Ekonomiczne 2009, no. 3–4], focused on the diagnosis of the recent crisis 
causes and challenges.
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Th e fi rst Section of this Chapter concerns the notion of globalization and the 
understanding of liberalism. Th e second is devoted to relations between Schum-
peterian constructive destruction and globalization. Th e third Section revolves 
around economic and fi nancial dimensions of global economic disequilibria, 
and the fourth deals with possible reactions of a contemporary state to the pro-
cesses of globalization.
1.1. Globalization
1.1.1. The notion of globalization
Th e notion of globalization appeared originally in business studies in 1970s but 
it came into common use in the second half of the 1980s [Gilpin 2000; Kowa-
lik 2002; Rodrik 2011; Stiglitz 2011; Nederveen 2012]. Wilkinson [2006, p. 69]3 
notes that “Th e usual timescale in which globalization is considered is at mini-
mum post-Cold War, at maximum post-Second War”. In both time frames, but 
in particular the fi rst, globalization strongly infl uenced the pace of economic de-
velopment of Central European countries. It unveiled their structural problems 
and civilization gap that further increased during the central planning decades. 
Th e end of the Cold War opened for Poland and other Central European Coun-
tries new chances of pro-market reforms.
Globalization, being a relatively new and ambiguous concept, is burdened 
with ideology and emotion. Th is stems from the fact that the notion has been 
used in multiple, distant contexts on the one hand, and on the other, has a wide 
scope (see Table 1.1). Th e core of the defi nitions used in literature is that glo-
balization can be described as an autonomous, multi-layered, and cross-border 
transformation process of national economies, institutions, societies and cul-
tures into a more interrelated system. Th e autonomous nature of globalization 
stems from speedy technological progress. Th is progress infl uences all aspects 
of life, reduces the signifi cance of distance, and fi nally leads to compression of 
time and space (Table 1.1).
Technological progress during the last three decades entailed mainly a break-
through in the processing, gathering, and transmitting of information and had 
a major impact on the functioning of the fi nancial intermediation sector. Within 
the sector, technological progress in information technology established grounds 
for a comprehensively global market operating on a real-time basis. As a result 
of the economies of scale and scope, it enabled cost reduction and the creation 
of not only new forms and channels of providing fi nancial services, but also new 
fi nancial instruments [Th e Economist 2012; Daruvala 2013]. New IT technolo-
 3 Quoted aft er Nederveen [2012, p. 2].
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gies and computer hardware seemed to create the possibility of applying unifi ed 
supervision and risk assessment methods to the fi nancial intermediation sector.
Changes and speedy technological progress also infl uenced the real economy. 
Th us, it included all areas, from research and development, design, production 
unifi cation and quality control, to supply chain management. It also had a strong 
unifying impact on changes in social relationships, consumption and leisure time 
patterns, as well as needs in terms of access to cultural heritage (Table 1.1).
In order to comprehend globalization and its recent economic repercussions 
it is important to see it from a longer perspective (Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1). In 
particular, such a perspective, dating back to the nineteenth century, is necessary 
to understand the structural traits of the twentieth century and also the range of 
recent global demand and supply shocks caused by the entry of China and India 
into the global economy.
Table 1.1. Dimensions of globalization according to social science
Disciplines Time Domains Keywords
Sociology 1800s modernity capitalism, industrialization, ur-
banization, modern states
Economics 1970s multinational corporations, tech-
nologies, banks, international 
fi nancial market, fi nancial de-
rivatives
global multinational corporation, 
world product, global supply 
chains, New Economy, Gatizm, 
intra-industry trade, global qual-
ity standards (ISO), off shor-
ing, outsourcing, trade in tasks, 
fi nancial crises and contagion, 
regionalization, central bank in-
dependence and reign
Cultural studies media, fi lm, advertising, informa-
tion and communication tech-
nology (ICT)
global village, global fashion, Mc-
Donaldization, Disneyfi cation, 
hybridization
Political science, in-
ternational relations
1980s internationalization of the state, 
International nongovernmental 
organizations (INGOs), region-
alization
competitor states, retreat of the 
state, post-international politics, 
global civil society
Developments studies International Monetary Fund, 
World Bank
IMF (conditionality), debt cri-
sis, structural adjustment policy, 
growth sustainability
Source: adapted and enhanced from: [Nederveen 2012, p. 3].
Th e size of these economies, in relation to earlier episodes of entry (in 1870 
and in 1950) shows the scale of supply and demand shocks in the global econo-
my such entry caused (Figure 1.1). From the macroeconomic point of view these 
shocks deeply changed the economic global landscape (see Section 1.3) such that 
they can be seen as major seeds of the economic crises.
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Th e European perspective, used in this book, stems from the focus on Poland 
and other Central European countries that had to transform their economies in 
the quickly changing European and global economic and institutional context. For 
their economies, this changing global environment created a serious economic 
policy challenge. Th e entrance of India and in particular China reduced the scope 
and time of their potential cost and price comparative advantage and thus made 
the social cost of market transformation higher (see Chapter 4).
1.1.2. Periodization of globalization
Periodizing globalization requires methodological choices. From the political 
and economic point of view the European nineteenth century was exceptional for 
its post-1815 relatively peaceful development4 and very high international trade 
dynamics that was abruptly ended by WWI. It was a century of further indus-
 4 In the nineteenth century there was the Crimean War (1853–1856, that de facto ended 
the Vienna Settlement) and other minor military confl icts in Northern Italy and Germany. 
Both insurrections in the Russian controlled part of Poland had a local character. Despite the 
heavy loss of life on both sides in the Crimean War the post-1815 century was peaceful; bat-
tlefi eld deaths as a proportion of Europe’s population were seven times smaller than was the 
case in the seventeenth century [Findlay & O’Rourke 2007, p. 378].
Figure 1.1.  Major episodes of globalization and the reentry of four Central 
European countries (CE-4: Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and 
Ukraine)
Source:  based on: [Maddison 2007; Maddison Database http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/Maddison.htm]
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trial development and applied innovations in various domains of life. Th e indus-
trial revolution that began in the UK was taken up in the continent: in France, 
Belgium, Scandinavia and in particular in Germany [Zank 1998, pp. 102–106]. 
It was also shared by the US, Canada, and also Australia and New Zealand. In 
Asia, aft er 1853–1858, Japan had to liberalize its foreign trade relations [Findlay 
& O’Rourke 2007, p. 401]. It began to follow the Western industrialization pat-
tern based mainly on the German and British experience.
Th e nineteenth century marked the beginning of North-South divisions and 
the economic and political global supremacy of the UK. British and European 
supremacy was based on two major pillars, namely the sound legal systems and 
development of a fi nancial system able to properly allocate funds. It has been 
stressed that the necessary condition for nineteenth century European relative 
prosperity and development was the political equilibrium established in 1815 
based on “a mutual consensus on norms and rules, respect for law, and overall 
balance among various actors in terms of rights, security, status, claims, duties 
and satisfactions rather than power” [Findlay & O’Rourke 2007, p. 378]. It was 
also a century of British and British off shoots domination, and of a few big Euro-
pean colonial powers, and of strengthening of economic, social and institutional 
foundations of modern capitalist states in which Poland and other Central Euro-
pean countries did not participate as independent entities. Th ese trends were well 
refl ected in gross domestic product (GDP) divergence that emerged at that time 
(see Table 1.2). Great Britain and British off shoots5 proved themselves to develop 
the fastest; their economies and institutions enabled the GDP per capita gap to 
increase in respect to all other regions (Table 1.2). Table 1.2 also shows the scale 
of the GDP gap dividing Eastern Europe from the best performers at that time.
Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia re-emerged as independent states in 
1918 and enjoyed their new status until WWII. Aft er the War they found them-
selves in the Soviet Union zone of interests and consequently until 1989/1990 
could not benefi t fully from free trade and capital relations. Th us, in the course 
 5 Th ey benefi ted not only from the then globalization. Great Britain in particular took 
advantage of its superior position over her colonies and exploited them.
Table 1.2. GDP per capita in 1820 and 1913 (in 1990 Int.$)
Region 1820 1913
British off shoots 1,202 5,233
Western Europe 1,204 3,458
Eastern Europe 683 1,695
Asia excl. Japan 577 658
World 667 1,525
Source: [Findlay & O’Rourke 2007, p. 415].
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of the twentieth century the gap was maintained and even widened due to two 
European wars and the subsequent geopolitical situation, that in fact, for over 
forty years separated Central European countries from the global economy (see: 
Chapter 4).
Th e post-WWII pace of globalization evolved within a new institutional con-
text. Th e main elements of the institutional framework of globalization were the 
United Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB), 
and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariff s (GATT)6 which was replaced 
in 1995 by the World Trade Organization (WTO). A key role was played by the 
gold-foreign exchange standard with the American dollar as its core. Th is system 
was designed and negotiated in Bretton Woods and implemented in 1947. Un-
til its collapse in 1971 it served as an important stabilizer of exchange rates and 
thus trade and capital fl ows.
Post-WWII re-globalization was highly diversifi ed due to deep political and 
ideological divisions.7 Th ese faded with the end of Cold War and the pace of 
globalization speeded up in the 1980s. Th is was triggered by both technological 
advancements and institutional developments in the EU (launching the idea of 
the Single European Market (SEM)). Th e positive West European integration 
experience inspired non-European countries to seek deeper trade and economic 
regional integration.8 Th us the process of globalization was accompanied by a 
parallel tendency for regionalization (regional integration agreements – RIA) 
with the most prominent examples of RIAs being: North American Free Trade 
Area9 (NAFTA, est. in 1994), Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR, es-
tablished in 1991), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN, est. 
in 1967) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS, est. 
in 1975).
 6 Originally establishment of the International Trade Organization was negotiated and 
its charter was approved in 1948. When the US Senate was not ready to ratify it, GATT, being 
a less comprehensive book of rules, became the framework for international trade negotiations 
until 1995.
 7 Contemporary EU predecessors were the European Coal and Steel Community (est. in 
1951) transformed in 1957 into the European Economic Community (EEC). Parallel to the 
EEC the European Free Trade Area was established. Originally its members were not inter-
ested in deeper integration and reduced their goal to the creation of a free trade area. Step by 
step the EEC membership become more attractive and consecutive EFTA countries joined the 
EEC (the UK, Denmark and Portugal) and the EU (Austria, Finland and Sweden).
 8 In 1949 the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) was established in 
Central and Eastern Europe with the Soviet Union playing a key economic and political role. 
For years the COMECON sealed its members within a RIA that eff ectively reduced they par-
ticipation in the global economy.
 9 Th e NAFTA agreement was preceded by the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement ( CUSTA, 
signed in 1989).
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From the perspective of economic policy, the entrance of China into global 
economic relations (Figure 1.1) induced real economy supply and demand side 
consequences. Consequently, they also contributed to global fi nance develop-
ments. One of the most distinguished general results of globalization described 
herein is a reduction in the actual ability of a nation state to infl uence the eco-
nomic (see Section 1.4), ecological, social, and cultural processes within its ter-
ritory. At fi rst, globalization brought hopes of expanding the range of choice for 
customers, as well as of higher and more stable economic growth. Th e reduction 
of the state’s infl uence on its economy and the re-emergence of market mecha-
nisms that accompanied it, seemed to create the grounds for the reduced discre-
tionary power of bureaucracy.
Th e prerequisites for globalization processes to take place have been peace, 
transport network safety, access to resources, and a free fl ow of goods and capital. 
It is well worth noticing that this set of necessary conditions does not uncondition-
ally involve a free fl ow of the workforce for at least two fundamental reasons: sig-
nifi cant diff erences in the achieved level of affl  uence between particular countries, 
as well as diff erent levels and models of social security systems [Żukowski 2006].
1.1.3.  Liberalism as a foundation of the contemporary 
stage of globalization
Th e contemporary stage of globalization (Section 1.1.2), apart from objective 
sources such as technological progress and the state of relative peace in the world 
post 1945, also has a subjective context: the liberal intellectual climate in economic 
thought and political science that emerged aft er the stagfl ation of the 1970s. Th is 
intellectual background has its roots in the nineteenth century. Th erefore, from 
the historical perspective this century is the corner stone of the recent phase of 
globalization. In his infl uential approach Polanyi [1944] argued that the nine-
teenth century’s fast economic development was orchestrated by a dominance 
of liberal economic rules of free trade and entrepreneurship over previous more 
harmonious norms and customs. Consequently, such environment contributed 
to a dominance of the economic sphere over the social and laid the foundation 
for a broad use of the concept of rational economic agent. Th is concept regained 
its prominent position in economics in the 1970s and 1980s.
Drozdowicz [2011, p. 15] emphasizes the ambiguity of the notion of liberalism 
and various adjectives that accompany it. Taking into account the whole variety 
of meanings it has, socio-economic liberalism dates back to the cultural system 
and intellectual atmosphere of the protestant revolution of the sixteenth century 
and of Europe’s seventeenth century rationalism. According to M. Weber [quoted 
aft er Drozdowicz 2011, p. 17] „the emergence of a powerful force that has been 
capitalism would not have been possible, or at least it would not have expanded 
to such an extent, had it not been for Calvinist ascetics.” Drozdowicz emphasizes 
18 1. Contemporary globalization and liberalization
that, having accepted the existence of this intellectual and normative trend in other 
parts of the world, Europe and North America remained its natural birthplace.
Th e failure of economic policy in its socio-economic version of the 1970s 
triggered a need to reconsider the scope and scale of state intervention in the 
market mechanism. What emerged as a new prevailing paradigm was a liberal 
position based on:
 – the assumed ability of markets to maintain equilibrium and
 – the reduced role of the state in the economy.10
In the sphere of positive and normative economics, its fullest manifestation 
was the New Classical Macroeconomics [Kowalski 2001, 2011a]. It played an im-
portant, inspirational role and infl uenced the evolution and development of other, 
more mainstream schools of academic economics. Th is new micro and macro-
economics was refl ected in applied economic policy in its normative aspects of 
both selection of goals and instruments, as well as in terms of property rights and 
general regulation [Kowalski 2011a].
Th e free market and deregulatory rhetoric of R. Reagan, and the actual policy 
of deregulation and privatization introduced by M. Th atcher proved inspiration-
al for other countries. Th e recurring debt crises in developing countries and in 
much state-controlled economies of Latin America also contributed to seeking 
new and eff ective institutional solutions. Gradually, the solutions applied in diff er-
ent countries within macroeconomic stabilization policy were becoming similar 
[Blinder 2010; Stiglitz 2011; Kowalski 2012]. A specifi c role in that respect was 
played by the International Monetary Fund and its “conditionality” policy based 
on [James 2010; Rodrik 2011]:
 – budget expenditure cuts,
 – countering infl ation,
 – liberalization of foreign trade and capital fl ow, as well as
 – fostering replacement of fi xed or administered exchange rates by a fl exible 
rate system.
Th e Washington Consensus by J. Williamson [Williamson 1993; Wojtyna 2008a] 
provides a good summary of the economic liberalization of that period.
Liberalization and deregulation in applied economic policy entailed a shift  
towards the “rule and power” of markets, reduction of fi scal authorities role and 
a substantive increase in the position and power of monetary authorities (Chap-
ter 2). Th e prominent position of central banks stemmed from:11
 – exchange rate systemic solutions,
 – institutional changes strengthening and securing political and functional in-
dependence of central banks, and
 – increase in the time horizon of economic policy goals.
 10 Th is has been labeled sometimes as ‘market fundamentalism’. See: [Somers & Block 2005].
 11 See: [Wojtyna 1998; Hochreiter & Kowalski 2000; Kowalski 2011b].
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It has been argued that long-term economic policy ought to be linked with the 
assumed autonomous self-regulatory abilities of contemporary markets. Following 
this assumption state economic policy was no longer focused on the fi ne-tuning 
of fi scal stabilization policy instruments (Chapter 2). Instead, it was assumed that 
its main role should be to provide economic agents with a high quality institu-
tional framework, as well as to facilitate economic agent expectation formation 
[Kowalski 2001, 2011a].
1.2. Globalization vs. Schumpeterian creative destruction
Th e tendencies outlined in Section 1.1 shape a framework of current and struc-
tural market adjustments both in sectors, national economies, regional integra-
tion agreements, as well as a global economy. Th e Schumpeterian concept of 
creative destruction (Figure 1.2) may be used as a generalization of these adjust-
ments. Its core is pressure for change stimulated by technological progress that 
is both spontaneous and triggered by state pro-development policies. Nowadays, 
this creative destruction leads to an unprecedented speed of changes in know how, 
processes and products, and, therefore, it induces elimination of former, outdated 
solutions (Figure 1.2). Within such a mechanism and the given scope and qual-
ity of regulations, if markets fail, the fi nancial and economic imbalances accu-
Figure 1.2. Schumpeterian creative destruction vs. globalization
Increase in productivity and complexity of an economy
Necessity of rejecting methods used to date as a precondition of introducing new ones 
Continuous process of elimination of obsolete technologies
Technological progress as a driving force of globalization
20 1. Contemporary globalization and liberalization
mulate at all levels: sectoral, national, RIA and fi nally at the global economy as 
well.12 Mounting social inequalities are an off shoot. It is a complex process but its 
main technological manifestation is the changing demand for employee skills. It 
marks itself in a weakening of demand for professions and skills connected with 
obsolete technology, services or products, and in fact leads to fragmentation of 
labor markets, both in terms of supply and demand, as well as pay rates. Creative 
destruction, in the contemporary stage of global capitalism, on the whole gener-
ates more jobs than the number it destroys [Grennes 2003]. Undoubtedly it cre-
ates ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ throughout: from individuals, professions, sectors, to 
specifi c economies and regional integration settings. It is thus a source of social 
tensions, requiring government counteraction.
Modern states have limited fi scal possibilities to level down income and wealth 
divergence. Under global competition pressure developed economies have diffi  -
culties to defend the historically established welfare state. Paradoxically, the state 
intervention, in order to be successful, should not focus on job protection. Instead, 
the state in order to maintain and then improve an economy’s international com-
petitiveness should facilitate autonomous creative destruction; innovations profes-
sional mobility, and continuous inter and intra-industry reallocation of workers 
amongst jobs. Th is task is diffi  cult not only in social and political terms. It is dif-
fi cult objectively due to technological advancement leading to the compression 
of distance and space and time and thus increasing the number of skills and jobs 
that become vulnerable, endangered and in line for extinction. Th e modern state 
supporting innovation and mobility will be able to facilitate job creation in new 
areas of the economy and in this way at least maintaining the total number of jobs.
1.3. Analytical approaches to globalization
1.3.1. Macroeconomic level
Globalization is a highly complex phenomenon requiring diversifi ed tools of 
economic analysis. It infl uences both the short-term and long-term behavior 
of economic agents. In the short-run in the macroeconomic context the most 
obvious tools to use are the aggregate demand (AD) schedule and the IS-LM-
BP model (Figure 1.3 a). AD in its simplest defi nition is a sum of expenditure 
for consumption (C), investments (I), government expenditure (G) and net ex-
ports (NX): AD = C I + G + NX. It systemizes various areas of an economy infl u-
enced by globalization that could be studied within social science (see Table 1.1). 
 12 Th ey require government interventions. In the globalized economy such individual in-
terventions are bound to be ineffi  cient. Regional integration agreements can be seen as one of 
the remedies for global economy challenges.
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Th e IS-LM-BP13 (Figure 1.3a) in the globalization context can be used to show the 
impact of a growing money supply (rightward shift  of LM schedule) and deep-
ening global fi nancial markets integration (fl atter BP schedule). Th e pre-crisis 
combination of low interest rates and low infl ation contributed to a strong global 
expansion of consumption and investments (fi xed and residential) and to a low 
cost in public sector borrowing (Chapter 3).
Th e impact of globalization can be systemized in a complete model (Fig-
ure 1.3b) as well. Th e short-run aggregate supply (SRAS) schedule is a combina-
tion of output Y and price level P; it captures the eff ect of natural level of output _
Y  and the price diff erence (P – P*) on current output level – Y (1.1):
 Y = F[Y (P – P e)] = SRAS, (1.1)
where:
 
_
Y  – natural level of output,
 P e – expected level of prices.
Th e recent stage of globalization and in particular the entrance of India and 
China into world economic relations made the SRAS schedule fl atter (SRAS' ). 
When entering the global economy in 2000 both countries had about 29% and 
over 45% of the world’s skilled and unskilled labor resources respectively [Salva-
tore 2007, p. 130]. Th eir joint capital endownemet was relatively low at that time 
(over 11% of the world’s capital) but the Chinese accumulation rate had been 
very high since then, enabling a sizable increase in capital stock per worker. Th is 
positive supply shock exerted downward pressure on both current (P) and ex-
 13 Th e IS schedule represents goods market equilibrium conditions, the LM shows combi-
nations of interests rates (R) and output (Y) securing money market equilibrium and the BP 
line indicates balance of payments equilibrium.
Figure 1.3. Impact of globalization
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pected price level – P e; in an extreme case the SRAS', especially for manufactured 
goods, could be even presented as pushed down below the pre-entrance level.14
Th e long-run aggregate supply (LRAS) does not depend on prices. Th e LRAS 
schedule is vertical (Figure 1.3 b); this means that output depends on capital (K), 
labor (L) and technology (T) (1.2):
 LRAS = f (K, L, T) = Y0. (1.2)
Th e accumulated entrance of China, India and other developing countries into 
the world’s economic relations meant that globally availably L and K increased, 
shift ing LRAS rightwards. In the case of China this supply eff ect was even mag-
nifi ed due to its very high investment rate and technological development.
1.3.2. Mezzo and micro aspects of globalization
Globalization and liberalization of entrance rules have a strong impact on com-
petitive pressure on all segments of goods and services markets. Th is dominant 
feature of the latest stage of globalization was magnifi ed in the context of the Sin-
gle European Market (SEM) that was launched in the mid 1980s. and was pro-
claimed completed at the beginning of the 1990s [Musiałkowska et al. 2012]. Th e 
SEM was supplemented by a number of EU regulations and directives concerning 
Trade, Competition and Industry Policies eliminating or substantially reducing 
national discretionary economic policy measures. Th us, it was this highly com-
petitive environment which the Central European New Member States joined in 
2004. Its simplifi ed graphic presentation is shown in Figure 1.4.
Th e horizontal axis in Figure 1.4 measures the number of fi rms (N) on the mar-
ket, while the vertical axis indicates price level (P) and the average or per unit cost 
of production (AC). In Figure 1.4 all fi rms sell at the same price. Th e background 
assumption for the schedule in Figure 1.4 is that fi rms are symmetric or face the 
same internal and external conditions in terms of costs and demand [Salvatore 
2007, p. 183]. Curve P is downward sloping and indicates all combinations of pric-
es and the number of fi rms (N) operating in the market; as more fi rms enter the 
market competition becomes stiff er so the price charged decreases. Curve C is up-
ward sloping and shows the relationship between the number of fi rms in industry 
functioning in a particular market and their average costs (AC); the more fi rms 
on the market, the lower their market shares, thus the higher AC. Points G and 
F show the initial market and cost conditions before market liberalization, while 
point E indicates the industry (market) long run equilibrium (Figure 1.4). Any 
 14 Th is is a simplifi ed causation scenario. In the actual conditions of the 2000s it was not 
only a positive quantitative supply shock. New technologies, higher stock of capital per worker 
and undervalued renminbi made the Chinese economy highly competitive.
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form of opening the market (trade liberalization, entering the SEM or launching 
new long-term expenditure project) attracts newcomers from foreign countries 
and induces local fi rms operating in other sectors to seek new opportunities for 
expansion (shown as a downward shift  of C to C'). Points E' and H indicate new 
markets and AC conditions aft er the industry (market) opening and the increase 
in the number of fi rms that entered the market (Figure 1.4).
Th e stylized relationships presented in Figure 1.4 are not very far from the EU 
specifi c hyper-competition [Polowczyk 2010] conditions, which New Member 
States have to face. Th e model in Figure 1.4 can be applied to analyze the specif-
ic situation in the following three contexts: fi nal goods and services production, 
intermediary goods and services and also in the public procurement context.
Final goods and services producers undergo strong competitive pressure but 
they have more leeway in the management of their product portfolio and mar-
gins as they may use creativity and innovations as their major tools of market 
success. Despite the shorter life cycle of products these producers can, using out-
sourcing and off shoring policies, actively exert their superior position over their 
supply chain.
Intermediate goods and services producers depend on the ultimate purchas-
ers of their output. Oft en, their market position is further weakened by purchaser 
Figure 1.4. Liberalization of entrance rules vs. competitive pressure
Source: adapted from: [Salvatore 2007]
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oligopsony. Th eir very existence and economic condition depends on their costs 
and quality control culture and fl exibility. Being lower-case parts of global supply 
chains, the intermediate goods and services producers’ innovativeness had to be 
subordinated to the oligopsonic purchasers of their products. With the develop-
ment in logistics and uniform technologies and low transportation costs they are 
constantly threatened by lower cost competitors.
Th e downward price mechanism shown in Figures 1.3 b and 1.4 applies to the 
sphere of open, pan-European public procurement tenders. Major infrastructural 
projects not only attract domestic fi rms already active on a specifi c market and 
other domestic companies that seek opportunities. Such big investments pro-
jects pull in fi rms from other countries as well. Th us the number of fi rm com-
peting for particular projects greatly rises pushing prices down (Figure 1.4). Th is 
mechanism is further magnifi ed by a single buyer (monopsony) – typical for ma-
jor public infrastructural projects. Th is downward power is enhanced by specifi c 
regulations that were introduced in countries with a weak civil service qualifi -
cations or such, where the level of public trust is low or are known for their bad 
corruption record (see Chapter 5). In this context, either through regulations or 
with the aim of avoiding accusations and responsibility, a system of a single cri-
terion – the lowest bid price – became a rule. It might have both short and long 
term negative impact on the domestic industry.
In the short run, from the point of view of the purchaser it brings savings be-
cause the competing companies are off ering prices much lower not only than 
their AC (see Figure 1.4) but also lower than the investor formal cost estimate 
(based on technical specifi cation and norms of the projects and typical costs of 
material and labor). Th e bidding fi rms bet on lower market prices of material, on 
possibilities to gain extra payments in the course of projects construction and on 
possibilities to further push down costs by subcontracting some of the work to 
local small and medium size companies.
In the middle and long run such predatory purchaser savings are virtual. Typi-
cally projects carried out under such pressure are delayed and accompanied by le-
gal action both in relations between purchaser and main contractor and between 
main contractor and subcontractors. Since law enforcement and law execution in 
new market economies is far from optimal (see Chapter 5), the resolution of legal 
disputes is time and money consuming. Th e parties to a dispute are not equal in 
terms of their fi nancial strength and thus have a highly diff erentiated ability to 
sustain, in fi nancial and economic terms procrastinated legal disputes. Th e mech-
anism pushes domestic large and SMEs into a short-term self-defense policy of 
disregard to high quality and of avoiding big ambitious tasks and projects. Domes-
tic and local fi rms do not develop their skills and specifi c competences because 
the mechanism does not reward high quality and innovative fi rms but only such 
that are able to compete in terms of costs. Th e destructive institutional and fi nan-
cial environment leads to partial devastation of production capacity and a higher 
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petrifaction of sectoral structure at a regional level thwarting its development, 
increasing unemployment and forcing regional and international labor outfl ow.
1.4. Economic and fi nancial disequilibria. Stylized facts
1.4.1. Supply side and trade of goods
Speedy technological progress triggers multiple changes in all dimensions of the 
economy (Section 1.2). In the sphere of global supply of manufactured goods, it 
meant a shift  towards East Asia. Admitting the People’s Republic of China (PRCh) 
to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 reinforced the impact of this 
shift . Since then, this state, being a unique combination of authoritarian politi-
cal power and quasi liberal economy, has been seen as part of the WTO set of 
democratic countries with market economies.15
Signifi cant changes in costs and prices in the global economy accompanied this 
tendency (see Figures 1.3 a and 1.3 b). Th e impact of these impulses was reinforced 
by the undervalued renminbi maintained by the PRCh [Gorynia &  Kowalski 2008, 
p. 53]. Such supply side conditions were refl ected in the foreign trade balance 
(Table 1.3) as well as in the share of the PRCh in the world trade (Figure 1.5).
 15 See: [Th e Economist 2012, March 3].
Figure 1.5.  Share of the PRCh, the USA, Germany and Japan in world trade 
in 1990–2011
Source: author’s estimation based on the WTO and national data
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Data in Table 1.3 reveals that in 2003 the PRCh was the fourth and third world 
exporter and importer, and its trade surplus reached US$ 25 bn. From 2009, the 
PRCh has been the top world exporter of goods and the second world importer 
(Table 1.3). In 2009 it reached the highest trade surplus so far (US$ 295 bn). Th e 
data proves a decrease in the volume of American exports of goods (in 2002, the 
USA registered the world highest export). In 2003–2010, the USA was the world’s 
biggest importer of goods (Table 1.3).
Data in Figure 1.5 shows the shift  of trade focus towards East Asia, and es-
pecially the PRCh (comp. Section 1.1.2). Mainland China tripled its share in 
world trade within ten years, becoming the world’s biggest exporter of goods in 
2009 (Figure 1.5). In 2000–2010, the dawn of American signifi cance in export 
came. Germany, aft er a round of successes in 2003–2007, gave way to the Chi-
nese economy.
1.4.2. Financial fl ows
World fi nancial fl ows in the period preceding the 2007–2009 crisis were domi-
nated by fl ows unrelated to the real economy. Data in Table 1.4a and 1.4b shows 
the scale of these fl ows. As can be seen in Table 1.4a 1998 daily fl ows in the global 
currency market exceeded one and a half trillion dollars. In 2010, they reached 
nearly four trillion dollars (US$ 3.981 bn). In 1998–2010, currency swaps, op-
tions and other complex exchange instruments constituted over 50% of the world 
forex market.
Table 1.4a. Global FOREX. Daily turnover and the structure of instruments
Instruments 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010
Exchange instruments (US$ bn) 1,527 1,239 1,934 3,324 3,981
Spot transactions (%) 37.0 31.2 32.6 30.0 37.4
Forward transactions (%) 8.4 10.5 10.8 10.9 11.9
Currency swap, options and other transac-
tions (%)
54.6 58.3 56.6 59.1 50.7
Source: based on Bank of International Settlements data.
Table 1.4b. Global FOREX. Daily turnover vs. yearly value of world export and GDP
Turnover 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010
Daily FOREX turnover / yearly value of global 
export of goods (%)
no data 20 21 24 27
Daily FOREX turnover / yearly value of global 
GDP (%)
4.9 3.9 4.6 5.9 6.3
Source: based on Bank of International Settlements and GI Databases.
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Traditional spot transactions played a minor role and their share in FOREX 
market total turnover ranged from approx. 30 to 37%. Turnover scale on the 
contemporary FOREX market is also shown by the data compiled in Table 1.4b. 
As is evident, currency market daily turnover increased from 20% of the world’s 
yearly export of goods in 2011 to 27% in 2010. Turnover as compared to global 
GDP ranged from 3.9% (2001) to 6.3% in 2010 (Table 1.4b). Th e scale of fl ows 
in the exchange market points to the signifi cance of autonomous market forces 
on the one hand, and the limited possibilities of eff ective market interventions 
of national central banks on the other.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is an important measure of modern economy 
internationalization (Table 1.5). Its scale and direction is an important barometer 
of national economy and RIO competitiveness. As the UNCTAD data shows, the 
United States was the biggest country receiving FDI, as well as the economy of 
the world’s highest export potential. Within the analyzed period, the PRC reg-
istered a much higher FDI infl ow than outfl ow. In recent years, Germany and 
France have been the biggest FDI net exporters. Table 1.5 includes data on the 
total value of FDI infl ow and outfl ow as compared to GDP. In 2003–2010, the 
economies of Great Britain and France boasted the most developed relations in 
terms of FDI fl ows (Table 1.5). In the case of Germany and the USA, this form 
of internationalization was of lower signifi cance.
Table 1.5. Total value of yearly outfl ow and infl ow of FDI as per cent of GDP
Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Th e USA 22.0 22.8 22.2 24.5 25.2 17.2 21.3 23.4
Germany 16.2 18.7 17.1 20.3 20.9 18.4 20.3 20.4
Japan 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.5 3.0 4.2 3.9 3.9
France 36.2 42.0 41.3 48.8 48.5 32.2 42.7 39.0
Th e PRC 13.8 12.7 11.8 10.5 9.5 8.6 9.5 9.9
Th e UK 32.6 31.9 36.9 46.6 44.2 36.9 48.7 48.4
Source: UNCTADstat Database.
A low share level of FDI/GDP in Japan stems from an insignifi cant FDI infl ow 
to this economy. Data in Table 1.5 indicates a decrease in the PRCh’s FDI to GDP 
ratio in 2003–2009 and its minor growth in 2009–2010.
1.5. Nation state vs. globalization
As the analyses in Section 1.2 showed, the scope and actual eff ectiveness of au-
tomatic and discretionary fi scal policy actions have recently decreased. In con-
ditions of free capital fl ows, as well as liberalization in the trade of goods and 
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services (see: Section 1.3), the impact of automatic economy stabilizers has di-
minished. A similar tendency could be seen in national discretionary fi scal and 
monetary policies and their range of options (Chapter 2). On the one hand, it is 
inscribed in the context of global goods and capital interrelations, while on the 
other, it refl ects the implications of a contemporary theory of macroeconomics, 
including especially the mechanism of expectation formation [Kowalski 2011a].
Contemporary states react to globalization in a variety of ways. Faced with 
globalization challenges they tend to seek regional integration solutions [Fren-
kel 1998]. With the exception of a few states such as the PRCh, Japan or South 
Korea, a vast majority of countries form regional integration organizations (see 
Section 1.3). Th is tendency, visible since the 1980s, has been called New Region-
alism [Hettne, Inotai & Sunkel 2002]. Th is recent regional trend diff ers from the 
trends of the 1950s and 1960s. Th e latest renaissance of the economic and trade 
agreements can be linked to the success of the European Economic Community 
(EEC) [Eichengreen 2007; Gilpin 2000; James 2010; Rodrik 2011]. Th e EEC and 
later the European Union (EU) constituted not only an inspiration but also a chal-
lenge for other countries.16 Especially from the American perspective, adopting 
the Single European Act (SEA) and the EU strategy towards the Uruguay Round 
of negotiations were impulses for the North American Free Trade Area [Gilpin 
2000, pp. 41–42]. In Asia [Cai 2010] and Latin America, similar actions led to 
ASEAN and MERCOSUR development.
 16 Th is picture has been dented by EMU countries recession and the debt crisis of 2009–2012.
Table 1.6. Major free trade agreements under negotiation
Free Trade Agreements 
negotiated
Value of bilateral 
trade in goods
(US$ bn, 2011 or 
latest)
Date launched Current status
Trans-Pacifi c PartnershipI 1,492.2 June 2005 16th round Mar. 2013
Regional Comprehensive Eco-
nomic PartnershipII
1,412.6 Nov. 2012 just launched
Transatlantic Trade and Invest-
ment PartnershipIII
618.5 Feb. 2013 not launched yet
UE-India 110.8 2007 concluding
UE-Canada 72.9 May 2009 concluding
COMESA-EAC-SADCIV 29.8 June 2011 concluding
Canada-Japan 19.7 Mar. 2012 1st round Nov. 2012
Canada-India 5.2 Nov. 2010 7th round Feb. 2013
I – 11 countries including US, Canada, Mexico and Vietnam. Japan may join. II – Ten ASEAN countries plus 
Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. III – EU-US. IV – 26 sub-Saharan countries.
Source: [Th e Economist 2013b, March 16].
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Th e scale of regional integration trends is proved by the number of regional 
integration organizations (RIOs) at diff erent stages of development, registered at 
the WTO. According to the WTO, at the end of the 1990s, there were approxi-
mately 100 RIOs. By the end of 2010, a multilateral trade system in the world in-
cluded almost 400 RIOs, 90% of which were free trade areas (FTAs).17 Table 1.6 
records the most important FTAs currently negotiated.
Th e recent revival of regionalism and interest in free trade areas stems also 
from the failure of the Doha round of multilateral trade talks launched in 2001. 
Earlier rounds of talks (still under GATT auspices) have exhausted most of the 
easy targets of trade and capital fl ow liberalization. Th e surge of interest in re-
gional agreements (Table 1.6) signals that some countries are looking for prag-
matic solutions outside formal, stagnated Doha round talks. It is argued (Th e 
Economist 2013) that the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership can 
give the US and UE the chance (without having to accommodate such powerful 
emerging economies as China or India) to establish general liberal rules for re-
solving non-trade barriers which then could become an international standard.
In the relevant literature [see: Gilpin 2001; Geyer 2006; Cai 2010; Rodrik 2011], 
it is pointed out that parallel to autonomous deepening of the regional economic 
integration stemming from technological and market-related reasons, states in-
creased the range of their cooperation in order to:
 – retain the already attended level of autonomy as well as
 – to strengthen the bargaining position in multilateral trade negotiations.
For these reasons, at the nation state level, regional economic integration can 
be doubly considered as [Gilpin 2001; Cai 2010]:
 – a reaction of national states to globalization and as
 – a way of protecting their governance and impact range.
In the fi rst case, judging from the perspective of companies, the more-devel-
oped the form of integration, the better conditions for an increase in transpar-
ency and reduction in uncertainty and transaction costs. In compliance with 
international economics theory [Rynarzewski & Zielińska-Głębocka 2006] it 
fosters competition (Section 1.3.2) and stimulates trade and thus leads to higher 
prosperity [Salvadore 2007]. Under globalization, active participation in RIOs, as 
well as deepening of integration enables nation states to maintain their existing 
scope of governance. Th ese states want to protect better their intrinsic cultural 
and societal principles and hope to allow globalization impact in a more orderly 
way. Th is philosophy can be traced back to the idea and mechanisms of EU and 
the EMU establishment.
Th e Great Recession that began in the USA in 2007 unveiled fl aws of such phi-
losophy; the hitherto attempts at regulating ‘the access’ of globalization forces to 
the national economies through RIOs turned out to have been insuffi  cient (see 
 17 Development of regional economic integration is elaborated by K.G. Cai [2010].
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Chapter 2 and 3). Th is has been visible in the way the EMU countries became 
“contaminated” and are stuck in recession [Kowalski 2012]. Apart from macro-
economic policy mistakes (see Chapter 4), as well as supply and demand shift s 
in world economy (see: Section 1.3), regulatory matters have come into signifi -
cance as a new challenge.
Recent decades have witnessed amplifi cation in the external factor impact on 
national economies. Th ese strong globalization forces were not suffi  ciently ad-
dressed and counterweighted. Despite regionalization development there was 
insuffi  cient coordination of supranational and global policies (Table 1.7). Table 
1.7 shows that there has been an asymmetry between the power of global mar-
ket forces and the feasible scope of competence at the national and supranational 
level. Th erefore, the European Union and its EMU could be seen from this per-
spective as a natural, preemptive reaction to the growing impact of the global en-
vironment on national economies (Table 1.7). It is well worth emphasizing that 
the construction of the EMU is as yet unfi nished. As Table 1.7 shows, the Euro-
pean System of Central Banks and single monetary policy were only supported 
by a fully unifi ed competition and trade policy. Th e inadequately rigorous Sta-
bility and Growth Pact is being supplemented by new measures designed and 
implemented in the reaction for the crisis. Th e scale of the crisis and its propaga-
tion led the EMU states to endorse better ex ante coordination of fi scal policies. 
Gradually, competitive pressure and globalization will make Member States in-
crease the scale of fi scal integration. In the long run, there will be conditions for 
further regional institutional and political integration.
Table 1.7.  National, regional and global framework for political and economic 
decisions
Major elements of institutional framework
Level
national EMU global
Political representation system and law enactment + (+) –
Regulatory authorities and law enforcement capability + (+) –
Central bank and the last resort lender + + (IMF)
Fiscal policy + (+) –
Trade policy + + WTO
Policy of competitiveness + + –
Social security and welfare system + – –
+ clearly visible attribute, (+) barely identifi able feature or one in the initial stage of development, – no 
attribute.
Growing complexity and interdependency in the global economy requires 
new widely accepted procedures and institutions of economic policy coordina-
tion. Th ere is also a need for more effi  cient regulatory authorities in the area of 
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the fl ow of goods, commodities, services and capital. It is well worth noticing 
that trade practices and the WTO institutional framework prevented protection-
ist measures from being taken up on a large scale basis. Th e IMF played a simi-
larly constructive role in relation to the fi nancial intermediation sector, as well 
as general fi nancial stability. Th is notwithstanding, existing solutions in the area 
of ex ante control and risk assessment, especially in capital fl ows, turned out to 
be insuffi  cient and thus require correction.
Conclusions
Th e period of economic stability of the 1990s induced excessive trust in self-reg-
ulatory capabilities of market forces. Th e gradual disequilibria accumulation in 
the fi nancial intermediation sector, both at the national and global level, had its 
antecedent roots in the structural changes in global supply, and consequently, 
in the global trade and fi nancial system. Th eir major symptoms were structural 
disequilibria in trade and capital relations between the USA and the rest of the 
world, including especially the PRCh.
Th e deregulation of national economies and the spread of liberal economic 
policy was both a necessity and a driving force of globalization. On the whole, 
despite the crisis of 2007–2009, globalization brought more benefi ts for its par-
ticipants than costs.
Financial and economic crisis experience showed that better coordination of 
economic policy is necessary both at the regional and global level. A more thor-
ough and eff ective coordination would require a stronger IMF role and probably 
creation of a new, supraregional regulatory authority and fi nancial control with 
a global reach. In this context an eff ective state is not an anti-thesis to the liberal 
economy. Under globalization the national state ought to coordinate and master 
its regulatory and control functions implemented both at the national and su-
pranational level.
Th e paradox of the modern state is based on the contradiction of its functions. 
On the hand it has to provide systemic conditions for creative destruction in or-
der to support the international competitiveness of its economy, on the other the 
state has to safeguard social coherence. Under contemporary social tensions ac-
companying swift  changes in technology and economy structure induced by glo-
balization, modern states need to design transitory compensatory mechanisms. 
Th is task, although necessary, is extremely diffi  cult. Its complexity stems from 
demographic challenges and high indebtedness of most developed countries call-
ing for indispensable actions to reduce public sector borrowing requirements.
2
ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE MODERN TIME
2.1. Economic trends after 1945
In the history of both North American and European developed economies 1945–
1971 was among the most prosperous periods1 (Table 2.1). It made history as the 
Golden Age of Capitalism [Marglin & Schor 1990]. Th e world economy of that 
time was strongly infl uenced by American global leadership, politics and inno-
vativeness. As a result of the then favorable objective conditions of supply and 
demand (post-war reconstruction, progress in organization and technology, high 
supply of qualifi ed labor force, etc.), and the stability of the Bretton Woods sys-
tem, the American and European economies were growing at a fast and relative-
ly stable rate (Table 2.1). Th e period was furthermore characterized by relatively 
low infl ation. Countries largely fi nanced private investments and public sector 
borrowing requirements from domestic savings; there were relatively minor in-
ternational capital fl ows.2 Th is era symbolically ended fi rst with the temporary 
suspension of the dollar’s peg to gold (August 1971) and then with the systemic 
departure of developed countries from the fi xed exchange rate system (March 
1973) [Eichengreen 2007, p. 30].
Th e seventies and early eighties of the twentieth century were characterized 
by supply shocks and demand disruptions which completely changed the mac-
ro- and microeconomic environment of designing and implementing economic 
policy. Th e growth rate signifi cantly decreased and its volatility increased (Ta-
ble 2.1). Also, the level and volatility of infl ation rose rapidly. High infl ation was 
followed by growing unemployment. Th is situation gave rise to reassessment in 
the theory of economic policy and changes in the area of systemic solutions, in-
cluding both qualitative policy and quantitative policy.3
 1 In this Chapter I draw on and develop my earlier work: [Kowalski 2001, 2009a, 2012].
 2 In this period most countries imposed constraints on capital fl ow.
 3 Quantitative economic policy involves introducing changes to numerical values of fi scal 
or monetary policy instruments in given institutional conditions. Qualitative economic policy 
denotes designing and implementing changes in institutional conditions, such as liberalisation 
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Th e 1980s were characterized by diversifi ed global economic conditions. In 
the case of the USA and Europe these included still low GDP growth rates but 
with a reduced infl ation rate (Table 2.1). Th e situation was particularly diffi  cult 
in Europe; the 1980s came to be called as the time of eurosclerosis [Olson 1996]. 
Since the 1970s Europe 15 continued to have a declining and lower than the US 
GDP growth rate. Moreover, except for the 2009–2011 sub-period, it used to have 
a higher or similar relative growth rate volatility as measured by its standard de-
viation (Table 2.1). During the last twenty years the European average infl ation 
rate (except for 1992–2000) was less volatile and lower (except for 2009–2011) 
than the US (Table 2.1).
Th e mid 1980s witnessed the beginning of a new turbulent stage of globaliza-
tion (see Chapter 1). It was also the time of a decrease in the potential and actual 
growth rates of Central and East European Countries. Apparently, they were un-
able, within their economic governance and limited international links, to cope 
with global economy challenges and, as well, unable to meet their consumers’ 
aspirations (see Chapter 4).
Th e 1960–1990s in the global economy was distinguished by the growing im-
portance of trade exposure (Figure 2.1). Aft er 1972, with minor breaks, the share 
of entry rules, or statutory decisions ensuring political and functional independence of central 
banks. Th e terms were introduced by J. Tinbergen [cf.: Tinbergen 1955]. See Section 2.2.2.
Table 2.1.  Rate of growth and infl ation in the USA and European Union countries 
in 1951–2011
GDP growth and 
infl ation
1951–
1960
1961–
1970
1971–
1980
1981–
1990
1992–
2000
2001–
2007
2001–
2010
2009–
2011
USA
Real GDP growth
Average growth rate 3.4 4.2 3.3 3.2 3.8 2.4 1.6 0.4
Standard deviation 2.9 2.0 2.5 2.2 0.7 0.8 2.0 2.8
Infl ation
Average rate 2.1 2.8 7.9 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.4 1.5
Standard deviation 2.3 1.7 3.1 0.5 0.5 0.6 1.1 1.4
European Union countries (EU 15)
Real GDP growth
Average growth rate 4.8 4.8 3.0 2.4 2.3 2.1 1.3 –0.3
Standard deviation 1.4 0.9 1.7 1.2 1.2 0.7 2.1 2.9
Infl ation
Average rate 3.6 3.9 10.8 6.7 2.4 2.1 2.1 1.9
Standard deviation 3.0 0.8 2.8 2.9 0.9 0.1 0.6 1.0
Source: [Eichengreen 2007, p. 30] and author’s calculations for 1992–2011.
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of exports of goods and services in the world Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
displayed an upward trend. Th is trend continued in the 2000s (Figure 2.1). It 
was however, halted by the global recession; in 2008 export exposure reached 
the highest point of 29.6% of global GDP and then fell by 4.0 percentage points 
in 2009 – the highest one-year drop in the post WWII era. In 2012 the share of 
goods and services exports in the global GDP recovered and reached a level of 
over 30%. Th e American economy was the fundamental source of global demand, 
but gradually the signifi cance of other countries and regions increased, including 
the European Community, particularly Germany, and further afi eld Japan in Asia.
Th e 1990s and the early 2000s were characterized, especially in the USA, by 
high and relatively stable growth rate.4 Th e fi rst decade of the 21st century featured 
the longest economic growth phase in history, lasting 120 months (Table 2.2). 
Positive economic trends, especially in fi ghting infl ation, occurred in Europe.5
 4 As shown in Table 2, in the post-war period in the USA, an average contraction phase 
lasted 10.8 months, and average expansion lasted over 60 months. It should be emphasised that 
the amplitude of fl uctuations of the post-war cycles was incomparably lower than before 1945.
 5 In the 1990s, aft er the phase of rapid growth in 1960–1980, Japan faced structural bar-
riers. In consequence, its economy fell into secular stagnation which lasted until the 2000s. 
Figure 2.1. Share of exports of goods and services in global GDP in 1960–2012 (in %)
Note: “Exports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services provi-
ded to the rest of the world. Th ey include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, 
royalties, license fees, and other services, such as communication, construction, fi nancial, information, 
business, personal, and government services. Th ey exclude compensation of employees and investment 
income (formerly called factor services) and transfer payments”; WDI Data Base. Th e 2012 trade expo-
sure is estimated.
Source: World Development Indicators Database
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Since the mid-1980s, the processes of economic globalization and region-
alization have picked up pace (see Chapter 1). Countries successively followed 
the liberal reforms introduced in the United Kingdom. An important role in 
promoting the liberal model of economic and systemic solutions was played by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) [Kowalik 2002, p. 276 et seq.; Findlay 
& O’Rourke 2007, p. 496 et seq.]. Th ese parallel trends led to the rise in the im-
portance of trade (Figure 2.1) and capital fl ows, and in the regional dimension – 
deepening of European integration and implementation of the decision to build 
a single European market [Hitiris 2003, pp. 63–83; Pelkmans 2006, pp. 79–99]. 
Th e direction and pace of European integration inspired and infl uenced the pro-
cesses of regionalization in other parts of the world [Frenkel 1998; Gilpin 2000, 
p. 193 et seq.; Geyer 2006].
Economic globalization accelerated even further aft er the end of the Cold War 
in 1989, taking over, with all economic, social, and political implications, the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Literature on the subject refers to this 
period as the Second Great Age of Capitalism [see Gilpin 2000, p. 15]. Th e peri-
od before mid-2007 was extremely advantageous for the global economy. World 
GDP in fact grew faster than the world’s population. One of the major structural 
features of the economy was the increase in capital fl ows and global trade, sig-
nifi cantly higher than output growth. Th e development of trade, both world-
Th e outbreak of the Asian crisis in 1997 was an important global event [cf.: Kowalski 1999; 
Eichengreen 2011]. See Chapter 1.
Table 2.2.  Business cycles and length of expansion and contraction phases 
(in months) in the USA aft er 1945
Business cycle turning points Length (in months)
peak bottom contraction phase expansion phase
1945 (February) 1945 (October) 8 80
1948 (November) 1949 (October) 11 37
1953 (July) 1954 (May) 10 45
1957 (August) 1958 (April) 8 39
1960 (April) 1961 (February) 10 24
1969 (December) 1970 (November) 11 106
1973 (November) 1975 (March) 16 36
1980 (January) 1980 (July) 6 58
1981 (July) 1982 (November) 16 12
1990 (July) 1991 (March) 8 92
2001 (March) 2001 (November) 8 120
2007 (December) 2009 (June) 18 73
Source: own compilation based on US business cycle expansions and contractions, NBER.
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wide and within regional integration groupings6, allowed for a better allocation 
of resources and an increase in production factors productivity. Th e expansion 
of trade relations was possible due to consecutive rounds of trade liberalization 
within the General Agreement on Tariff s and Trade (GATT), then the founda-
tion of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, and fi nally admission of 
the People’s Republic of China to this organization in 2001. China’s full-fl edged 
entrance to world trade has signifi cantly modifi ed ongoing macroeconomic pro-
cesses.7 Th is major structural shift  was accompanied by the diminishing capacity 
of democratic national states to effi  ciently infl uence the direction and course of 
autonomous market adjustments [Sweeney 2005; Castles 2007]. In fact, it forced 
governments to accept their reduced impact on the course of domestic econo-
mies and led to changes in practice of national economic policy making. At the 
mezzo and micro levels the liberalized context of capital fl ows and goods facili-
tated deepening of specialization and fast development of intra-industry trade. 
Technological development in IT contributed to reduction of the scope of non-
tradable goods and services and paved the way to further fragmentation of sup-
ply chains and thus to trade in tasks.
2.2. Theory and practice of economic policy
2.2.1. The general background
Th e post-war reconstruction of European economies and the growth of the Amer-
ican economy until the early 1970s (see Section 2.1), followed the then Keynes-
ian consensus.8 In the fi eld of positive economics, it was a period of undisputed 
domination of the adaptive expectations hypothesis [Kowalski 1998], and the de-
velopment of investment, consumption and economic growth theories.
Th e sphere of normative economics was also dominated by various streams of 
Keynesian economics, including welfare economics. Th ese streams of economic 
 6 Among the regional integration groupings, the emergence and development of the Eu-
ropean Union enjoyed the greatest success. Other major regional trade agreements of this type 
include NAFTA, MERCOSUR, and ASEAN.
 7 It is worth noting that the infl uence of excessive money supply in the period before the 
current phase of globalisation (characterised by the presence of China in the global circulation 
of goods and capital) would have resulted in economic overheating in the classical sense, and 
would manifest itself by an increase in prices (CPI and PPI). Such a scenario would have been 
an easy and typical task for central banks and fi scal authorities. As China and other quickly-
industrialising economies came into world play, their production capacity “smoothed and 
fl attened” the global supply curve signifi cantly modifying the supply and demand conditions 
throughout the entire world economy.
 8 Th is Section draws on and develops my publication: [Kowalski 2011a].
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ideas created foundations for recommendations regarding standard econom-
ic stabilization policy. Th eoretical foundations for quantitative and qualitative 
economic policy were developed by Jan Tinbergen [Tinbergen 1955, 1956]. His 
general systemic approach emphasizing the targets-instruments relations was 
subsequently extended both in terms of the econometric apparatus,9 as well as 
the context of the open economy.10
Under the prevailing consensus of that time, economic stabilization policy 
was based on active, discretional steps undertaken by governments (through fi s-
cal policy and direct control instruments), and by central banks (through mon-
etary and exchange rate policy instruments) in order to counteract or mitigate 
the fl uctuation of business activity. It was generally accepted that the task of such 
policy was to maintain the economy as close as possible to the state of “full em-
ployment” with a low or zero infl ation rate, and without deteriorating the balance 
of payments [Kowalski 2001, p. 8]. Th e task of designing and implementing such 
a stabilization policy, despite its complexity, due to the multiplicity of potential 
targets of economic policy and time lags, was successfully implemented in the 
economic conditions of the 1950s and 1960s (see Table 2.1 and 2.2).
In view of relatively minor international capital fl ows and the fi xed exchange 
rates system (see Section 2.1), the instruments of fi scal policy played a leading 
role in active and discretional stabilization policies. In this period, virtually only 
the Federal Reserve (Fed) and the central bank of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many enjoyed formal and actual political independence, but due to the fi xed 
exchange rate system, their functional independence was in fact limited. An im-
portant addition to the quantitative policy of governments and central banks of 
the time was the wide use of the instruments of direct control, of an administra-
tive and regulatory nature.
Th e other distinct period, aft er the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, 
and the US 16-month recession of 1973–1975 (see Table 2.2), was characterized, 
until the fi rst half of the 1980s, by the polarization of positions within both posi-
tive and normative economics.11 Since the mid 1970s, following the reduced effi  -
ciency of economic policy based on Keynesian recommendations, the theory of 
macroeconomics clearly turned back to classical economics. Positive and norma-
tive macroeconomics began to adopt the rational expectations hypothesis (REH) 
as defi ned by John Muth [Muth 1961; Kowalski 1987]. Th e gradually emerging 
new consensus was thus revolving around the concept of rational expectations and 
an assumption about the ability of an economic system to return autonomously 
 9 For example the works of W. Brainard, S. Turnovski, R. Th eil, and R. Pindyck.
 10 Compare T. Swan, R. Mundell.
 11 In the fi rst dimension it concerned the diagnosis and cause-eff ect mechanism of the re-
cession and stagfl ation of that time, in the second it concerned the scale and scope of the au-
tonomous capacity of the market economy to return to balance.
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to its equilibrium in response to supply and demand shocks. Consequently, the 
previous active role of the state in the economy, as well as its institutional founda-
tions, were reinterpreted. Th e new vision of the functioning of economy and the 
reduced role of economic policy that followed was based on the presupposition 
of the autonomous, self-regulatory capacity of the market system.
Th e rational expectations hypothesis12 and the equilibrium paradigm consti-
tuted a starting point for a new description of the operation of fi nancial, mon-
etary, commodity, and labor markets, as well as the economy as a whole [Lucas 
1973].13 Th e issue of the systemic role of expectation formation mechanisms 
became the focus of attention of the theory and practice of economic policy. It 
was argued that under rational expectations the optimal discretional economic 
policy is time inconsistent and thus should be replaced by an announced apri-
ori rule [Kydland & Prescott 1997]. Th is approach was further strengthened by 
the globalization of economic processes, new information technologies, as well 
as mutually-related eff ects of information supply growth. Such combination of 
factors enhanced the role of expectations. Th is was refl ected in the increasing 
signifi cance of transparency of the processes of design and implementation of 
macroeconomic policy and also in economy deregulation. Th e tendency for de-
regulation stemmed from the already emphasized belief in the power of autono-
mous market adjustments.
Th e dominance of the REH and, what followed, the key signifi cance of expec-
tations to designing and implementing of monetary policy, have also led to deep 
reassessement in this fi eld. It formed an important foundation for institutional 
enhancement of the independent position of central banks, extension of the ho-
rizon of monetary policy, and fi nally popularity of direct infl ation targeting. Th e 
undisputed success of central banks in fi ghting infl ation (at least according to its 
classical defi nition) allowed governments to reduce a wide band of economic pol-
icy goals to a total measure of stability and growth – the output gap. As globali-
zation and regionalization progressed, the predominance of the liberal stream of 
normative economics has gradually led to abandonment of active national sectoral 
policies. Th ese trends have also expressed themselves in European integration.14
 12 In parallel to REH, studies were conducted over the behaviour of business agents, as-
suming their bounded rationality (as defi ned by A. Simon) [cf. Kowalski 2002]. It implies that 
the process of expectation formation is slower than the REH assumes, and that it may be bur-
dened with errors. Th is direction of studies remained outside mainstream macroeconomics, 
but fi nally it was used and developed within fi nance and in behavioural economics.
 13 A breakthrough in the philosophy of modelling changes of economic policy was the 
publication by R. Lucas [1973]. Gradually, under the infl uence of Lucas’s arguments and pro-
gress in econometric modelling of macroeconomic processes based on microeconomic foun-
dations, DSGE models began to prevail.
 14 See for example, EU Competition policy, implementation of the Single European Act, 
and fi nally the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). See: [Sweeney 2005].
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One of the important features of contemporary economy is the dominance of 
the fl exible exchange rate system. Flexible exchange rates, the aforementioned role 
of monetary policy, and the prominent position of central banks which gained po-
litical and functional autonomy and thus became independent entities with clearly 
defi ned fi nal goals, created a new environment for economic policy. Launching 
these processes and deepening of economic integration15 gradually reduced the 
scope of national discretional economic policy and increased the signifi cance of 
autonomous market adjustments.
2.2.2. Approaches to economic policy design
2.2.2.1. General model of economic policy making
Th e basic implications and institutional context of formulating economic policy 
are given in Figure 2.2 [comp.: Kowalski 2001; Frey & Steiner 2012] . Th e model 
shows the key areas of the general economic policymaking framework, which to-
wards the end of the twentieth century underwent a process of deep transforma-
tion, triggered by a signifi cant reassessment in normative economics (see Chapters 
1 and 4). Th is period was diffi  cult for advanced market economies as they had 
to adjust their policymaking and functioning to globalization and the prevailing 
new liberal economic policy. At the same time developed economies, in particu-
lar those of the then European Economic Community, became a reference point 
for the Central European transition countries. Th e civilization gap between these 
countries and developed Europe, together with the necessary transformation of 
all economic areas and policymaking, show the scale of challenges lying ahead 
of the Central European countries.
Th e model (Figure 2.2) shows interconnections between major institutions of 
a modern state involved in the process of defi ning targets and economic policy 
tools. Figure 2.2 further comprises the major entities jointly shaping the setting 
of economic policy. Government is the major decision-maker. In modern institu-
tional conditions, a central bank became a very signifi cant entity. Th e institutional 
framework (Figure 2.2) is complemented by parliament, civil service (bureau-
cracy), as well as lobbyists and advisors.16 Th e effi  ciency and consistency of cur-
rent policymaking, as well as the more complex process of deep reforms, depend 
on the relations linking the particular government with state bureaucracy (civil 
service) and parliament. Th e more complex coalition structure the government 
constitutes, the less probable is its coherent stabilization policy. Th e same con-
cerns such a weak government’s ability to design and implement a fundamental 
institutional reform (see Chapters 3–4).
 15 Th at is, the establishing of the EMU in 1999.
 16 Th e signifi cance of advisors in the process of stipulating and implementing a pro-elec-
tion type of economic policy is emphasized by Weatherford [1987].
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An important element of the model presented in Figure 2.2 is the voters; their 
attitudes and expectations, especially in view of deep reforms of state and econo-
my. Voters may be the driving force of changes (as was the case with the Solidar-
ity period in 1980–1981), or a reform support power (in 1988–1990 at the time 
of the second Solidarity) (see Chapter 4). However, voters and the general public 
quite oft en reduce the room for manoevre both in current and long-range eco-
nomic policymaking. Figure 2.2 also indicates the possibility of the direct im-
pact of economic policy instruments on voters. Such a possibility stems from the 
mechanism of expectations formation and the fact that some fi scal instruments 
(eg. transfers) might be an integral part of the voters’ utility function. Worth em-
phasizing, however, is the infl uence of opinion-making sources and mass media 
on voting choices. In this respect accumulated public experience also plays an 
important role.
In the political-economic model (Figure 2.2), it might be assumed that voters’ 
assessment of government’s current achievements and long-term economic re-
forms, and consequently, the government’s re-election prospects, depend on the 
economic situation of the country at election time. Such a logic of the democratic 
process determines the area of feasible economic policy solutions. Consequently, 
the government (and precisely speaking, the ruling party or the ruling coalition), 
pursuing to extract maximum benefi ts from being in power, may manipulate the 
economy by using economic policy instruments in order to retain power. It might 
Figure 2.2.  General politico-economic model of economic policy design 
and implementation
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also postpone or alleviate the necessary institutional and structural reforms in 
fear of a negative general public and electorate reaction. It is well worth notic-
ing that adopting such a rationale behind government actions means a departure 
from the classical general economic policy model formulated by T. Tinbergen, 
discussed in Section 2.2.2.2. Th e benefi ts of being in power might be twofold; 
one is the possibility of implementing ideological goals by the ruling coalition, 
another is the possibility of pursuing the interests of bureaucracy and the civil 
service17. Generally, the model presented in Figure 2.2 might be reduced to two 
major parts, namely the popularity function (Section 2.2.2.1.1) and the reaction 
function (see Section 2.2.2.1.2).
2.2.2.1.1. Popularity function
Th e popularity function describes the scope of endorsement of government by 
the electorate. Th e theoretical basis of this function’s specifi cation is founded on 
the economic theory of voting. It is assumed that the result of parliamentary or 
presidential election expresses the preference and decision of voters on the basis 
of their expected utility criterion, i.e. what voters expect to gain under the chosen 
party’s rule (or a coalition’s rule).18 An important trait of election decisions is their 
low frequency and the fact that a possible lack of solid preparation before making 
a voting decision does not lead to their immediate negative impact on the fate of 
active voters. Following Simon [1985], the analyses of the infl uence of econom-
ic events on election decisions is typically based on the following assumptions:
 – the voter is driven by a system of preferences that ranks candidates/parties,
 – the voter wants to vote in order to contribute to the selection of its candidate,
 – the voter believes that their vote might be decisive,
 – the voter trusts in its own perception of the past and current experience,
 – both past and accumulated experience play a major role in voting.
In compliance with the economic theory of voting, the scope of electoral 
endorsement, expressed by the government popularity index (conducted and 
regularly published by polling institutes) in the period between elections, or al-
ternatively the sole result of the election, refl ects voter assessment concerning 
the economic policy competence of the government. Th us, it is assumed that the 
voters primarily assess the economic results to date, and on this basis vote for the 
party which promises the highest expected future voters’ utility. With such logic, 
the primary concern is to determine the extent to which the past has an impact on 
current voting decisions, as well as to fi nd which economic variables best refl ect 
future utility. Typically the following variables are used in popularity functions: 
unemployment and infl ation rates (misery index, see Chapter 4), disposable in-
 17 Th e last dimension is accentuated by public choice theory. See e.g.: [Mueller 1990, 2012; 
Acocella 2000].
 18 A thorough review of literature on the theory is found in: [Alt & Chrystal 1983; Drazen 
2000, 2001; Brender & Drazen 2008].
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come growth rate and also the value of transfers for households. Th e popularity 
function in its general form may be formulated as in (2.1).
 POPt = POPt–1 + α(POPt* – POPt–1), (2.1)
where: 
 POPt* – long-term popularity level,
 POPt – current popularity level based on public opinion research,
 α – function parameter.
POP* may also be interpreted as the lagged reaction of the electorate to the 
changing economic situation expressed by the example variables. In its simplest 
form, assuming only two arguments of the function (i.e. the aforementioned 
unemployment and infl ation rates), POP* might alternatively be presented as in 
formula (2.2):
 2 20 1 2( ) ( )t t tPOP*
? ?
? ? ? ? ?α α UR UR α INF INF , (2.2)
where:
 UR
?
 and INF
?
 – the desired unemployment and infl ation rate levels,
 α0, α1, α2 – parameters.
Th e new Central European market economies still diff er from the well-estab-
lished European democracies (Table 2.3). As Table 2.3 shows, transformation in 
this area is far from over. It concerns not only such issues as a well-defi ned politi-
Table 2.3.  Stylized features of the political system and representation in developed 
and new market European economies
Features of the political system Developed economies
New market 
economies
Well defi ned political spectrum + –
Predictability of government and program coalitions + –
Parties with long experience in running the state’s aff airs + –
Robust local government base + –
Parties with stable and consistent ideologies + –
Parties having sizable membership and thus stable resources + –
High and predictable turnout (+) –
Stability of electorate preferences (+) –
Economic policy competence of electorate (+) –
Historical consideration (+) +
Emotions and symbols (+) +
Personal animosities (+) +
+ dominant feature; (+) feature not fully developed; – still weak or not existing.
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cal spectrum or the lack of stable and consistent ideologies, but also the instabil-
ity of electorate preferences (Table 2.3). In new market economies, an important 
role is still played by historical considerations and personal animosities. In such 
conditions, a pragmatic approach along with compromise is much more sought-
aft er and diffi  cult to attain. It is thus diffi  cult to defi ne and implement stabiliza-
tion policy and complex reforms.
2.2.2.1.2. Reaction function
Th e upper loop of the feedback presented in Figure 2.2 is called the reaction 
function.19 Formally, a reaction function is usually a linear model, in which an 
instrument of economic policy is a function of a time-lagged instrument and 
some other variables. Th us, such a reaction function describes possible actions of 
a central bank20 or government. Th e government reaction function describes the 
mechanism of government response to the changing economic situation, and the 
level of general public endorsement for government actions. It is assumed that in 
its economic policy the government is driven by a time horizon, the main focus 
of which is the election year. In such an approach, stabilization policy targets and 
instruments are subject to the government utility function; i.e. creating opportu-
nities for pursuing ideological programs, including long-term economic goals.
Th e reaction function refers to a specifi c instrument. In the case of stabiliza-
tion policy we talk about a set of reaction functions, as it is the rule that a given 
policy consists of more or less synchronized actions comprising a set of fi scal, 
monetary and direct control instruments. Th e reaction functions in the model 
presented in Figure 2.2 in fact describe the mechanism of designing and imple-
menting stabilization policy in which it is implied, for simplicity, that the main 
motive of such actions is reelection.21 From the model standpoint, it means that 
current economic policy is subordinated to changes in government popularity, 
and more specifi cally, it undergoes the process of adjustment each time govern-
ment popularity in the period preceding the election does not guarantee its re-
election. Within the opportunistic model it is thus assumed that government 
attempts to increase its popularity will be greater as the election date approaches 
and electorate endorsement declines.
Th e philosophy of the reaction function allows for two diff erent situations: in 
the case of a popularity surplus, government implements its (ideology-related) 
policy goals, and in the case of a popularity defi cit and risk of an election failure, 
government undertakes any active stabilization policy aimed at the improvement 
of voters’ esteem. In general, the government reaction function might be formu-
lated as follows equation (2.3).
 19 Th e notion was fi rst introduced by Reuber [1964]. See also: [Alt & Wooley 1982].
 20 See Section 2.3 of this Chapter.
 21 Such logic is an oversimplifi cation. Political aims of government might be far more com-
plex.
 2.2. Th eory and practice of economic policy  45
 INSTRit = f (INSTRit–1, BDt–1, POPt–1, ID), (2.3)
where:
 INSTRi – i-instrument of economic policy,
 BD – budgetary constraint,
 POP – index of government popularity,
 ID –  ideology (program implemented when a cabinet enjoys popularity 
/ approval surplus).
Taking into account the lagged variable representing the economic policy 
instrument, and a variable referred to as the budget defi cit formula (2.3), may 
express the economic and institutional constraints a government faces when de-
fi ning and implementing its endogenous economic policy. POP and ID variables 
express economic conditions, which play major roles in such a decision-mak-
ing mechanism. Th e development of the generally defi ned reaction function in 
each case has to refl ect the institutions and conditions typical of each country. In 
subsequent Sections (2.2.2.2–2.2.2.4), more specifi c models of economic policy 
choices are discussed.
2.2.2.2.  Fixed target approach – a normative model of 
economic policy
J. Tinbergen was a precursor of normative quantitative economic policy theory. 
He distinguished two kinds of economic policy: quantitative and qualitative. By 
quantitative economic policy Tinbergen meant changes in numerical economic 
policy instruments, within a given institutional and legal framework. Qualitative 
policy meant changing certain aspects of the institutional and legal framework 
[Tinbergen 1956, p. 7]. Th e process of designing economic policy is of a sequen-
tial character and is composed of the following stages [Tinbergen 1955, pp. 2–4]:
 – determining a collective, general preference function of society,
 – deduction, from the preference function, of the targets of economic policy,
 – selecting adequate qualitative and quantitative economic policy instruments,
 – determining the values of the chosen economic policy instruments,
 – formulating and analyzing interrelations between the targets, instruments of 
economic policy expressed in numbers, and the structure of the economy in 
question.
Th e operational character of Tinbergen’s problem of economic policy is such 
that it might be used to study the eff ects of diff erent variants of fi xed target vari-
ables expressed in numbers derived from the general preference function.22 Th e 
original fi xed target approach model consists of four types of variables:
 – target variables, yk ,
 22 In the literature, Tinbergen’s approach is also called the ‘fi xed target approach’, whereby 
also the ‘fl exible target approach’ and the ‘simulation approach’ are distinguished. Th e founders 
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 – economic policy instruments, zj ,
 – exogenous variables (data in Tinbergen’s original nomenclature), ui ,
 – other variables (irrelevant variables in Tinbergen’s original nomenclature), xs.
Th e last group of variables singled out by Tinbergen comprises all the eco-
nomic variables not included in the targets, though being “indispensable in a true 
picture of the economy considered”, but “not interesting for the economic policy 
studied” [Tinbergen 1956, pp. 7–8]. In Tinbergen’s approach, unknown quanti-
ties are variables representing economic policy instruments. Th e model includes 
boundary conditions complementing structural relations. Th ey express techni-
cal, institutional and legal constraints, concerning both the target variables and, 
above all, the instruments. Boundary conditions play a major role in the logical 
structure of the model.
Th e standard set of economic policy targets (according to the time criterion) 
may be divided into the short-term and long-term.23 Th e short-term policy tar-
gets (stabilization policy) comprise:
 – ‘full’ employment,
 – price stability,
 – improving the balance of payments.
Th e set of long-term targets usually comprises:
 – economic growth,
 – improving factors of production allocation,
 – satisfying social needs,
 – improving the effi  ciency of income and wealth distribution,
 – protection and priorities for particular regions and sectors,
 – environmental protection.
Apart from above long-term targets, less signifi cant objectives oft en are also 
indicated: consumption model improvement, security of supply, population struc-
ture improvement, decrease in working hours.
Th e economic policy instrument set is composed of fi scal and monetary pol-
icy instruments, the exchange rate, as well as direct control instruments. Th e fi s-
cal policy instrument set (both at central and local government levels) includes 
instruments of budget revenue and expenditure instruments (see Section 2.3.1).
Fiscal policy instruments together with instruments of direct control are highly 
politicized; their actual selection is always the outcome of political bargaining be-
tween government and its political backing in the party ranks and the parliamen-
of the fl exible target approach are C.C. Holt and H. Th eil. See: [Holt 1962; Th eil 1964; Aco-
cella 2000].
 23 Th ere are various non-contradictory, target classifi cations, as well as economic policy 
instruments. See for example Horodecka [2011]. For the purpose of this Chapter, I follow the 
standard Tinbergen classifi cation. Th e list of targets, as well as the instruments to be used in 
each case depend on, among others, the historical, institutional and legal context of a particu-
lar country.
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tary majority. Th e framework for such political control, as well as the possibility 
and scope of fi scal policy changes, is in each case regulated by the Constitution, 
specifi c provisions, as well as the practice of each country (see Section 2.2.1).
An important and already emphasized feature of fi scal policy is the existence 
of many decision-making entities and the multi-dimensionality of its targets. 
Fiscal policy, because of its parliamentary control, represents the main way of 
expressing political preferences of the electorate. However, it has to be stressed 
that the contemporary scope of discretionary control over economic policy, in-
cluding also fi scal policy, has undergone a process of signifi cant reduction (see 
Chapter 1).
Th e main instruments of contemporary monetary policies are open market 
operations (including swaps), standing facilities and obligatory reserves (also 
called minimum reserve requirements for credit institutions). Specifi cally cen-
tral banks set policy rates (reference, lombard, deposit and rediscount rates) 
in order to achieve their short-term aims and statutory target – price stability 
[comp.: Blinder 1998, 2010; Sławiński 2011; see also Balling & Llewellyn 2012]. 
An important instrument of impacting credit creation by a central bank, and 
above all, the running of the fi nancial intermediation sector, is also moral sua-
sion signaling the aims and intentions, not only through the direction and in-
tensity of open market operations, but also through statements and declarations 
made by central bank representatives. A signifi cant feature of monetary policy 
is its institutional consistency, manifesting itself in the existence of a single, in-
dependent decision-making center on the one hand, and a simple set of central 
bank goals expressed as countering infl ation and a conditional support of gov-
ernment economic policy on the other, as long as it does not disrupt the main 
objective of the central bank.24
Th us economic policy instruments and targets, together with the institutional 
context, are the main building blocks of Tinbergen’s model of quantitative eco-
nomic policy. Th e model is based on the following assumptions [Tinbergen 1955]:
 – economic structure of an economy is a given,
 – target variables values are fi xed,
 – a set of instruments at the politician’s disposal is given,
 – randomness is omitted.
In such an approach, the economic policy problem amounts to specifying the 
instrument values as a function of the fi xed target variables, linear structural in-
terrelations, as well as indicating and analyzing the connections between these 
interrelations and economic structure. In fact, such interrelations also fall under 
a political-economic model, but the main diff erence is such that in the politico-
economic model discussed in Section 2.2.2.1, the mechanism of the economic 
policy setting is endogenous.
 24 To be further discussed in Section 2.3 of the Chapter.
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2.2.2.2.1.  Tinbergen general model of economic policy. The certainty 
condition
Formally, Tinbergen’s approach might be presented as follows:
 is s ik k ij j i
s k j
γ x α y c z u? ? ?? ? ?  , (2.4)
where:
 yk  – target variables; k = 1, …, n,
 zj  – variables representing economic policy instruments; j = 1, …, n',
 xs  – irrelevant variables; s = 1, …, N,
 ui  – data, variables not under the control of the decision-maker; i = 1, …, N',
 γ, α, c  – structural parameters of the model
 
min max
min max
k k k
j j j
y y y
z z z
? ?
? ?   boundary conditions.  (2.5)
Model (2.4)–(2.5) is complete (identifi ed), if the number of endogenous vari-
ables (target variables and irrelevant variables) is equal to the total number of 
independent model equations, i.e. N' = N + n. From the point of view of the eco-
nomic policy target, the above set (with fi xed values of target variables) is a com-
plete (identifi ed) model if the number of economic policy instruments is equal 
to the number of target variables, i.e. n' = n. In the static version of Tinbergen’s 
model under certainty and omitting the costs connected with the application of 
instruments, a decision maker might only use as many instruments as they have 
target variables.
2.2.2.2.2. Analysis in conditions of uncertainty
Th e assumption of certainty (see Section 2.2.2.2.1) does not refl ect real conditions 
and thus reduces the model’s usefulness for empirical and theoretical analyses. 
W. Brainard proposed the generalization of Tinbergen model’s in conditions of 
uncertainty [Brainard 1967]25. Th e inclusion of multiplicative stochastic distur-
bances in the model changes its original conclusions. Tinbergen’s proposition of 
full controllability of the system (the number of instruments equals the number 
of targets) need to be revised. In order to show the diff erences between the deter-
ministic approach and the approach under uncertainty, we may consider a case 
where a decision maker has one instrument at her/his disposal in order to achieve 
one fi xed target [Turnovsky 1977; see also Turnovsky 2000]. Th e functional rela-
tion between the target variable, y, and the variable representing economic policy 
instrument, z, is stochastic and linear (2.6).
 25 Brainard’s pioneer work was further developed by Okun [1972], Johansen [1973] and 
Turnovsky [1977].
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 y = gz + u , (2.6)
where:
 y, z – scalar variables,
 u – random variable,
( ) , ( ) (.)E u u E g g E? ?  – the expected value,
2 2Var( ) , Var( ) , Var(.)u gu δ g δ? ?  – variance.
Equation (2.6) takes account of both the additive random disturbances, which 
are independent of the policy instrument value, and multiplicative disturbances, 
proportionate to the value of the variable. Th e last kind of disturbances infl u-
ences the system through random disruptions of the model parameters. In con-
sequence, under uncertainty, the impact of instruments on the target variable 
becomes random.
Assuming that y*  is the value of a target variable determined by the politi-
cian, the task of economic policy under uncertainty is to fi nd such a z so as to 
approximate the actual target variable value on average as close as possible to the 
fi xed value of variable y*.
Th e task might be presented as follows [Turnovsky 1977, pp. 113–119]:
 min E(U) = E [(y – y*)2]  (2.7)
with boundary conditions (2.8):
 y = gz + u .  (2.8)
Substituting equation (2.6) for function (2.7), we obtain:
 E[(gz + u – y*)2] .  (2.9)
Calculating the expected value of expression (2.9), we have:
 2 2 2 2[ ] 2 ( *)g u g uE U δ z δ ρδ δ z gz u y? ? ? ? ? ? ,  (2.10)
where:
ρ stands for the correlation ratio between g and u.
Minimizing (2.10) in terms of z, we obtain:
 2 2
( * ) g u
u
g
g y u ρδ δ
z
g δ
? ?
?
?
. (2.11)
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Th e formula (2.11) indicates the optimal value of zu under uncertainty, stem-
ming from the fi xed value of the target y*. Th e value of zu is a function of the pa-
rameters of probability distribution of u and g. Comparing the solution to model 7 
under certainty (2.12), i.e.:
 ( * )c
y uz
a
??  δg = 0, δg = 0,  (2.12)
with the solution under uncertainty (2.11), we may distinguish two cases stem-
ming from multiplicative disturbances:
1. If δg = 0, δu ≠ 0, thus if disturbances are additive, the instrument value calcu-
lated in terms of a specifi ed level of the target variable does not diff er from the 
deterministic model solution. In the literature this is called a certainty equiva-
lent [Th eil 1964, pp. 54–59; Turnovsky 1977, p. 311].
2. If δg ≠ 0, and for the purpose of simplicity δu = 0, then the instrument in con-
ditions of multiplicative disturbances might be specifi ed as follows:
 
2
2 2 2
( * )
u c
g g
g y u gz z
g
?? ?
? ?δ g δ
. (2.13)
From formulas (2.12) and (2.13) follow that |zu| < |zc|; in conditions of multi-
plicative disturbances, the decision-maker should use the economic policy instru-
ment with care and moderation. Substituting the optimal value of zu – equation 
(2.13) – into equation (2.6) and maintaining u = 
_
u (since δu= 0), it is possible to 
determine the target variable value y:
 2 2
( * )
g
g y uy a u
g δ
?? ?
?
. (2.14)
It follows from Brainard’s generalization that taking into account multiplica-
tive random disturbances in Tinbergen’s static model of economic policy substan-
tially modifi es the original solution. Considering these disturbances, in order to 
reduce the risk of failure, the decision-maker should implement all available in-
struments, even if the number of instruments is higher than the number of fi xed 
targets (n' > n) [Brainard 1967, pp. 418–421].
2.2.2.3. Swan-Salter model
Following conclusions drawn on the basis of the general economic policy model 
of Tinbergen, we discuss its two specifi c extensions. Th e fi rst analyzed here was 
developed independently by T. Swan [1955] and W.E.G. Salter [1959]. Combin-
ing these two approaches, the Swan-Salter model may be graphically presented in 
Figure 2.3. It refl ects well the economic policy options and framework prevailing 
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under the Bretton Woods system (see Section 2.1) of fi xed exchange rates pegged 
to the US dollar. Under this system, governments had to maintain a feasible bal-
ance of payments (BOP) and, at the same time, for obvious reasons (see Section 
2.2.2.1) had to strive for an internal balance defi ned in terms of full employment 
with price stability. Following the original assumptions of the general equilib-
rium context, no capital fl ows and the Marshall-Lerner condition, the two eco-
nomic policy targets have to be matched by two independent and domestically 
controlled instruments. In the model, these are fi scal policy actions focused on 
the control of domestic absorption (Section 2.2.2.3.1) and exchange rate adjust-
ments (Section 2.2.2.2.2).
2.2.2.3.1. Real domestic absorption
Real domestic absorption (shown on the horizontal axis of Figure 2.3) basically 
consists of private sector consumption and investment, as well as current govern-
ment expenditure on goods and services, transfers and government investments. 
Consumption and private investment might be indirectly infl uenced by govern-
ment taxation and transfers. Th e other three elements of domestic absorption, 
namely transfers, current government expenditure on goods and services and 
government investments are in fact instruments of fi scal policy (see Section on 
Figure 2.3. Th e Swan-Salter model
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Tinbergen’s model). Th e more expansionary fi scal policy, the further it is from 
the origin of the axis (Figure 2.3).
2.2.2.3.2. Real exchange rate
Th ere are two ways of defi ning real exchange rate [Egert 2004, pp. 38–39]. Th e 
internal real exchange rate (IRER) is a ratio of the nontradables price level PNT 
to the tradables price level PT. In the model, we use the macroeconomic defi ni-
tion of the real exchange rate (RER). It is a ratio of the nominal exchange rate 
(E) (expressed as the number of domestic currency units per one unit of foreign 
currency) multiplied by the foreign level of prices (P*) and divided by the do-
mestic price level (P) (2.15):
 *E PRER
P
?? . (2.15)
Defi nition (2.15) relates to the foreign level of prices (numerator) and the do-
mestic level (denominator) expressed by the same unit of measure – the domes-
tic currency. Th e RER is shown on the vertical axis: either the devaluation of the 
E (with P* = P = 1) or RER depreciation with P growing faster than P* mean an 
upward movement on the vertical axis (Figure 2.3).
2.2.2.3.3. Equilibrium schedules
Following the assumed equilibrium framework, the internal balance (IB) and 
external balance (EB) conditions are expressed in terms of two domestic, inde-
pendent instruments available in the model (Figure 2.3). Th e IB schedule shows 
various combinations of the RER and the domestic absorption that result in the 
IB. Th e IB line has a negative slope. It refl ects the following causation scheme: 
lower RER (either thanks to revaluation or appreciation due to relative price 
movements) worsens the balance of payments (trade balance). In order to main-
tain domestic equilibrium, this development must be accompanied by a larger 
domestic absorption (Figure 2.3). And consequently, a devaluation (depreciation 
of RER) would lead to the BOP surplus accompanied by infl ationary pressure. 
Th is outcome would require a contractionary action on the side of fi scal policy 
(reduction in absorption). Having combined both scenarios, we have it that all 
the points above (to the right of) the IB line indicates demand-pull infl ationary 
pressure, while the point below (to the left  of) the IB line shows an excessive un-
employment area (Figure 2.3).
Th e EB schedule refers to the external balance conditions and shows various 
combinations of exchange rate policies and domestic absorption that result in BOP 
equilibrium. Th e EB must be positively sloped because depreciation of RER leads 
to the improvement of BOP (see the assumption of the Marshall-Lerner condi-
tion). If this happens, it must be accompanied by an increase in real domestic ab-
sorption (Figure 2.3). In the Swan-Salter model, higher real absorption is needed 
to counteract the eff ect of depreciation – to maintain the BOP balance, it requires 
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higher domestic absorption. We may note that outside the EB schedule there are 
two areas of disequilibrium: below (to the right of) the EB, there is an area of 
BOP defi cit. And above (to the left  of) the EB, there is an area of BOP surplus.
2.2.2.3.4. Model discussion
Th e intersection of the IB and EB schedules shows, in terms of the model, the 
unique combination of the RER and real absorption when there is simultaneous 
internal and external equilibrium. Any departure, except from a special case when 
an economy fi nds itself either on EF or AF, calls for a coordination of exchange 
rate policy and fi scal policy focused on domestic absorption adjustment. In the 
model, we can distinguish four disequilibrium zones (Figure 2.3):
 I. BOP surplus and excess infl ation,
 II. BOP defi cit and excess infl ation,
 III. BOP defi cit and excess unemployment,
 IV. BOP surplus and excess unemployment.
Th e Swan-Salter model may be used as a tool to study feasible political op-
tions or to analyze autonomous adjustment needed if we assume the economy 
is able to return to equilibrium on its own. Th e use of RER instead of the nomi-
nal exchange rate paves the way for interesting analytical extensions. Assuming 
P* = P = 1, the model might serve as a tool of economic policy analysis under 
a pegged exchange system. Dropping the assumption of fi xed P*/P relation and 
assuming irrevocable nominal exchange rate E, the Swan-Salter model may be 
used to study options open for those EMU countries facing external and domestic 
imbalances. Th is includes internal devaluations available for EMU countries un-
der the current economic and fi nancial crisis (see Chapter 1 and [Alesina & Ar-
dagna 1998; Mooij & Keen 2012]).
2.2.2.4. Eff ective market classifi cation
Th e Mundell eff ective market classifi cation concept (Figure 2.4), as with the Swan-
Salter model, directly invokes Tinbergen’s principle presented in Section 2.2.2.2 
Th e following major assumptions set the eff ective market classifi cation frame-
work [Mundell 1962, pp. 70–71]:
 – internal balance requires that aggregate demand for domestic output matches 
domestic aggregate supply at full employment,
 – external balance implies that the trade balance equals the net of capital ex-
ports at fi xed exchange rate parity; any external imbalance leading to exchange 
rate pressure that is prevented by appropriate counteractions of central bank 
(accumulation of or dispensing with stocks of foreign currency in order to 
maintain the parity),
 – balance of trade is a function of the level of domestic expenditure (all foreign 
policies and exports demand are given),
 – capital fl ows are responsive to interest diff erentials,
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 – domestic expenditure depends only on fi scal policy (budget surplus) and mon-
etary policy (interest rate).
Table 2.4 compares the major assumptions of the Swan-Salter and Mundell 
models. Th ere are two main diff erences between these models. Th e fi rst concerns 
the capital fl ows assumption (Table 2.4). Th e other is the monetary policy instru-
ment (interest rate).
Table 2.4.  Synopsis of major assumptions and features of the Swan-Salter and 
Mundell model
Model Internal balance
External 
balance Capital fl ows Economic policy instruments
Swan-Salter UR/infl ation BOP = trade 
balance
no fi scal policy/
expenditure
exchange rate
Mundell UR/infl ation BOP yes fi scal policy/
expenditure
monetary poli-
cy/interest rate
UR – unemployment rate; BOP – balance of payments.
Two economic policy targets, namely an internal equilibrium understood as 
full employment and price stability and an external equilibrium expressed as the 
balance of payment, are to be achieved with the use of two independent, domes-
tically controlled instruments (see Section 2.2.2.1).
Figure 2.4. Th e Mundell eff ective market classifi cation model
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2.2.2.4.1. Fiscal and monetary policies’ representation
Fiscal policy actions are shown on the horizontal axis. Th e movement away from 
the origin of the axis represents an expansionary fi scal policy. Th is might be done 
either through an increase in budget defi cit or a reduction in its surplus, depend-
ing on the initial fi scal policy stance.
Th e actions of a monetary policy are expressed on the vertical axis. Th e up-
ward movement along the vertical axis represents higher interest rates or, in 
other words, a tighter monetary policy. Technically, it does not matter whether 
a higher interest rate is achieved by the central bank directly setting its policy 
rate or whether it is done through open market operations. One has to note that 
in the original version, R. Mundell emphasized that central bank actions regard-
ing monetary policy stance are triggered by two considerations, namely external 
balance and the exchange rate parity (see the above list of general assumptions 
of the eff ective market classifi cation scheme).
2.2.2.4.2. Eff ective market classifi cation equilibrium schedules
As in the Swan-Salter approach, the model is built around the core assumption 
of a general equilibrium framework. It is enhanced by the specifi c assumptions 
listed above. Th e internal balance (IB) line is the locus of such combinations of 
interest rates (a monetary policy instrument) and net government expenditure 
(a fi scal policy instrument) that are consistent with simultaneous full employ-
ment and price stability. Due to the new axis scheme, the IB line needs to be 
sloped upward. Its slope stems from the fi scal and monetary policy relation-
ships: fi scal expansion, if it is not to undermine price stability – full employ-
ment equilibrium, has to be off set by tighter monetary policy. An area to the 
right of and below the IB line represents excessive infl ation. Th e area to the left  
of and above the IB line features another kind of internal disequilibrium – ex-
cessive unemployment.
Th e eff ective market classifi cation scheme allows for external capital fl ows. 
Th ey are, by defi nition, sensitive to interest rate diff erentials, thus opening a new 
transmission channel for monetary policy. Th e external balance (EB) line is the 
locus of such combinations of interest rates and fi scal policy stance that are con-
sistent with the balance of payments equilibrium. It is assumed that the EB line 
is upward-sloped, as is the IB line. However, it is presented as fl atter than the IB. 
Th is is to refl ect that the external balance is more sensitive to any changes of the 
domestic rate against the foreign rates than the internal equilibrium.
Th e area to the left  of and above the EB line features interest rates that, at 
a given exchange rate, are too high for the needs of the external equilibrium; in 
other words, they lead to an excess infl ow of capital, and thus BOP surplus. And 
consequently, the area to the right of and below the EB schedule represents BOP 
defi cit; domestic interest rates (at a given exchange rate) are such that they trig-
ger an outfl ow of capital, and thus BOP defi cit.
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2.2.2.4.3. Economic policy coordination in the model
Th e combination of disequilibria described in Section 2.2.2.4.2 and presented at 
Figure 2.4 consists of four areas:
 I. Excess unemployment accompanied by BOP surplus,
 II. Excess infl ation accompanied by BOP surplus,
 III. Excess infl ation accompanied by BOP defi cit,
 IV. Excess unemployment accompanied by BOP defi cit.
Th ey require coordinated sequential adjustments in monetary and fi scal pol-
icies to restore and maintain equilibrium, given the prevailing exchange rate. 
Figure 2.4 shows that there is only one set of interest rate and fi scal policy that, 
within the eff ective market classifi cation scheme, generates simultaneous exter-
nal and internal equilibriums. Following the assumptions discussed in Section 
2.2.2.4.1, and the features of the EB and IB lines, it is appropriate to use fi scal 
policy for the internal equilibrium needs and focus the monetary policy (interest 
rates) on the external equilibrium. Th e causation scheme of the above relations 
is such that any change in the interest rate diff erential has an impact on both the 
current account (trade balance) and the capital account. As far as the internal 
impact is concerned, it is assumed that the interest rate mainly aff ects investment 
decisions. Th is assumed regularity opens a specifi c transmission mechanism for 
monetary policy in the eff ective market classifi cation schedule. Monetary policy 
(interest rate) should be used in order to restore or maintain external equilib-
rium, whereas fi scal policy (net government expenditure) should be focused on 
restoring or maintaining internal equilibrium.
A specifi c policy mix, resulting from the philosophy of the eff ective market 
classifi cation model, in a particular situation is an outcome of the type of a dis-
equilibrium (see Figure 2.4) and a specifi c combination of structural features 
behind the IB and EB loci. In real policy challenges, it is also an outcome of poli-
cymakers’ time preference and their perceptions and expectations regarding the 
economy’s autonomous abilities to restore equilibrium aft er adverse external or 
internal shocks. Th is prevailing perception of the intrinsic self-control ability of 
modern economies has led, step by step, to a reassessment of economic policy 
state of the art (see Section 2.3.1).
2.3.  The 2008–2009 recession implications for economic 
theory and policy
2.3.1.  Pre-crisis consensus in theory and practice of 
economic policy
In view of the evolution of the theory and practice of economic policy presented in 
Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, it is possible to determine major economic policy pre-cri-
sis features. Mainstream policy was founded on the assumption that despite their 
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doubtless imperfections, fi nancial markets and, to a smaller extent, commodity 
and labor markets display both static (allocative) effi  ciency, as well as dynamic, 
Schumpeterian effi  ciency. In such conditions, the basic task of economic policy 
authorities was to eliminate impediments to effi  cient operation of markets, and 
thus supporting autonomous market processes, primarily through deregulation 
[Sweeney 2005; Castles 2007]. Deregulation, and in consequence gradual reduc-
tion of modern state functions to a set of basic responsibilities, might be inter-
preted on the one hand as a deliberate broadening of the operative scope of the 
private sector – by allowing more fl exible adjustments to changing market con-
ditions, and on the other hand, as a natural and logical reaction to the previously 
activated globalization processes. Th us, the instruments of direct control (see Sec-
tion 2.1) have been recently used for implementing the concept of deregulation.
Other important attributes of economic governance were changes in exchange 
rate practice and policy. Th ey had a major impact on the functioning of national 
economies. Governments together with central banks were gradually abandon-
ing the fi xed exchange system, which eventually led to creation of a new envi-
ronment for national economic policies.26 Th e fl exible exchange rate system that 
crowded out the Bretton Woods regime created a new environment for design-
ing and implementing national stabilization policy.
Th e main shift  in focus as compared to the period of fi xed exchange rate domi-
nation, however, was based on a gradual switching from discretionary fi scal poli-
cies to automatic fi scal stabilizers, and, above others, the prominent role of central 
bank monetary policy (Table 2.5 and 2.6). Th ese tendencies were accompanied 
by growing political approval for choosing to fi ght infl ation as the main target of 
national economic policy. In practice it meant a higher political readiness to en-
hance the economic policy horizon, because infl ation fi ghting requires painful 
actions and is always a longer-term endeavor.
In an open economy, under fl exible exchange rates and capital mobility, what 
undergoes major change is the power and competence confi guration regarding 
target selection and, consequently, economic policy instrument implementation. 
As Table 2.5 and 2.6 show, under a fl exible exchange rate, central banks had be-
come an institution of major signifi cance. Under the fl exible exchange rate system 
discretionary fi scal policy is no longer an effi  cient instrument of aggregate de-
mand management. Fiscal expansion triggers national currency rate appreciation 
on the one hand, and causes an international crowding-out eff ect on the other.27 
 26 Th e theoretical bases for formulating contemporary economic policy in conditions of capital mo-
bility were set by M. Fleming and R. Mundell at the beginning of the 1960s. See: [Fleming 1962; Mundell 
1963]. In recent literature see: [Rodrik 1996, 2007, 2011]. See Section 2.2.2.3 and 2.2.2.4.
 27 Th e effi  ciency of fi ne-tuning economic activity by means of discretionary fi scal policy becomes 
questionable also because of the uncertainty of this policy’s time lags and due to a diff erentiation of the 
expectation formation mechanism.
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Th e fl exible exchange rate system, if it does not fully exclude an active, discre-
tionary fi scal policy, certainly substantially reduces its effi  ciency. Consequently, 
the area of feasible selection of fi scal policy contracts signifi cantly, also reducing 
the risk of government using fi scal policy instruments for election purposes. Th e 
rising position of central banks was gradually maintained by their strengthening 
of political and functional independence [see e.g.: Cukierman, Webb & Neyap-
Table 2.5. Impact of fi scal expansion under capital mobility
Fixed exchange rate system Flexible exchange rate system
Short-term:
Increase in interest rates accompanying fi scal ex-
pansion is lower than it would be in the case of 
a closed economy, as the infl ow of capital (portfo-
lio) takes place
Interest rates’ reaction is the function of capital mo-
bility and local fi nancial market specifi cs
In conditions of full capital mobility, especially in 
a small economy, interest rates do not undergo change
In eff ect, foreign agents fi nance the additional, na-
tional demand for credit stemming from fi scal ex-
pansion
Th e scale of the crowding-out eff ect will thus be 
small or non-existent. Monetary policy is, however, 
ineff ective; the supply of money has to increase. Th e 
scale of its growth depends on central bank’s ability 
to run sterilization operations. Growth of the ag-
gregate demand and gross domestic product will be 
a total eff ect in the real sphere. However, the scale of 
the unemployment rate reduction depends on the 
specifi cs of the particular labor market institutions
Short-term:
Portfolio capital infl ow in general leads to domestic 
currency appreciation. Appreciation reduces for-
eign demand for domestic goods and thus shatters 
the initial aggregate demand growth triggered off  by 
expansionary fi scal policy. Th e domestic currency 
appreciation also leads to import revival, and trade 
balance deterioration. As a  consequence, there 
emerges a crowding-out eff ect triggered off  by the 
exchange rate appreciation. Fiscal policy as a means 
of stimulating the economic situation is ineffi  cient
Long-term:
If, as a result of fi scal expansion, the actual prod-
uct approaches the level of or exceeds the potential 
product, infl ationary pressure will emerge. Th e ac-
tual product and the unemployment rate return to 
the previous level. If the public sector’s borrowing 
requirement continues to be high and is accompa-
nied by a decreasing aggregate product, tax rev-
enue decreases
In consequence, fi xed budgetary expenses will in-
crease their share in budgetary expenditure. What 
might arise is a threat of discontinuing the debt 
service and/or the necessity of devaluation. Such 
a forced devaluation might be interpreted as a proof 
of earlier mistakes and the economic policy’s failure. 
A complicated and varying structure of economic 
policy time lags means that the likelihood of an ef-
fi cient fi ne tuning of the economy is low
Long-term:
If the public sector borrowing requirement is con-
stantly maintained on an excessive level in relation 
to the supply of domestic saving, the ability to re-
pay foreign debt is undermined.
Th e market appraisal of domestic currency will de-
teriorate. It might be an early warning of a fi nancial 
and exchange rate crisis
Source: author’s synopsis of mainstream macroeconomic literature, based on: [Kowalski 2001, pp. 164–165].
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ti 1992; Masciandaro & Spinelli 1994; Capie et al. 1994; Blinder 1998; Wojtyna 
1998; Hochreiter & Kowalski 2000].
Fiscal policy was either restricted to formal rules,28 or was shift ed to the back-
ground. Th is feature stems from the fact that in open economy conditions, the 
fi scal multiplier is reduced, and moreover, in currently dominating fl exible ex-
change rates active fi scal policy is ineffi  cient (Table 2.5 and 2.6). An additional 
factor limiting the potential scope of fi scal expansion might be the way it is fi -
nanced. Typically, budget defi cits are partly fi nanced abroad; if fi scal expansion 
receives an unfavorable foreign assessment it might become unfeasible or could 
require special risk premiums on treasuries.
Aft er EMU formation, the exchange rate policy within this grouping ceased 
to have any importance. In relations with third countries, the EMU decided to 
apply the fl exible exchange rate system. Th e USA has been using the fl exible ex-
change rate system practically since 1971.29 Such a combination of the main pa-
 28 For example convergence criteria as a necessary condition for joining the EMU, or Sta-
bility and Growth Pact as a set of rules for the EMU members. Interestingly, the requirements 
concerning defi cit and level of public debt in relation to GDP formally apply to all EU mem-
ber states.
 29 Among the major economies, only China maintains a system of fi xed exchange rates 
with elements of regular correction towards appreciation.
Table 2.6. Impact of monetary expansion on the economy under capital mobility
Fixed exchange rate system Flexible exchange rate system
Short-term:
Impact of monetary expansion on domestic inter-
est rates is negligible when a free fl ow of portfolio 
capital and direct investment is maintained. Th e 
economy’s reaction is marked by domestic and for-
eign investors pulling out from the country; outfl ow 
of capital contributes to a signifi cant neutralization 
of the original monetary expansion. As a result, the 
effi  ciency of monetary policy expansion is low or, 
in extreme cases, even zero
Short-term:
Outfl ow of capital triggers domestic currency de-
preciation. Th e depreciation decreases the demand 
for imports and increases competitiveness of do-
mestic products and exports. As a consequence, 
aggregate domestic demand and gross domestic 
product increase. Monetary policy is eff ective.
If a basic fl exibility of the labor market is main-
tained, the unemployment rate also decreases. If, 
however, labor market is rigid, the phenomenon 
of hysteresis occurs and the unemployment rate 
remains unchanged
Long-term:
Outfl ow of capital neutralizes the growth in money 
supply. In the economy, the level of production ca-
pacity utilization will not change, and in the long-
term, the real eff ect of money supply expansion will 
be non-existent. In the long term, money is neutral
Long-term:
Th ere is a risk of infl ation growth. A rise in prices 
gradually neutralizes the eff ects of currency depre-
ciation. Th e gross domestic product and employ-
ment (if it has risen) return to the long-term level. 
Th ere are no longstanding real eff ects in the econ-
omy. Monetary policy is not eff ective. In the long 
term, money is neutral
Source: author’s synopsis of mainstream macroeconomic literature, based on: [Kowalski 2001, pp. 164–165].
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rameters of fi scal policy and exchange rate policy pushes monetary policy into 
the foreground. In fact, since the late 1980s, central banks, their instruments and 
the problem of choosing goals have become the centre of attention of both theo-
rists and practitioners of economic policy.
As emphasized in Section 2.2, central banks gradually began to play a promi-
nent role in the institutional structure of the design and implementation of eco-
nomic policy. Th eir position, independent of current political pressure, has been 
practically universally codifi ed and socially and politically accepted. It was com-
monly acknowledged that their primary goal is to ensure low and stable infl ation. 
Due to the huge scale of capital fl ows and the fl exible exchange rate system, inter-
est rates, particularly the open market operation rate, became the key instruments 
of central banks. Th erefore, due to the long and variable outside lag of monetary 
policy and expectations as the key channel of transmission of monetary policy 
impulses, also in this area meant the acceptance of a certain kind of rule. It may 
be expressed by Taylor’s rule binding the central bank rate with expected infl a-
tion and output gap [Taylor 1993, 1999]. In fact there is a family of such reaction 
rules in which central bank’s interest rate adjusts in response to actual and fore-
casted fl uctuations of both infl ation and real sector economic activity. Th ese re-
action rules have their roots in Th eil’s fl exible-target approach (see Section 2.2). 
According to Orphanides [2007, p. 6] Taylor was inspired by the policy regime 
evaluation project reported by Bryant, Hooper and Mann [1993]. Th e objective 
of the project was to identify a simple reaction function in which nominal in-
terest rate controlled by a central bank would be consistent simultaneously with 
price and real sector economic stability. Its main conclusion was a general reac-
tion function of the following form (2.16)
 i – i* = θπ(π – π*) + θq(q – q*), (2.16)
where:
 i – short-term nominal interest rate controlled by a central ban,
 i* – baseline or desired level of nominal interest rates,
 π – rate of infl ation,
 π* – desired, targeted infl ation rate,
 q  – real output,
 q* – potential, trend real output,
 θπ , θq – reaction function parameters.
Following this general form (2.16) and Taylor, by setting i* and π* to 2 and θπ , 
θq to 0.5, formulated his monetary policy rule that ex-post, well described ac-
tual FED monetary policy reactions in the late 1980s and early 1990s [Orpha-
nides 2007, p. 6] followed:
 i  = 2 + π + 0.5(π – 2) + 0.5(q – q*). (2.17)
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Simplicity and empirical soundness made the Taylor rule reaction function 
popular and triggered work on its extensions. It became not only an important 
teaching instrument but was also used by central banks as one of their analyti-
cal tools. One of these extensions (equation (2.18)) is an open economy dynam-
ic version with real eff ective exchange rates, a lagged interest rate, and a more 
developed real sector impact on the endogenous variable [see: Mohanty & Klau 
2004, p. 10; Orphanides 2007, p. 7]:
   π q(1 )( * *) ( *) ( *)? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?θ r π θ i θ π π θ q q1i ii ?
 q s(? ? ? ?θ q q θ s sΔ ΔΔ Δ *) (Δ Δ *),   (2.18)
where:
 r* – equilibrium (natural) rate of interest rate,
 (Δq – Δq*) – diff erence between output growth and its potential,
 (Δs – Δs*) –  diff erence between actual and trend-based real eff ective exchange 
rate changes,
 θi, θΔq, θΔs – reaction function parameters.
Th e Taylor rule describing central bank behavior is linked to the modern sup-
ply side function that has been a foundation for contemporary economic policy 
long-term perspective and its fundamental role in stabilizing infl ation expecta-
tions [Mankiw 1997; Blanchard 2011]. Th e standard aggregate supply function 
can be written in the following form (2.19):
 q = q* + α(P – P e), (2.19)
where:
 P and P e – actual price and expected price levels respectively,
 α – parameter.
Equation (2.19) can be expressed in terms of actual price level (2.20):
 1 ( *)eP P q q
α
? ? ? . (2.20)
Th en by subtracting P–1 from both sides of equation (2.20) and, for the sake of 
simplifi cation assuming that (P – P–1) = π is infl ation rate, and (P e – P) = π e is 
expected infl ation rate we have (2.20'):
 1 ( *)eπ π q q
α
? ? ? . (2.20')
Following Blanchard [2011, p. 186] and Mankiw [1997, p. 347] it is possible to 
generalize the aggregate supply equation (2.20') by adding a supply shock term ε, 
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and substituting the output gap (q – q*) with the deviation of actual unemploy-
ment rate u from its equilibrium (natural) rate u
_
 – (2.21):30
 π = π e – β(u – u
_
) + ε, (2.21)
where:
β – parameter.
In fact equation (2.21), derived from aggregate supply function (2.19) is the ex-
pectations augmented Phillips curve. It summarizes the pre-crisis economic policy 
consensus, where a low and stable infl ation rate became the core of both central 
bank and fi scal policy concerns. Furthermore it also justifi es longer term priority 
of infl uencing infl ation expectations and thus relying on autonomous self cor-
recting mechanisms of contemporary economies.
In view of the above fi ndings, it can be asserted that the pre-crisis consensus 
on the optimum economic policy mix ensuring welfare (as its ultimate goal) was 
based on:
 – the postulate for deregulation – freeing market mechanisms in a maximum 
breadth of sectors,
 – central bank providing low and stable infl ation, which was seen as a founda-
tion for fi nancial market generation of a relatively low real interest rate,
 – reduction of the output gap (Okun’s gap), with the assumption that the fulfi ll-
ment of the fi rst two conditions considerably increases the probability of the 
reduction, or even complete elimination of this gap.
2.3.2. New outlook on economic policy
With reference to the description of the American economy, as well as the global 
situation in the period directly preceding the events of 2007, 2008, and 2009, it is 
not diffi  cult to see that the rates of commonly measured infl ation were relative-
ly low, real market interest rates were also quite low, and the output gap gave no 
basis for concern. Th us, the greatest recession in the USA and Europe since the 
1930s occurred despite the fact that the pre-crisis combination of parameters of 
macroeconomic policy and macroeconomic performance measures were close 
to optimum [see: Blanchard et al. 2010; Blinder 2010]. On this basis, a number 
of conclusions may be drawn.
First of all, the assumption about effi  cient operation of deregulated markets 
proved unjustifi ed. Particularly, fi nancial markets displayed unexpectedly deep 
inconsistencies which eventually threatened the entire fi nancial system and re-
quired the involvement of extensive public funds (fi nanced from debt) and in-
tervention of central banks (including unconventional quantitative easing) on an 
 30 It follows from Okun’s law that when q > q*, then u < u
_
.
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extraordinary scale. In this fi eld, deregulation without applying necessary rules 
of caution and effi  cient supervisory institutions became one of the causes of the 
crisis. Th e fi nancial system was the main channel for spreading negative impulses 
and uncertainties over the entire global economy.
Central banks, though politically and functionally independent, have failed. 
It was especially evident in the case of the Fed which allowed excessive loosen-
ing of monetary policy aft er 2001. Such policy contributed to the emergence of 
high overliquidity not only in the USA but in the whole world economy. China’s 
entrance to the world supply chain of goods distorted the standard image of in-
fl ation, making it harder to diagnose the actual infl ation situation, as well as to 
prepare reaction scenarios. Despite various signals from market participants, 
commentators and theoreticians, central banks did not redefi ne the way infl a-
tion was gauged, and did not include indexes measuring the infl ation pressure 
in fi nancial assets in the set of actual warning signals. Th us both the theoretical 
foundations of the economic policy, and the pragmatic rules for decision-making 
in central banks, main regulators of fi nancial markets and supervisory and rating 
institutions proved inappropriate to the actual complexity and interdependence 
between national and international segments of the fi nancial system.
Conclusions
Th e current stage of globalization calls for a new outlook on the institutional so-
lutions with respect to the design and implementation of economic policy. Surely, 
the foreground is now occupied by the need to revise current solutions regard-
ing information fl ows and public regulation and supervision of economic op-
erations. Th us, the pre-crisis standard approach to qualitative economic policy 
requires revision.
Th e effi  ciency of counteracting such broad economic disruptions we had to 
and still have to face, will improve if we develop new early warning signals about 
growing infl ation pressure and in particular accumulation of imbalances. Th e lat-
ter, especially due to the development of fi nancial engineering, are not necessar-
ily quick to be refl ected in the prices of fi nancial assets. An important condition 
for improvement in the effi  ciency of this policy is further institutionalization of 
the coordination of preventive actions of central banks and fi nancial supervi-
sory institutions.
Th e scale of fi scal interventions rescuing the threatened fi nancial and non-fi -
nancial institutions has led fi rst to the increase in budget defi cits, and then to the 
rise of public debt. Th is way, fi scal policy returned as a subject of special interest 
of both theorists and policymakers. Basically, the conditions for fi scal policy im-
plementation and its prospective effi  ciency will not change signifi cantly. How-
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ever, the scale of defi cits and the leaping growth of public debt will constitute an 
important factor limiting room for maneuver in economic policy.
It has to be emphasized that individual countries will continue to face diminish-
ing scope for selection of instruments of discretionary quantitative economic pol-
icy. Th erefore, the rank of key success factors and major distinguishing marks in 
the area of their international competitiveness should include qualitative econom-
ic policy. It should particularly feature the ability of governments and regulatory 
bodies to create and maintain a high quality of institutional environment, fl ex-
ible labor market and the ability to create conditions promoting innovativeness.
3
GLOBALIZATION AND FINANCIAL CRISES
3.1. Modern fi nancial crises
3.1.1. Typology
Typically contemporary fi nancial crises apart from exchange rate shift s have been 
associated with one or more of the following phenomena [Claessens &  Kose 
2013, pp. 4–5]:
 – substantial changes in credit volume and asset prices,
 – severe disruptions in fi nancial intermediation and supply of external fi nanc-
ing to various actors in the economy,
 – large scale balance sheet setbacks (of fi nancial intermediaries, sovereigns, 
fi rms, and households), and
 – need of large scale government rescue programs focused mainly on fi nancial 
intermediaries.
Th us, regardless of their ultimate sources, which are always passionately de-
bated, fi nancial crises are multidimensional events with international implica-
tions. Th erefore, they cannot be characterized by a single indicator.
Basically, there are two major groups of necessary conditions behind fi nancial 
crises: structural, manifested mainly by macroeconomic imbalances and transi-
tory disturbances in the form of internal or external shocks. Suffi  cient conditions 
may be numerous; from economic policy or private sector mistakes, to “irration-
al” factors [Minsky 1975; Kindleberger 1978; Greenspan 1996; Akerlof & Schiller 
2009; Bosi & Seegmuller 2009; Taleb 2010; De La Torre & Ize 2011].
Since fi nancial crises are complex and oft en interrelated events, their typol-
ogy depends on schools of economic thought and the exact time of analyses (Ta-
ble 3.1). Following [Claessens & Kose 2013, pp. 12–13] the four major types of 
crises are distinguished:
 – currency crises,
 – current or capital account crises also named as sudden stop crises,
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 – debt crises,
 – banking crises.
3.1.2. Currency crises
Currency crises manifest themselves by a sharp decrease in currency value 
through either devaluation or depreciation. Typically such currency is under 
pressure from speculative attacks. Th ey trigger, especially in the fi rst stage of cri-
sis, defensive reactions by central bank. Th ese reactions usually involve one or 
more such tools as raising short-term interest rates, massive use of foreign cur-
rency reserves, use of IMF short-term facilities and oft en administrative capital 
controls. Th e order of both symptoms and countermeasures diff ers from case 
to case but the main defi ning features and prevailing analytical approach (Ta-
ble 1.1) are rather universal.
Since the currency crises were numerous, it is no wonder that the literature is 
rich. Th ere are three generations of models explaining mechanisms of contem-
porary currency crises. Th e fi rst generation of models [Krugman 1979 & 1998; 
Flood & Garber 1984] assumes a certain dependency of central banks on govern-
ments, controlled exchange rates (either fi xed or pegged) small foreign reserves, 
and unsustainable current account (CA) and/or budget defi cits stemming from 
expansionary fi scal and/or monetary policy as necessary conditions. In principle, 
the expansive fi scal and/or monetary policy underlies the future slump. Th is is 
manifested by substantial domestic (budgetary) and external defi cits, which are 
excessive in comparison to the capacity of the local savings market. Th ese con-
tribute to the creation of a level of domestic absorption which is impossible to 
maintain in the long run. Th e models are closely linked with CA type of crises 
and their foundation is a mistaken economic policy. First generation models de-
scribe investor speculative attack on a country’s currency that is seen to be reach-
ing excessive defi cits. Investors sell the endangered currency anticipating the end 
of the peg. Defence of a pegged exchange rate under speculative attack conditions 
requires either further loans from, for example, the IMF, or very high policy in-
terest rates discouraging foreign exchange investors from short-term borrowing 
of the attacked currency. Th is pressure fi nally leads to the collapse (sharp deval-
Table 3.1. Typology of contemporary fi nancial crises
Analytical approaches
qualitative quantitative
foreign debt crisis currency crisis
systemic banking crisis current or capital account crisis
Source: author’s synopsis based on [Claessens & Kose 2013; Reinhard 2011].
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uation) of the currency as the central bank, in trying to maintain the pre-crisis 
exchange rate level, loses its foreign currency reserves.
Th e second generation of models [Obstfeld & Rogoff  1986; Obstfeld 1994, 1996; 
Frankel & Rose 1996] addresses consequences of pegged exchange rate protection 
within the new conditions of growing international capital fl ows and interdepen-
dency at the end of 1980s and the decade of 1990s. Contrary to fi rst generation 
models, their logic does not assume public economic policy mistakes as neces-
sary conditions for materialization of a currency crisis. Th ese models are based on 
private sector subjective expectations and, in particular, doubts regarding com-
mitment of the central bank and government to stick to the current level of the 
pegged exchange rate. Basically, contrary to the fi rst generation models, they as-
sume sound economic conditions and thus multiple equilibria, both in the private 
sector and the public sector agents. Th e mechanism of crisis evolvement is based 
on the self-fulfi lling subjective judgments of investors who, when beginning to 
sell the currency, expect that other investors will attack the currency. Defensive 
tight monetary policy and high interest rates are becoming the source of and at 
the same time the channel for transmission of critical phenomena, arising on the 
exchange market, to the real sector. Th e crowd behavior of investors willing to 
reduce their exposure in a particular currency becomes the main impulse trig-
gering the crisis and fi nally leading to sharp step devaluation. In the real sphere, 
crisis is manifested by a slowdown or fall in the economic growth rate and an 
increase in unemployment. Th e currency policy described in the second genera-
tion models brings in high social costs.
Th e third generation of crisis models were the theoretical reaction to the Asian 
crisis of 1997–1998. In the pre-crisis years in East Asian countries, fi scal and cen-
tral bank policies were rather consistent. Th erefore the third generation models 
focus on deterioration and unsustainability of bank balance sheets and real sector 
corporations having high foreign exposure, as the core problem area and a nec-
essary condition for the currency crisis. Th ese models are typically represented 
by: [Corsetti, Pesenti & Roubini 1998; Krugman 1999]. According to Krugman 
[1999, p. 460], “moral-hazard-driven lending could have provided a sort of hid-
den subsidy to investment, which collapsed when visible losses led governments 
to withdraw their implicit guarantees”. Th is course of events was accompanied 
by downward fl uctuations in asset prices. Currency crises evolve as a result of 
growing uncertainty and pre-crisis over-borrowing from foreign banks and in-
vestment funds. Th e crises, in such circumstances, are directly triggered by mas-
sive eff orts to liquidate assets.
3.1.3. Current account (CA) or capital account (CapA) crises
Current account or capital account crises (Table 3.1) are usually associated with 
preceding high and unsustainable CA or CapA defi cits and thus high depend-
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ence on external fi nancing. Such a crisis oft en involves a sudden large-scale fall 
in external capital infl ow. Due to this specifi c symptom these crises are also called 
‘sudden stop’. Typically a sudden reversal of capital fl ows triggers a sharp rise in 
foreign credits spreads associated with reduction in economy’s general credit rat-
ings. Typical countermeasures diff er due to specifi c situations, but they always 
require coordination of central bank and government qualitative and quantita-
tive policies.
3.1.4. Foreign debt crises
A foreign debt crisis and its morphology belong to qualitative types of crises (Ta-
ble 3.1). It involves either a public or major private sector inability to service its 
foreign debt. It can induce, especially in the case of public sector debt, either ac-
tual default (when a country does not honor its fi nancial foreign obligations) or 
reduction of the real burden when it purposefully infl ates its currency. A stand-
ard countermeasure involves reduction in domestic absorption, devaluation (de-
preciation) of domestic currency and imposition of administrative restrictions 
focused mainly on private sector foreign capital fl ows.
3.1.5. Systemic banking crisis
Systemic banking crisis (Table 3.1) is defi ned and analyzed in qualitative terms. It 
involves liquidity stops and the danger of large scale bank failures requiring both 
government and central bank interventions. Th ey are typically aimed at restoring, 
through central bank actions, customary interbank money and credit transac-
tions and at avoiding dangerous bank runs and thus restoring public trust in the 
banking sector. In the course of severe banking crises governments take partial 
or full control (nationalization) of endangered banks in order to prevent implo-
sion of the banking system.
Th e four major types of crises, in the contemporary framework, are interrelated 
and in specifi c conditions may coexist. Th us public reaction, either preemptive 
or defensive, has to be coordinated both at the national and supranational level. 
In the European context it is the EU and EMU framework; in the global context, 
elementary coordination is required not only at the bilateral level, but also at such 
multilateral frameworks as G-7, G-20, OECD and fi nally IMF.
In the following Sections (3.2 and 3.3) two fi nancial crises – the Asian crisis 
of 1997 and the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 – with major international 
implications are analyzed and assessed. Both evolved under the new stage of eco-
nomic and fi nancial globalization (Chapters 1 and 2). Both had their diversifi ed 
impact on Central and East European countries (Chapter 7).
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3.2. Asian crisis of 19971
3.2.1. Pre-crisis development in East Asian economies
In 1965–1990 East Asian countries tripled their GDP per capita [Kwon & Mo Kang 
2011]. Th ese countries transformed themselves from backward, rural economies 
into more developed economies. During this period, the scale of poverty in Ma-
laysia, Indonesia, Th ailand and Philippines was considerably reduced while the 
general health and level of education of these societies were raised. Relevant lit-
erature emphasises [see Dasgupta 1993; Moreno 1998; Kowalski 1999] that such 
economic and social development was reached thanks to the concentration of 
public investment in those domains that yielded the highest social rate of return.
Th e period of stable economic growth was marked by a set of attributes specif-
ic to the whole region. East Asian countries were ruled by authoritarian govern-
ments. Th ese regimes provided political and social stability and interconnected 
nature of state authority, merged the interests of the political class, the army, and 
the business sector. It produced fuzzy corporate governance.
Public investments were targeted at the construction of infrastructure, creation 
of common elementary education and broader access to healthcare. Concentra-
tion on development of human capital was, apart from domestic private sector 
investment, the main key to the supply side of economic development [Kwon & 
Mo Kang 2011]. On the demand side exports were the main growth driver for 
the East Asian countries. Th is two-pillar economic growth was supported by a 
coherent fi scal policy which created favourable conditions for private sector de-
velopment. Th is conservative fi scal policy was marked by a low rate of fi scal re-
distribution with a low (18%) share of tax revenue in GDP. In 1978–1990 budget 
defi cits in East Asian countries were on average at 1.5% of their GDP. In other 
regions of similar economic development budget defi cits were much higher, for 
example 4.9% in South American countries and 7.0% of GDP in South Asian 
countries. In the fi rst stage of economic development these conditions allowed 
East Asian central banks to run a low interest rate policy.
East Asian economies did have minor macroeconomic problems prior to the 
1997 events. However, when faced with economic disruptions, both governments 
and central banks proved able to react accordingly in a coordinated manner. Th e 
fi scal burden levied on foreign trade (fees, licenses, export taxes, tariff s), which 
was lower than in other regions, was a distinctive feature of East Asian econo-
mies. Th e average rate of fi scal burden on foreign trade in East Asian countries 
was about 10%, whereas in countries with a similar level of development in South 
America it was about 38%, in South Asia 35%, and in Africa 28%. As a result, 
East Asian countries became very much export-oriented and actually export-
 1 Th is section develops my paper [Kowalski 1999].
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dependent. Aft er mid-1990 a series of external adverse shocks hit the East Asian 
economies slowing their growth rate, reducing exports development and nega-
tively infl uencing asset prices [Moreno 1998].2
Speedy economic growth unveiled disproportions between the dynamics of 
the real sector and development of the fi nancial intermediation sector based on 
the banking sector (Table 3.2). Banks were completely controlled by local capi-
tal. Basically, the banking sector was insuffi  ciently supervised [Kowalski 1999]. 
In the 1980s weak regulations and a low level of banking technologies led to lo-
cal banking crises (Table 3.2). Public rescue operations required between 1 to 5 
per cent of GDP (Table 3.2). Banking crises were not only arising in the quickly 
developing East Asian economies. At the turn of the 1980s and 1990s they also 
aff ected countries from other parts of the world, such as Japan or the Scandina-
vian countries.
3.2.2. Major attributes of the 1997–1998 East Asia crisis
Th ailand was the fi rst victim of the crisis. According to Fischer [1998] Th ailand 
had been confi dentially warned by the International Monetary Fund about the 
threat of the currency crisis (Section 3.1). Other countries from the region also 
received IMF reports indicating the weakness of their fi nancial systems.3 Th e East 
Asian countries that signifi cantly suff ered from the crisis ran diversifi ed foreign 
investment policies [Guitian 1998]. Th ailand used to pursue the most aggressive 
policy of foreign investor acquisition. It introduced tax incentives for foreign 
investors and created a fi nancial institution, the Bangkok International Banking 
Facility, the aim of which was to enhance the absorption of foreign capital. By 
contrast, South Korea and Indonesia followed a cautious policy of capital fl ow 
liberalization.
 2 Th ese were the devaluation of the renminbi and yen, and decline in semiconductor in-
ternational prices.
 3 Countries from the region, such as Taiwan or Singapore, experienced smaller fl uctua-
tions in exchange rate and share price.
Table 3.2. Banking crises in selected East Asian economies in 1981–1988
Country Period Total fi scal cost of rescue (% of GDP)
Bad loans as per cent 
of total loans
Malaysia 1985–1988 5 33
Philippines 1981–1987 3–4 –
Th ailand 1983–1987 1 15
Source: [WEO 1998, p. 78].
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In fact both a currency crisis and a systemic banking and fi nancial crisis 
took place in these East Asian countries (see Section 3.1). Usually, the notion of 
a currency crisis is used to describe a situation resulting from a speculative at-
tack on the exchange rate, in which the currency drops in value or is subject to 
sudden depreciation and/or the authorities are forced to take out loans (mostly 
from the International Monetary Fund), and/or the authorities must drastically 
raise interest rates.4 Th e notion of a systemic fi nancial crisis describes a situa-
tion in which the functioning of the whole fi nancial intermediation system is 
disrupted and this disruption is then transmitted to the real sector. East Asian 
economies were also hit by a banking crisis (Section 3.1.4). Th is was manifest-
ed by the liquidation of a considerable number of banks and the reinforcement 
of supervision over these remaining, as well as the creation of a technical and 
fi nancial support facility.
Th e East Asian currency crisis enforced severe adjustments in exchange rates. 
Th eir extent is shown in Table 3.3. Th e data in Table 3.3 demonstrates that the 
currencies of East Asian countries underwent signifi cant real depreciation of 
their currencies which triggered real sphere adjustments resulting in a balance of 
payments surplus. Th e biggest GDP drops occurred in Indonesia, Th ailand and 
Malaysia.5 In February 1998 stock exchange indices in the East Asian countries 
undergoing the crisis dropped on average by 50% in comparison with the high-
est level in 1996–1997.
Before the crisis, the countries analysed here had not only recorded a large 
infl ow of direct investment, portfolio investment and loans, but had also become 
signifi cant importers of investment and consumer goods from Japan and other 
OECD countries. Currency depreciation and eff ective domestic demand decline 
were the reasons for the abrupt drop in imports [Adams 1998]. Before the crisis, 
 4 See: [World Economic Outlook 1998, p. 74ff ].
 5 See: [Th e Economist, October 15, 1998, pp. 14–15].
Table 3.3.  Current accounts and real eff ective exchange rates in East Asian countries 
in 1997–1998
Country Current account balance in 1996 (% of GDP)
Real eff ectives exchange rates 
1997.06–1998.03
(minus means depreciation)
Indonesia – 3.4 – 61.9
Malaysia – 6.3 – 22.4
Philippines – 4.5 – 21.4
Th ailand – 7.9 – 25.3
Source: [WEO 1998 May; Litan 1998].
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Asian countries were the main recipients of foreign capital infl ows outside de-
veloped countries. Th eir share in total net capital fl ows reached the highest lev-
els in 1995 and 1996 (48% and 42% respectively). Change in capital fl ow growth 
was particularly big in 1995. Investors opening their positions in East Asia were 
guided by the criteria of speedy economic development, growing export poten-
tial and their international economic competitiveness. However, as the situation 
evolved, their assessments, especially those regarding microeconomic aspects, 
turned out to be inaccurate. Ratings agencies were to a large extent accountable 
for those incorrect evaluations, as they were not capable of providing adequate 
and timely assessments neither of national risks, nor of the quality of information 
published by the local real sector and fi nancial sector institutions.
Foreign short-term investments proved to be highly changeable, while foreign 
direct investments were fairly stable. Japanese banks and international investment 
funds were the main source of capital for East Asian countries. Th is was why the 
East Asian crisis fi rstly hit Japanese fi nancial institutions and international in-
vestment funds. Th e negative eff ects could be felt to a lesser extent in European 
Figure 3.1. Patterns of intra-East Asian trade by industry in 1996–2000
Source: [Fukao, Ishido & Ito 2003, p. 42]
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banks as well. Th e East Asian countries discussed above were mainly intercon-
nected by standard foreign trade (Figure 3.1); their fi nancial links did not play 
a major role. Th ey were attracted by foreign direct investments (FDI) (Figure 3.1) 
directed at their tradable sector. Due to a high structural similarity and exchange 
rate, as well as trade policies, they were engaged in competition in the traditional 
inter-industry trade (Figure 3.1).
Th e fi nancial collapse in East Asian countries did not have the typical features 
of a currency crisis. Th e fi rst phase of the currency crisis, in particular in the cases 
of Th ailand and Indonesia, was intensifi ed by erroneous economic policy deci-
sions, including new restrictions imposed on foreign investments and the defence 
of the exchange rate with foreign loans.
When studying these East Asian countries, apart from their high foreign trade 
exposure, one particularly signifi cant feature was the lack of typical, fundamen-
tal macroeconomic sources of the crisis. In the case of East Asia, the sudden rise 
in fi nancial assets prices and real estate, which preceded the crisis, was the main 
indicator of internal disequilibrium. Th e substantial defi cit on the current ac-
count (Table 3.2) was a manifestation of their external disequilibrium. It did not 
result, however, from indebtedness of the public sector but from the ever-grow-
ing indebtedness of the private sector. Large-scale investments were made in the 
manufacturing sector. Loan fi nanced capacity growth (in particular the automo-
tive, chemical and electronic industries) was based on the assumption that the 
high rate of export growth could be maintained. Th is resulted in overinvestment.
However, the most signifi cant sources underlying the crisis could be found in 
the institutional environment and in the functioning of the fi nancial intermedia-
tion sector. It was poorly prepared (both in terms of capital and regulations) to 
service the high domestic credit demand. East Asian banks did not adequately 
use either the credit or the currency risk assessment methods. Th e banking sec-
tor was insuffi  ciently supervised and regulated, which in turn led to moral haz-
ard.6 Moral hazard, in the particular case of the East Asian countries and their 
fi nancial intermediation sector, can be interpreted as a biased asset allocation that 
resulted from investor assumption (implicit or explicit) that the investment was 
protected. Th is resulted in lower incentives to monitor fi nancial institutions and 
in an acceptance of higher investment risk.
Th e infl uence of this mechanism can particularly be observed in the experi-
ence of Th ailand’s Finance Companies (FC) – nonbank fi nancial intermediaries 
[Krugman 1998]. Th ese intermediaries gathered some short-term deposits from 
the domestic market, but most came from off shore locations. Th e FCs based on 
 6 In the case of East Asia one can talk about two dimensions of moral hazard: local, ac-
knowledging that investments are “insured” by the (national) authorities in one way or an-
other, and international. Th e latter results from the mere existence of the IMF, its stabilisation 
functions and bail-out facilities.
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such liabilities extended loans and long-term credit, including real estate loans. 
Due to the political interconnectedness between the fi nancial sector and the po-
litical authorities and the previously mentioned unclear corporate governance 
structures, both domestic and foreign investors implicitly assumed that the FCs 
deposits were safe and sound. Th is conviction of the market participants resulted 
in lower incentives to monitor risk thoroughly. A similar mechanism was also 
present in other countries in the region and it concerned both banks and real 
sector institutions that acquired their loans abroad to avoid high domestic inter-
est rates.7 Th eir level resulted mostly from the credit demand which grew much 
faster than domestic savings supply. Consequently this also explained the high 
dependency on external sources of capital.
Th e combination of weak banking supervision, vague ownership structures 
of nonbank fi nancial intermediaries, low standards of fi nancial reporting and 
no requirement for independent balance sheet and fi nancial statement auditing 
by external auditors made it diffi  cult or even impossible to eff ectively assess fi rst 
the risk and then the scale of the crisis. For example, in South Korea, 11% of the 
credit and loan portfolio was in an irregular situation – this amounted to about 
13% of GDP.8 It became clear that the real sector in East Asian countries was de-
veloping rapidly without its own suffi  ciently large capital base. It was dominated 
by family-run businesses with no tendency or tradition of sharing data or issuing 
shares. Such companies preferred to acquire capital from bank loans rather than 
from marketable debt issue. Step by step the fi nancial intermediation sector situa-
tion deteriorated unveiling both the low quality of their loan and credit portfolios 
and overinvestment in the manufacturing and real estate sectors. Th e slump that 
followed in the regional economies induced high social costs (increase in unem-
ployment, loss of savings and a dramatic drop in local currency exchange rates).
3.2.3. Global fi nancial market in the 1990s
In the 1990s, the fi nancial market already had a global character and thus allowed 
for diversifi cation of investment across instruments, currencies and regions. Its main 
threat, which was in fact particularly evident in the case of the 1997 East Asian cri-
sis, came from fi nancial contagion, that is, the cumulative negative eff ects of imbal-
ance and crisis phenomena which had previously had a primarily local character.
Th e global liquidity and savings supply were relatively large and growing. Th e 
international share of Treasury Bill and Treasury Bond transactions grew from 
 7 Insuffi  cient supervision, vague structures of corporate governance in Japanese corpora-
tions and corruption were also the cause of the second banking crisis in Japan.
 8 In recent years mistakes regarding the property market have also been made by Euro-
pean banks – see the banking crisis in Sweden or the biggest European banking disaster of the 
French bank, Credit Lyonnais. Japanese banks reached around US$580 bn of credits in an ir-
regular situation.
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the level of roughly 3% of American GDP in 1970 to about 136% of American 
GDP in the mid-1990s. In this period, direct foreign investment increased three 
times faster and foreign trade twice faster than world GDP growth. Th ese pro-
cesses were accompanied by a sudden growth in foreign exchange turnover, with 
its daily rate equalling roughly US$1.5 trillion at the end of the 1990s.9
Short-term and ultra-short-term fund fl ows are by nature highly sensitive to 
interest rate fl uctuations and new relevant information. On the one hand, these 
fl ows have a tendency to contribute to the lowering of interest rates on the global 
market. On the other hand, however, they can compound uncertainty as they are 
completely detached from commercial transactions or direct foreign investment.10
Th e large increase in capital fl ows in the 1990s was a result of several reasons. 
One of the most important was the growing ability and tendency to save in new 
market economies and in economies exporting raw materials, a drop in public 
sector borrowing requirement in OECD countries and low interest rates in these 
countries.11 Th e general growth in the propensity to save, and a higher appetite 
for liquid assets off ered by investment funds, was also connected to demographic 
factors and the weakening of trust in public retirement programmes. On a global 
scale this led to growth in demand for fi nancial instruments off ering liquidity and 
high return on investment and fi ercer competition between investment funds. 
Th is was the background of a growing interest of institutional investors in high-
risk fi nancial markets, such as in East Asia.
Resource reallocation, risk monitoring and assessment are the most fundamen-
tal functions of fi nancial intermediaries. Th is is why investors attach signifi cance 
to transparency and standards of data published by countries and businesses. De-
spite growing standardization, especially that pertaining to information, countries 
that build market economies were still very much diversifi ed and an assessment 
of their economies or of particular businesses required experience and prima-
ry information collected by specialised companies. Th erefore, one of the main 
problems for investors acting in new fi nancial markets had been, and still is, the 
acquisition of appropriate microeconomic information. Lack of information or 
its inadequacy, as well as diffi  culties in selecting experienced employees, led to 
incorrect risk assessment and insuffi  cient monitoring of local institutions. Th ese 
factors in turn induced “herd behaviour” among investors. Hence, one of the “ex-
ternal” sources of destabilisation and consequently the crisis were mistakes and 
 9 At the beginning of the 1970s daily foreign exchange turnover was around US$20 bn.
 10 Th ese were the reasons for which J. Tobin put forward the idea to levy a tax on this type 
of investment. Such taxation would require international coordination and could result in an 
increase in interest rates, which would limit accessibility of capital.
 11 In 1997, for example, all EU member states (apart from Greece) narrowed their budget 
defi cits to the level below 3% of GDP and Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Luxembourg re-
corded a budget surplus.
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insuffi  cient care of investment funds and international fi nancial institutions re-
garding investment portfolios and risk assessment.
Another cause, linked to the aforementioned factors, was separation between 
ownership and governance, which created conditions for short-termism and 
speculation. Th e infl uence of this factor was particularly seen in periods of ex-
pected economic recovery. Th e years preceding the East Asian crisis were glob-
ally relatively prosperous, leading to high stock market prices, particularly in the 
USA but also in the EU countries.
In the face of the threat of a global-scale crisis, aft er the main participants of 
the fi nancial market recognized the seriousness of the situation, the main coun-
tries could adopt the strategy of coordinated and energetic action, the strategy 
of delayed action or of awaiting the course of events, or the competitive strategy 
– separate actions taken to cushion the eff ects in one’s own fi eld carrying evident 
negative consequences for one’s economic partners. Th e delayed action strategy 
proved to be the most feasible and pragmatic.
Th e regulatory experiences of the 1980s and 1990s supported the strategy of 
limited action as they gave empirical evidence of a potential for self-regulation of 
market mechanisms. Autonomous adjustment mechanisms are on the whole, at 
least in the medium- and long-term perspective, more effi  cient than the attempts 
at resolving the temporary problems by means of interventionist regulations and 
accompanying administrative structures. Besides, it seems that there is currently 
a relatively high willingness to accept the necessary short-term social costs of eco-
nomic adjustments for the sake of the creation of long-term growth conditions.
Th e fact that in reality the crisis occurred mostly in the new market econo-
mies of East Asia and to some extent in Japan, and also in Brazil in 1998, was a 
hindrance to common action. Th e East Asian events had a negative impact on 
the global economy and undermined trust in the currencies of other emerging 
economies, including in particular Russia. According to Camdessus [1998], in 
Russia the problems had origins far beyond the purely economic domain. In eco-
nomic terms, the principal causes of the Russian crisis stemmed from domestic 
fundamentals; they were enhanced by exogenous factors (including the impact 
of lower oil and gas prices) triggered by the events of 1997. Camdessus [1998, 
p. 3] maintains that “even if in a totally diff erent context, the problems of Rus-
sia at the beginning of 1998 were strikingly similar to those which at that very 
moment were destroying Asian prosperity”. From the institutional point of view 
these were a macroeconomic defi ciency, particularly in fi scal policy, weakness in 
the fi nancial intermediation sector and capitalistic cronyism.
Th e negative eff ects of fi nancial market disturbances infl uenced diff erent coun-
tries to a diff erent extent.12 Th is fact made it hard to coordinate actions both be-
 12 Diff erent eff ects could also be seen in particular US states. See: Th e Economist, October 
3rd, 1998, p. 75.
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tween the USA, Japan and the then emerging Eurozone, as well as within the 
latter.13
Th e question of whether or not international regulation and the supervision of 
speculative capital fl ows would be possible and justifi ed requires separate inves-
tigation. Such a solution does not seem to be real or justifi ed. Speculative capital 
on its own does not endanger the functioning of economies pursuing a sound 
macroeconomic policy. Speculative capital has an important and peculiar func-
tion as it identifi es the macro- and microeconomic centres of wrong decisions 
and in this sense it disciplines the participants of economic life.
3.3. The 2007–2009 crisis and its evolvement
3.3.1. General background
Financial sector shocks and crises were occurring in the 20th century in virtu-
ally every decade. Th e most recent, also called the Great Recession, initiated in 
the USA in 2007, is consequently part of a more general tendency. Its root causes 
are complex (Section 3.1). Th e recent fi nancial crisis is narrowly defi ned as the 
time between 2007–2009, but it can be divided into two major phases [Schmidt 
et al. 2011]:
 – “before Lehman” (early 2007 to September 2008) and
 – “aft er Lehman” (from September 2008 to end 2009).
Th ese two phases were followed by the time of crisis evolvement that could be 
further broken down into two more [Schmidt et al. 2011]:
 – period of subdued fi nancial crisis with its proliferation to the real economy 
that further triggered a second wave of negative impact on fi nancial sector 
institutions and
 – period of public debt tensions triggered by fi scal rescue interventions and de-
clining budget revenue due to real economy contraction.
Th e antecedent causes of the crisis had been accumulating for many years 
(Chapter 1 and 2). Before the Great Recession, the American economy was 
booming. Hogan [2012, p. 10] notes that “over nearly a quarter century stock 
prices increased eleven fold. House values grew four fold. Indeed the deeply 
held belief that home prices would continue to rise prompted lenders to ignore 
borrowers’ credit defi ciencies and borrowers to assume repayment obligations 
they could not aff ord. Increased home equity values become the source of bor-
rowed money – a piggy bank – from which homeowners mounted a consump-
 13 I am thinking of the mere capacity and/or the need of economic depreciation policy 
in the euro-11 area in the face of asymmetric shocks. For more on the subject of asymmetric 
shocks see, e.g.:[Pauer 1996].
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tion spree”. Th e real estate bubble was partly created by public policy promoting 
‘aff ordable housing’.14
Shachmurove [2011] and Hogan [2012] underline mounting disequilibria in 
the American economy. Excess liquidity prompted rapid development of fi nan-
cial derivatives.15 Th ey became widely used and could be seen as a specifi c arms 
race between the fi nancial intermediation sector, regulators and rating agencies 
(Figure 3.2). At the outset of the Great Recession about 95% of the world’s 500 
biggest companies used derivatives [the Economist 2009b]. According to Bank 
of International Settlements data, the “notional” value of derivatives reached a 
level of over $600 trillion in 2009. Th e “notional” value overestimates the actual 
scale of the claims on market; “once banks’ claims on each other are stripped out, 
the residual, that is gross credit exposure was (…) well under 1% of the notional 
total” [the Economist 2009b].
Wide-spread securitization (Figure 3.2) broke the customary relationship 
between borrowers and ultimate lenders. Included among the derivative instru-
ments were credit default swaps (CDS), collaterized debt obligations (CDOs), 
 14 Hogan [2012, p. 13] notes that “Beginning with the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) 
(…) public policy required insured banks and other depository institutions to allocate funds 
for mortgage applicants whose income was below the community median. Congress consid-
ered and usually passed amendments to the CRA in ten of the years from 1989 to 2010”.
 15 Interestingly, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system triggered demand for instru-
ments to hedge foreign currency and interest rate exposures. Financial theory advancement 
in option pricing and IT developments helped to value derivatives in practice. And fi nally, in 
1989 the Federal Home Loan Bank System obliged American thrift s to hedge their interest-
rate risk [the Economist 2009b].
Figure 3.2.  CDOs and transformation of subprime mortgages in ever increasing 
amounts of AAA-rated securitized debt
Source: [Making Securitization 2009]
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mortgage back securities (MBSs) and generally asset based securities (ABS), be-
ing highly complex, also for the rating agencies, became traded globally (Fig-
ure 3.2). Th ey were, and continue to be, extensively used by banks, prompted by 
the Basel capital adequacy rules, where loans to banks required one-fi ft h of the 
capital set aside for loans to non-banking institutions (1.6% vs. 8%). Th us, using 
derivates, such as the already mentioned instruments, the lending banks could 
provide more loans (and achieve more profi ts) at the same level of capital. Th e 
new-type of fi nancial instruments also helped the lending institutions to man-
age their domestic and international portfolios and to syndicate their credit risks 
to other risk-taking economic agents (Figure 3.2). Th e growing interdependence 
between the fi nancial intermediaries set the stage for a domino eff ect16 when the 
real estate bubble burst and consequently the mortgage backed securities became 
highly unwanted instruments. It has to be stressed that neither securitization nor 
derivates caused the Great Recession, but they extended it and contributed to its 
inter-sectoral and international proliferation.
In the American context, the following conclusions were reached by the Con-
gress-appointed Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, set up to investigate the 
causes of the crisis [Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2010; Hogan 2012, 
p. 13]:
 – the stability of fi nancial markets were undermined by widespread failures in 
fi nancial regulation and supervision,
 – failures in corporate governance and risk management at major fi nancial in-
stitutions were key causes of the crisis,
 – there was a combination of excessive borrowing, too risky investments and 
lack of transparency in the fi nancial system that contributed to the crisis,
 – the contagion and crisis was facilitated by poor mortgage lending standards 
and a massive use of mortgage securitization,
 – OTC derivatives contributed signifi cantly to the crisis evolvement,
 – credit agencies and their risk assessment failures played a major role in the 
crisis evolvement.
Th e Commission, not being unanimous, also found that the crisis could be 
avoided and government was ill-prepared for the crisis and its inconsistent re-
actions increased uncertainty. It noted that there was systemic breakdown in 
accountability and ethics [Hogan 2012, p. 13]. Interestingly, in the conclusions 
focused on the fi nancial sector failures, the Commission did not take a fi rm po-
sition regarding Fed monetary policy preceding the crisis (Figure 3.5).
Th e recent crisis distinguishes itself from the East Asian crisis (Section 3.2) 
and other 20th century crises by its true global scale and the fact that, apart from 
the 1929–1933 crisis, it constitutes the gravest hindrance in world economy func-
 16 At that moment about 40% of the subprime back assets were held by the European fi -
nancial institutions. I owe this comment to C. Wihlborg.
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tioning and growth. From the global perspective (see Chapter 1 and 2) the cur-
rent crisis is the result of the interplay of:
 – mistakes in economic policy,
 – shift s in global real and fi nancial spheres, as well as
 – technological advancements.
Th ese three broad groups combined had fi rst led to sectoral disruptions and 
imbalances, including fi rst of all the fi nancial intermediation sector, later they 
contaminated particular countries, and hit cross-national integration groupings 
(such as the EMU) to fi nally cover the whole world economy.
Th e common feature of major fi nancial sector shocks is that they lead to the 
necessity of public intervention, virtually in all cases consisting of fi nancial insti-
tution system recapitalization. In the past thirty years, the Scandinavian countries, 
Japan, East Asian states (Section 3.2), Eastern and Central Europe (Chapter 6) and 
the USA have been the breeding grounds of such occurrences. Th e ultimate aim of 
various intervention forms has been to restore the stability of the sector, as well as 
the trust in banks and the stock market. An ever controversial side eff ect has been 
using taxpayers’ money to rescue the endangered fi nancial institutions and, indi-
rectly, their shareholders. Th is moral ambiguity, in a non-involved observer’s point 
of view, has always provoked intense emotions and disputes. It has also incurred 
a signifi cant political cost. Th e sole manner of providing public assistance for the 
sector has depended on the scale of the risk, resource allocation method, i.e. the 
fact that if a particular system has been based on bank intermediation (the ‘Euro-
pean model’) or if the stock market has been its heart (the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model). 
Th e sector concentration scale, as well as the too big to fail dilemma [Wihlborg 
& Kowalski 2010], have also been of considerable importance (Section 3.3.2).
Another signifi cant feature of major fi nancial disruptions and, above all, the 
natural follow-up to the controversy resulting from the scale of public aid is… 
searching for the guilty. Th is ritual element is understandable; as in the case of 
aircraft  or construction site accidents, the slumps and crises alike are caused by 
human error; at the end of the day, it is a person or a group of people who turn 
out to have been at fault. Th e quest for the guilty is conducted both in political 
debates, in mass media, as well as within the corporate and academic economics 
realm. Such debates are by defi nition infested with ideology and emotions, comp. 
the Krugman vs. Lucas debate [the Economist 2009].
Th e disputes are thus centered around the level of responsibility on the part of 
the politicians: the President, Prime Minister and Secretary of Treasury includ-
ed, as well as the central banks’ governors and fi nancial supervision authorities, 
not excluding the responsibility on the part of the supervisory boards’ and pri-
vate fi nancial institutions Board of Directors’ chairmen or the shareholders and 
academic economists. Th e latter group’s responsibility concerns the intellectual 
background for corporate level decision taking, the choice of directions and the 
selection of macroeconomic policy tools.
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Th e third universal trait of fi nancial crises has been the attempt to fi nd sys-
temic corrective action and regulatory solutions of a preventive nature. In the 
case of the crisis initiated in the USA in mid 2007, the debate and dispute have 
concerned the possibility of introducing global systemic prudential solutions in 
the banking sector, or the role of the rating agencies themselves, and their op-
erational framework. What also remains the main focus of the debate is the ac-
tion to be taken to reduce the scale and intensity of ultra-short and short capital 
fl ows through the possible introduction of Tobin’s tax.
While analyzing the fi nal dimension of the fi nancial crisis consequences, it 
is well worth noticing that there exists a specifi c technological race between dif-
ferent regulatory and prudential institutions on the one hand, in some part also 
including rating agencies, and private fi nancial sector institutions on the other. 
Th e latter, oft en as the reaction to conditions created by the central bank or gov-
ernment administration policies (as will be discussed further), have become the 
source of fi nancial innovations. Product and process innovations, virtually al-
Figure 3.3.  Th e US budget defi cit and current account balance as percent 
of the US GDP
Source: GI Database
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ways preceed both the regulations introduction and the rating agencies capability 
of conducting up-to-date and adequate risk assessment connected with them.17
In light of the above mentioned comments, as well as relevant literature, the 
2007–2009 crisis can be analyzed in terms of both
 – market economy autonomous tendencies (i.e. its cyclicality) and
 – specifi c origins [Gorynia & Kowalski 2008, 2009; Kowalski 2009a; Ostrup, 
 Oxelheim & Wihlborg 2009; Kowalski & Shachmurove 2011; Płowiec 2009; 
Cline 2010; Shachmurove 2011; Taylor 2010; Catte et al. 2009; Amri,  Angkinand 
& Wihlborg 2011; Barth, Lin & Wihlborg 2012].
In the latter, there is already consent as to the fact that among the major mac-
roeconomic policy causes (Figure 3.5) there had been the American policy mix 
(Figure 3.3) including the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) monetary policy (Fig-
ure 3.4), that had preceded the crisis, especially in the period of September 2001 
 17 Th e issue of corporate governance as related to rating agencies, due to the limited space 
of the monograph is not studied here.
Figure 3.4.  World and the US money supply and world and the US GDP 
annual change
Source: GI Database
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to May 2004, as well as the economic policy, with the PRC exchange rate policy at 
the forefront [Eichengreen & Park 2006; Feng 2006; Kowalski 2008; Cline 2010].
Th e subsequent American administration expansionist fi scal policy (expens-
es connected with two Gulf Wars, cost of the American presence in Afghanistan 
and post-9/11 counter-terrorist measures, policy assistance in residential hous-
ing, etc.) had led to high budget and current account defi cits (Figure 3.3). Th ese 
processes (see Chapter 2) were accompanied by an overtly expansionist monetary 
policy of Fed (Figure 3.4) and (Figure 3.5). Similar monetary conditions had been 
prevailing in the world economy in general (Figure 3.4) [the Economist 2005].
As a consequence, a multiannual overliquidity period followed in the world 
economy. Its eff ect was a decrease in real interest rates, increase in general rate of 
debt in both public and private sectors, and majorly speculation-based increase in 
raw material (Figure 3.6) and fi nancial asset prices. Given such macroeconomic 
circumstances (Figure 3.5), the private fi nancial sector reacted by introducing 
large-scale fi nancial innovations and a tendency for fi nancial disintermediation 
appeared; banks changed their preferred asset structure towards a more liquid 
one. In this way, the fi nancial stage was set for the crisis (Figure 3.5).
Th e lack of infl ationary pressure (in terms of Consumer Price Index (CPI) or 
Producer Price Index (PPI)) stemmed from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
and other developing economies joining the global economy (Chapters 1 and 2). 
Its apparent manifestation was a regular trade surplus of PRC towards the USA. 
Th e PRC’s status, resulting from maintaining undervaluation of the reninmbi, was 
additionally strengthened by granting this country membership in the WTO in 
Figure 3.5. Background mechanism of the crisis
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Increased of asset prices
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commodity pricesEasy-money policy
Disintermediation
Financial innovations
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structure
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2001 (Chapter 1, Section 1.4.1). Th e PRC’s trade surplus went from 2.9% GDP 
in 2000 to 9.3% and 8.3% in 2007 and 2008 respectively. According to WTO data 
the share of Chinese exports in total global exports in 1990 amounted to 1.5%, in 
2000 – a year before accession to the WTO – it was 3.9%, only to reach the level 
of over 9% in 2008. In 2011, the Chinese year of record-high exports, the share 
surpassed 11.5%, i.e. it increased over seven times in the period between 1990–
2012. Within that time, the world trade share of all the major market economies 
(Japan, Germany and the USA) decreased (Figure 1.5).
China, thanks to its macroeconomic policy of being able to take advantage 
of its signifi cant yearly trade surplus, has become the major buyer of American 
treasury bonds and other fi nancial assets, thus contributing largely to the increase 
in overliquidity in the American money and credit market. China has devel-
oped into an economy of two surpluses – due to the FDI infl ow, it has registered 
a capital account surplus. Th e international trade and fi nancial fl ow tendencies, 
outlined above, have led to the deepening of global disequilibria. Th eir most 
spectacular manifestation is over 26% of total global foreign exchange holdings 
Figure 3.6. Crude oil price and non-fuel price indices. 2001.M1 = 100
Source: IMF Database
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owned by a single country – PRC. In 2010, this country, alongside Hong-Kong, 
Taiwan and Singapore, was in control of over 35% of world foreign-exchange re-
serve. Another consequence of overliquidity is the scale of daily FOREX trans-
actions. In 2010, according to BIS data, it reached US$3,981 bn; that is 6.3% of 
the global GDP (Chapter 1).
Foreign reserves controlled by the PRC and other emerging countries are cur-
rently being readjusted to the developed economy fi nancial system rules. Global 
fi nancial fl ows have been conducted within a relatively small but powerful group 
of large complex fi nancial institutions (LCFI), and as a result of this, LCFI have 
had overliquidity resources to be used at will. Th e term “large complex fi nancial 
institutions” (LCFIs) was introduced to fi nancial literature by the Bank of England 
in 2001. “It refers to those institutions that are among the largest ten participants 
in a number of capital market activities measuring relative business size” [Under-
standing 2010, p. 6]. Table 3.4 covers the top fi ft een institutions operating globally.
Table 3.4.  Top fi ft een large complex fi nancial institutions (LCFI). Defi ned by top 
book runners
Institution Coun-try
Interna-
tional 
bonds
Struc-
tured fi -
nance
US ABS
Syndi-
cated 
loans
Equities
all cur-
rencies
Rank
all in-
terna-
tional 
issuers
Rank
Rank Rank
Asia-
-Pacifi c
Rank
Europe/
Middle 
East/
Africa
Rank
US
Rank
JP Morgan Chase US 1 2 3 1 8 1 1
Barclays Bank UK 2 3 1 15 7
Deutsche Bank D 3 9 5 8 4 10
Bank of America US 4 4 2 2 6 3 4
HSBC UK 5 6 24 10
Credit Suisse CH 6 7 18 6
Citigroup US 7 7 4 6 4 7 9
UBS CH 8
BNP Paribas F 9 7
RBS UK 10 5 6 12 9
Goldman Sachs US 11 10 13 1 2 3
Morgan Stanley US 12 8 22 10 6 2
Credit Agricole F 14 9 5
Lloyds UK 8
Rabobank NL 10
US ABS – US asset backed securities.
Source: [Understanding Financial Interconnectedness 2010, p. 8].
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Th e global crisis hit these LCFIs and their interconnectedness contaminated 
the global fi nancial system. Five LCFIs out of fi ft een had been domiciled in the 
US, the rest come from Europe (four from the UK, two from Switzerland and 
France and one each from Germany and the Netherlands (Table 3.4). Th eir range 
of impact had been enhanced because they not only dominated major sections 
of the fi nancial market (Table 3.4), but they comprised bank and nonbank in-
stitutions, such as investment banks, money market funds, and special invest-
ment vehicles [Understanding 2010, p. 7]. As such they were able to boost their 
economies of scope and scale. During the fi nancial turmoil they were too big to 
fail and their operations contaminated business partners. Finally their problems 
hit the very economies they functioned in at least two ways; they infl icted losses 
on their shareholders and, being endangered, they required massive and costly 
public interventions, oft en in distant, seemingly unrelated countries (Figure 3.7).
Figure 3.7 shows the scale of interconnectedness of a small and peripheral 
EMU country – Greece. Despite the fact that banking exposure to Greece was, in 
Figure 3.7. Example of interconnectedness. Th e case of Greece
Red cluster – countries with access to funds domiciled in Luxemburg; black cluster – countries with ac-
cess to funds domiciled in the off shore centers of British Virgin Islands, Jersey, Cayman, Guernsey and 
the Isle of Man; blue cluster – access to funds with Ireland at the core; green cluster – with the US at the 
core and with other major investors
Source: [Understanding Financial Interconnectedness 2010, p. 19]
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relative terms, rather small, its economic problems and, in particular the public 
debt sent shockwaves all over Europe. It threatened the very stability of the EMU 
itself. Figure 3.7 distinguishes four major clusters of investors domiciled in vari-
ous, oft en distant countries which found themselves exposed to the Greek debt 
challenges that further contaminated other Southern EMU members. Th e rescue 
action proved to be delayed and caused even more public money to be used. Th e 
case of Greece and the other Southern EMU members triggered work on systemic 
regulation and shed light on the institutional fl aws of the very EMU construction.
Figure 3.8 summarizes the general mechanism of contagion of European banks. 
It shows systemic causes of the banking and debt crises in Europe. Commercial 
banks domiciled in the continental part of the EU before crisis used to have rather 
modest performance ratios. Under pressure from shareholders and due to bank 
management failures they seek higher profi ts in other fast growing segments of 
the fi nancial markets, including US structured instruments (Figure 3.8). Th ey 
creatively used loopholes in regulations and by creating SPVs, could redress their 
books. Th eir major failure was, however, the scale of mismatch in the time struc-
Figure 3.8. General mechanism of contagion of European banks
Source: author’s synopsis based on: [Schmidt et al. 2011, pp. 131–133]
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ture of assets and liabilities and in particular the mass use of the systemic, global 
overliquidity to engage in risky operations (Figure 3.8).
Schmidt et al. [2011, p. 133] note that total write-off s of European banks due to 
their open positions only in various securitized loans between mid 2007 and end 
2009 reached over US$350 bn for UK fi nancial institutions and over US$ 400 bn 
for banks domiciled in the EMU countries of which 50% were losses of German 
banks. Th ese losses were refl ected in stock exchanges and they hit their share-
holders. Th ey also forced central banks and governments to take orchestrated 
institutional (regulatory) and fi scal actions (Section 3.3.2). In relative terms the 
most severely hit was Ireland, whose banking sector grew to a size inconsistent 
with its economy’s GDP.18
3.3.2. Economic policy reactions
In its early stage, the fi nancial crisis was rather perceived mainly as a liquidity 
problem. In particular this attitude was held by the European Central Bank (ECB) 
[Schmidt et al. 2011, p. 140]. Soon all major central banks recognized how se-
vere the banking crisis was. Th ey began to loosen monetary policy and provide 
liquidity in all possible ways.
In the US Fed cut its target federal funds rates and has kept it at a range of 
0–25 percent since December 2008 [Calomiris, Eisenbeis & Litan 2011, p. 2]. Fed 
provided a broad variety of liquidity measures to the market participants. Among 
these were [Hogan 2012, p. 11]:
 – Term Auction Facility (TAF) that helped shore up liquidity of troubled banks 
whilst preserving some form of anonymity,
 – Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and 
its Commercial Paper Funding Facility created in order to alleviate shrink-
ing demand for Commercial Paper from the Money Market Mutual Funds,
 – Th e Money Market Mutual Funds were backed by the Fed establishing the 
Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF).
With the policy rate at a zero level Fed continued its easy monetary policy by 
implementing non-standard quantitative easing (QE). In the fi rst stage of this op-
eration (QE1) it reversed its sales of government securities, added to its portfolio 
longer term T-bonds and began purchasing housing related agency mortgage-
backed securities from Freddie, Fannie and Ginnie Mae [Calomiris et al. 2011, 
p. 35]. Fed continued its liquidity injections by deciding to implement QE2 and 
later on introducing an operation known as “operation twist”. Operation twist 
consists of [Calomiris et al. 2011, p. 36]:
 – selling short term treasuries and reinvesting the revenue to purchase longer 
term T-bonds and
 18 A similar situation was seen in Iceland, which was on the brink of fi nancial meltdown.
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 – reinvesting maturing agency and mortgage related assets in new housing re-
lated assets.
Th ese Fed actions, prompt reductions of the federal funds rate and the Ad-
ministration fi scal expansion package (Table 3.5 and 3.6) saved the American fi -
nancial intermediation system from an implosion. Th e size of liquidity created 
together with unprecedented US budget defi cit and high public debt, threatens 
future stability of the US domestic and global fi nancial system. As such, it has had 
an impact on new Central European market economies. Other central banks fol-
lowed the Fed actions (Table 3.4) with European Central Bank being reluctant to 
use the most aggressive types of actions (QE). In the European context the most 
hit was the banking sector – commercial banks play a major role in the fi nancial 
intermediation system.19
 19 Before the crisis, in EU15 the stock of loans to the private sector surpassed 97% of GDP, 
while in the US it was 51%. Stock market capitalization (% of GDP) was 58% and 95% respec-
tively. Source: [ECB Monthly Bulletin 2004, May].
Table 3.5.  Major fi nancial counter crisis measures in selected developed countries in 
Sep. 2008 – Jan. 2009
Selected 
countries
and the 
EU
Increased 
private 
sector 
deposit 
guaran-
tee
Guar-
antees 
for bank 
loans and 
debt
Funds to 
purchase 
commer-
cial paper
Pur-
chase of 
mortgage 
bonds
Ban or re-
strict on 
short-
-selling
Capital 
injections
Option to 
purchase 
toxic as-
set
the US × × × × × × ×
Japan × × ×
the UK × × × × × × ×
Germany × × × × ×
Ireland × × ×
the EU ×
Source: [Schmidt et al. 2011, p. 147].
Table 3.6.  Major fi scal cost of counter crisis measures in selected developed 
countries in 2008
Selected 
countries Capital injections Guarantees
Total of measures 
announced Total (% of GDP)
the US $250 bn $700 bn 5.1
the UK ₤50 bn ₤250 bn ₤400 bn 28.6
Germany €70 bn €400 bn €480 bn 19.8
Ireland €450 bn €450 bn 235.7
Source: [Schmidt et al. 2011, p. 147].
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In the EU, Ireland was the fi rst country that felt the heavy repercussions from 
the global crisis. Ireland had to introduce idiosyncratic policy measures towards 
the domestic banking sector. Th ose measures were “bold, quick, painful and deci-
sive, the moves that were everything that the European solutions were not” [Lord 
2011, p. 64]. A number of Irish banks went bankrupt because of their reckless 
growth, driven by overseas expansion, too high a risk appetite and, fi nally, due to 
a faulty policy of lax lending to the real estate sector in a bubble. When the scale 
of their risky exposures and bad loans became evident, the Irish government de-
cided one-sidedly to guarantee all bank deposits, to avoid bank runs. Th e EMU 
partners of Ireland had no choice but to follow suit. As the next step, the Irish 
government was de facto forced to nationalize fi ve out of six [largest] commercial 
banks and subsequently recapitalize them. Th e total fi scal cost of this interven-
tion, coupled with the slowdown of the Irish economy, resulted in more than 32 
per cent of GDP budget defi cit in 2009 [Kowalski 2012, p. 30].
In 2009 in order to proceed with banking sector restructuring the Irish gov-
ernment created the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA). Th e agency 
was modeled on the bad bank set up in Sweden of the early 1990s.20 Th e NAMA 
eff ectively slimmed down the ailing sector [Lord 2011, p. 65]. Th e transparent 
mechanism used (Figure 3.9), triggered a swift  process of unveiling the actual 
scale of the Irish banking sector failure. Another advantage of the NAMA ap-
 20 Th e diff erence between the Irish way and the banking crisis resolution used at the be-
ginning of 1990s in Sweden is that in Sweden NAMA, capitalized by the state, paid high pric-
es for the problem assets and this way partly recapitalized the ailing banks. I owe this note to 
C. Wihlborg.
Figure 3.9. Th e Irish NAMA-based approach to banking sector restructuring
No private capital available – the government rescuing the banking sector
on its own terms
The banks’ losses triggered the need for new capital
Commercial banks’ big losses unveiled
Irish commercial banks forced to sell NAMA assets at very low price
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proach was the downsizing of the banking sector to a reasonable scale in terms 
of the Irish GDP.
Th e NAMA was criticized for the actions taken [Lord 2011]. According to 
Lord [2011, pp. 65–66] the public and private cost of restructuring was very high 
and its uniform, “one size fi ts all” approach disregarded the nuances of particu-
lar bank’s individual situations (Figure 3.9). Th e scale of recapitalization needs 
forced the Irish government to apply to the IMF and the EMU for bailout. Total 
fi nancing from the European states and the IMF reached in Ireland €15,000 per 
capita and was second, only aft er Greece (€21,800) so far [the Economist 2013a, 
p. 63]. Recapitalization and deleveraging of Irish banks was done through three 
parallel strategies [Sen 2011; Lord 2011, pp. 66–67]:
 – liability management exercises (LME),
 – raising fresh equity and debt,
 – divesting assets from the balance sheet.
Th e LME were implemented through a legal act and allowed, in certain cases, 
the haircut of junior bondholders bonds to 10% of their original level. Th ere were 
also numerous cases of bond for equity swaps. While these steps gradually rein-
troduced confi dence in the Irish banking sector, they also permitted the private 
and fi scal costs of rescuing the Irish fi nancial intermediation sector to materialize.
Th e Irish banking sector crisis sheds light on the negative externalities of gov-
ernmental sector policies of the 1980s and 1990s. Consecutive Irish governments 
orchestrated and supported the development of the banking sector as one of the 
Irish national champion industries, oft en using fi scal incentives. As a result the 
Irish banking sector became signifi cantly oversized compared on the size of the 
economy and its domestic needs. Its failure brought the country economy to the 
brink of collapse and resulted in heavy rescue costs.
Th e example of Ireland shows the scale of problems in the EU banking sector. 
In other countries the public rescue operations were not that spectacular but also 
required high and orchestrated fi scal spending. Th e most publicized were cases 
of bank failures and consolidations in Belgium, Germany and Greece.21
Th e scale of fi scal rescue operations caused widespread public debate concern-
ing both the issues of guilt and general economic governance on both sides of 
the Atlantic. Budget defi cits and public debt levels focus attention because they 
are summary measures of government involvement in the economy on the one 
hand and indicate current and future public sector borrowing requirement on the 
other. In the case of the EMU, the member states only have fi scal policy instru-
ments at their national disposal. Discretionary use of fi scal policy instruments, 
however, is limited by specifi c EU rules. At the outset of the crisis, in 2007, the 
3% budget defi cit criterion was fulfi lled by 10 out of the 12 EMU countries, with 
6 countries out of 10 having budget surplus (Figure 3.10). Th e best performers 
 21 See the excellent review of the European crisis evolvement by Schmidt et al. [2011].
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in this respect were Finland and Luxembourg, 5.2% and 3.7% of GDP, respec-
tively [Kowalski 2012].
In 2007, only Greece and Portugal exceeded the level of 3% (6.7% and 3.2% 
of GDP respectively). Th e fi nancial and economic consequences in Europe af-
fected the general government fi nancial balances (GGFB) of the EMU countries 
in diff erent ways. In its peak in 2009–2010, only Finland and Luxembourg did 
not exceed the 3% level (Figure 3.10). Th e gravest GGFB downturn took place in 
Ireland (32.4% of GDP), Greece (15.6%), Spain (11.1%), Portugal (10.9%) and 
France (7.5%) (Figure 3.10). In the U.S., whose defi cit peaked at 11.9% in 2009, 
the situation was diff erent from the EMU because it could control its own national 
fi scal and monetary policies. In subsequent years (2010–2012), all the countries 
tried to sort out their public fi nance conditions. Greece, however, does not fall 
into the latter category, having found itself on the verge of bankruptcy aft er the 
revised data became public.
Consecutive budget defi cits stemming from fi nancial sector public rescue 
operations and recession were refl ected in growing public debt levels. Accord-
ing to Eurostat data, in 2007 there were only 5 EMU countries, namely Luxem-
bourg – 6.7%, the Republic of Ireland – 25%, Finland – 35.2%, Spain – 36.1%, 
and the Netherlands – 45.3% that maintained the debt to GDP ratio on a level 
Figure 3.10.  General government fi nancial balances as % of GDP in 2007–2012 
(estimate)
Source: [Kowalski & Shachmurove 2013]
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lower than the 60% of GDP. Other countries had higher debt levels, to a greater 
or lesser extent; Austria, with its 60.7%, had the lowest deviation from the 60% 
level, while Belgium, Italy and Greece produced the highest i.e., 84.2%, 103.6% 
and 105.4%, respectively. In the fi rst crisis-ridden year, all EMU countries, ex-
cept Finland, increased the debt to GDP ratio in comparison with the level of 
2007. In contrast, in 2011, the U.S. increased its debt burden by 64 percentage 
points against the level of 2007. In the two years that followed, as a reaction to 
the crisis and as a consequence of the increased public fi nance sector defi cits, 
the countries augmented the levels of their debt. Th e lowest level of debt increase 
in 2010 as compared to 2007 was the share of Italy, Belgium and Austria, which 
amounted to 114.9, 115, and 119 percentage points of the 2007 level respective-
ly. Th e highest public debt increase during the 2007–2010 period was the share 
of Ireland – 385 percentage points higher than the 2007 level, Spain – 166, the 
Netherlands and Finland – about 138, as well as Portugal and Greece – 136 and 
137 percentage points respectively.
Th e fi nancial market participants, based on new information regarding the 
quality of macroeconomic data reduced investment in the treasury securities of 
Greece and other southern EMU countries; they rightly perceived such invest-
ments as a threat to their own credit rating. As more data about the Greek mac-
roeconomic accounting fraud were released, and due to the delayed ECOFIN and 
ECB reactions, a negative sentiment towards most debt by the European Com-
munity countries began to surface. As a result, the banking sectors were hit again, 
especially the French and Italian, the most involved in the treasury securities of 
the EMU countries of the highest debt to GDP ratios. It consequently meant the 
need to off er further public aid to the contaminated banks.
Contrary to the EMU countries, policymakers in the U.S. had more room for 
maneuver in their use of fi scal instruments [Kowalski & Shachmurove 2013]. 
As the crisis deepened, the U.S. responded with aggressive expansionary fi scal 
measures (see Table 3.5). Th is was clearly evidenced by the near quadrupling of 
the U.S. defi cit relative to GDP. In the initial year of the crisis, 2007, the U.S. had 
a defi cit to GDP ratio of –2.9%. By 2009, once the full scale of the crisis was ap-
parent, this fi gure leapt to –11.9% (Figure 3.10). With the passage of the Trou-
bled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in late 2008 and the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, the federal U.S. government attempted to 
improve the worsening economic situation [Kowalski & Shachmurove 2013]. 
Th ese programs account for the rapid increase in U.S. defi cit to GDP ratio. Th e 
fl exible and discretionary use of fi scal instruments allowed the U.S. government 
to implement massive public spending, although some, such as Krugman and 
Stiglitz, advocated an even larger stimulus. Th e level of defi cit in the U.S. in 2009 
(–12.9%), relative to the EMU economies, ranks it amongst the largest (Figure 
3.10). While Ireland, by far, saw the largest deterioration (to the level of –32.4%), 
in 2012 the U.S. had the highest budget defi cit of –8.5%. Even at the height of the 
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crisis, with the exception of Ireland and Greece, no EMU countries saw defi cit 
levels near that of the U.S.
3.3.3. Economies reactions to the crisis
Figure 3.11 presents the GDP per capita at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). Th is 
is a summary measure of economic performance of countries. It takes into ac-
count the diversifi ed price levels between the US and also variations amongst the 
EMU countries. Th ese statistics grasps the diff erences in real GDP volumes and 
price levels triggered by the global fi nancial crisis.
According to the World Development Indicators Database, in the pre-crisis 
year of 2007, the three countries with the highest PPP in the EMU were: Lux-
embourg (Int.$74,144), Ireland (Int.$41,025) and the Netherlands (Int.$37,577). 
Th e least wealthy were Spain (Int.$28,522), Greece (Int.$26,733) and Portugal 
(Int.$21,993). Consequently, PPP in Luxembourg was 3.4 times that of the least 
wealthy, Portugal, in 2007.
As the data presented in Figure 3.11 indicate, in 2008, Ireland and Italy, and to 
a lesser degree France, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain, were the fi rst to be neg-
Figure 3.11. GDP per capita, at PPP (constant 2005 Int.$). 2007 = 100
Source: [Kowalski & Shachmurove 2013]
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atively impacted by the global fi nancial crisis. 2009 witnessed the highest adjust-
ments of real GDP per capita for all the EMU countries, except Ireland, Greece and 
Spain, which also suff ered from continuous declines throughout 2010 and 2011.
In order to compare the GDP level in 2010 to the 2007 pre-crisis level, based 
on the WDI Database, it is worth noting that the top three countries are the same. 
Th e only diff erence is Ireland that dropped to the third position, behind Luxem-
bourg and the Netherlands. Due to the crisis and the decline in real GDP, Italy 
dropped to tenth position, remaining only ahead of Greece (11) and Portugal 
(12). Th e U.S. began amongst the bottom three countries, falling considerably 
through the crisis years. By early 2009, GDP per capita rose above Luxembourg, 
Finland, Spain, Greece and Italy. Only Germany, though, has recaptured its pre-
crisis level of per-capita GDP.
Between 2007–2010, the real per-capita GDP of the wealthiest country, Lux-
embourg, was 3.3 times that of the least wealthy, Portugal. Th is diff erence was 
little changed over the crisis years. Th e data show that in comparison with 2007, 
in the year 2010, per-capita GDP level was the same in Germany (Figure 3.11). 
Relatively high per-capita GDPs were in Austria, Portugal, Belgium and the Neth-
erlands. Th e most acute results of the crisis, as measured by per-capita purchas-
ing power GDP, were Ireland, where its GDP in 2010 amounted to slightly over 
86% of the 2007 level, with Italy and Greece at approx. 93%.
Th e Great Recession had its impact on the competitiveness positions of the 
US and EMU economies in the Global Competitiveness Reports (GCR). During 
2007–2011, the top three EMU performers in the GCR were the same, namely: 
Finland, Germany and the Netherlands (Table 3.7). In 2007–2011, Finland was 
three times the most competitive EMU economy, while Germany twice. Th ese 
three countries also belonged to the top 10 most competitive economies in the 
world in 2007–2011. In the same period, the bottom four economies were also 
the same, i.e., Spain, Portugal, and Italy with Greece being steadily the worst per-
former in the GCR.
Table 3.7 presents the relative positions of the U.S. and EMU countries ac-
cording to the Global Competitiveness Reports (GCR) for the period 2006–2011. 
Ireland was the hardest hit economy in CGR rankings losing 7 positions (from 
22 to 29), but within the EMU ranks it went down only from 7th to the 8th po-
sition. Th e most punished EMU economy was however Greece, where its GCR 
position deteriorated from 65th in 2007 to 90th in 2011. Th e crisis showed strong 
discrepancies between the best Northern and Southern EMU members. Addi-
tionally, while the U.S. has been losing competitiveness since 2008, it still ranks 
high compared to EMU countries. Even as the U.S. fell to fi ft h position in 2011, 
of the EMU countries, only Finland held a higher GCR ranking. Th e decline in 
relative competitiveness is, in part, the result of the emergence of China and oth-
er developing countries. Th e fi nancial crisis spread across the globe and was felt 
over the world. However, it was most strongly felt in the developed economies, 
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whose mature fi nancial institutions were more closely linked. Th is allowed for the 
transmission of the crisis. Th e gap between the average CGR positions of the top 
three and the average position of the bottom four economies increased from 39 
positions in 2007, 40 and 41 notches in 2008 and 2009, respectively to as many 
as 48 in 2010 and 2011 (see Table 3.7).
Conclusions
Th e recent fi nancial crisis has been the most serious disruption in economic 
growth in post WWII history. It is called global for its widespread repercussions. 
But in fact it hit the US and higher-developed European economies the most. 
It unveiled their very high fi nancialization. Th e scale of unprecedented leverag-
ing was especially seen in fi nancial institutions domiciled in the US and Europe. 
Universal banks, contrary to the conservative model, refi nanced their asset ex-
pansion not through their own deposit development but mostly with borrowed, 
in the international money market, capital. Th is strategy was facilitated by over-
liquidity created by the Fed and other central banks.
Global overliquidity and regulatory and supervision failures led to unsustain-
able asset price increases and speculation-driven commodity prices hikes. Th e 
Table 3.7.  Relative positions of the U.S. and EMU countries in the Global 
Competitiveness Reports (GCR) in 2006–2011
2006 2007 2008 (2008–2009)
2009 
(2009–2010)
2010 
(2010–2011)
2011 
(2011–2012)
US (1) US (1) US (1) US (2) US (4) Finland (4)
Finland (6) Germany (5) Finland (6) Finland (6) Germany (5) US (5)
Germany (7) Finland (6) Germany (7) Germany (7) Finland (7) Germany (6)
Holland (11) Holland (10) Holland (8) Holland (10) Holland (8) Holland (7)
France (15) Austria (15) Austria (14) France (16) France (15) Belgium (15)
Austria (18) France (18) France (16) Austria (17) Austria (18) France (18)
Ireland (22) Belgium (20) Belgium (19) Belgium (18) Belgium (19) Austria (19)
Belgium (24) Ireland (22) Ireland (22) Luxemb. (21) Luxemb. (20) Luxemb. (23)
Luxemb. (25) Luxemb. (25) Luxemb. (25) Ireland (25) Ireland (29) Ireland (29)
Spain (29) Spain (29) Spain (29) Spain (33) Spain (42) Spain (36)
Portugal (43) Portugal (43) Portugal (43) Portugal (43) Portugal (46) Italy (43)
Italy (47) Italy (46) Italy (49) Italy (48) Italy (48) Portugal (45)
Greece (61) Greece (65) Greece (67) Greece (71) Greece (83) Greece (90)
Numbers in parentheses refl ect countries’ total GCR ranks.
Source: author’s synopsis based on Global Competitiveness Reports.
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global decrease in interest rates that followed led to consumer and mortgage 
credit booms and consequently to excessive debt burdens. It also contributed to 
real estate bubbles.
Overliquidity, advances in IT and fi nancial technologies facilitated fi nancial 
innovations. Financial liberalization alongside development and spread of com-
plex, nontransparent fi nancial instruments was faster than adequate reactions on 
the side of regulators, fi nancial supervisory authorities and central banks. Th is 
specifi c arms race made central bank functioning diffi  cult, because it disturbed 
classic signals such as consumer and producer price indices and sizably reduced 
central banks impact on domestic fi nancial markets. Th ese trends made the inter-
national fi nancial system more and more interdependent and autonomous from 
feasible interventions of individual central banks and regulators.
Th e worst fi nancial crisis since the Great Depression would not be possible 
without specifi c necessary macroeconomic conditions. Th e entrance of PRC 
onto the global market created major supply and demand shocks in the global 
economy. It disturbed global price mechanisms and strongly infl uenced global 
fl ows of savings. Th e combination of these major structural and transitory phe-
nomena activated main pass through mechanisms between the macro level and 
the mezzo and micro dimensions of the modern developed economies. With the 
high interconnectedness they infl uenced the economic development of Central 
European new market economies.
Anti-crisis economic policy measures fi rst of all focused on restoring both 
trust in fi nancial institutions and capital markets liquidity. Central banks reduced 
their policy rates close to zero and used unconventional ways to inject liquidity 
into the ailing fi nancial institutions. On the fi scal side, governments had to ac-
cept budget defi cit levels that, before 2007, would be seen as unacceptable. Due 
to these actions global fi nancial liquidity is similar to that of the 2007 pre-crisis. 
Any sustainably global solution would require more international economic pol-
icy coordination. New current and long-term economic policy and regulatory 
solutions will be very diffi  cult to work out and would require active involvement 
of the US, EU (EMU) and PRC.
4
ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE
Th e aim of this Chapter1 is an empirical evaluation and comparison of Poland’s 
economic transformation from 1990–2012 against the results achieved by the 
Central European countries (CECs) – Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slo-
vak Republic and Ukraine and the economic performance of Southern Europe-
an countries (SECs), namely Greece, Portugal, Spain and Turkey. Th e Chapter, 
drawing on fi ndings of the fi rst two Chapters of this book, focuses on major eco-
nomic aspects of market transformation. Consequently, the empirical analyses 
center on the initial macroeconomic stabilization frameworks and then on the 
general growth factors and mechanisms embedded in a standard growth model.
Th e Chapter is divided into four Sections and Conclusions. Th e fi rst Section 
explains the selection of countries compared to Poland and briefl y outlines the 
macroeconomic transformation context. A conceptual framework of a standard 
production function is used to focus attention on the main determinants of eco-
nomic performance. Th e second Section discusses the initial conditions of the 
transition in Poland and the other CECs under examination. Special attention 
is paid to major structural and macroeconomic conditions on the threshold of 
transformation. Th e third Section is devoted to the assessment of selected growth 
factors and impediments to growth. Th e fourth Section focuses on general out-
comes of transformation in terms of real eff ective exchange rates, GDP per capita 
and international competiveness rankings of the World Economic Forum. Th e 
analysis is summarized in Conclusions.
4.1. Analytical background of comparative analysis
Th e selection of Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, and Ukraine as 
countries for the comparative analysis with Poland was based on the following 
grounds. Hungary was a country that had been reforming and transforming its 
 1 Th is Chapter draws on and develops my earlier publications [Kowalski 2009b, 2010 and 
2013].
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economy since the end of the 60s. Examination of Hungary allows comparison 
between the results of gradual reforms and the results of the radical alterna-
tive of the quick pro-market shift  implemented in Poland [Kowalski, Wihlborg 
& Vensel 2007]. A comparison with Czechoslovakia,2 which had considerably 
higher economic development, a relatively good initial macroeconomic situ-
ation and where the reforms were introduced one year later than in Poland, 
should allow assessment of the signifi cance of initial structural diff erences and 
the specifi c premium resulting from the possibility of watching Polish pioneer 
experiences during the fi rst months of transformation. Ukraine, at the outset of 
transformation, used to have a rather signifi cant structural similarity to Poland, 
i.e. the high importance of agriculture and natural resources to the economy. 
Moreover, the Ukrainian GDP level per capita in 1990 was the same as in Po-
land. Furthermore, Ukraine, as a post-soviet economy, should shed some light 
on the soviet type-institutional and social heritage and its impact on business 
and macroeconomic performance. Incorporation of Ukraine into the analysis 
allows verifi cation of whether this country took advantage of a backwardness 
premium, since it had started the political emancipation process in August 1991. 
As a result, Ukraine had an opportunity to launch full market transformation as 
an independent state and to base its actions on the experience of Hungary, then 
Czechoslovakia and Poland.
Th e choice of South European countries (SECs), namely Greece, Portugal, 
Spain and Turkey for comparative analysis with Poland stems from the fact that 
the fi rst three joined the EU relatively late and the fourth, with European Un-
ion membership aspirations, is generally seen as one of the most promising fast 
growing market economies. Greece and Turkey3 both applied to become associ-
ated states in 1959. Greece was accepted as a member state in 1981. Portugal and 
Spain joined the then European Economic Community in 1986. Th ese EU coun-
tries were much less developed than the Northern countries, and in the case of 
Spain and Portugal, for many years had non-democratic polity. Also Greece, at 
the end of the seventies, had a military coup and rule. Th us, they were not only 
relatively poorer but, basically being market economies, entered European inte-
gration with institutions infl uenced by an authoritarian heritage. Th us to some 
extent they had a number of similarities to Poland and other CECs. Comparing 
Poland’s case with SEC growth, reactions to the pace of globalization would shed 
light on Poland’s and their relative performance and development sustainability.
Evaluation of the economic consequences of the transition process of 1990–
2012 requires a consistent theoretical and methodological context. For this rea-
 2 1st January 1993 Czechoslovakia ceased to exist. In its place, came into being the Czech 
and Slovak Republics.
 3 Th e 1999 Helsinki EU summit declared that Turkey obtained recognized candidate sta-
tus.
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son, in this Chapter the transformation process is seen as composed of two major 
stages:
 – a macroeconomic stabilization stage and implementation of fundamental in-
stitutional changes and
 – a stage of growth and adjustments of initial economic policy measures accord-
ingly to the specifi c challenges of a particular country.
Th e initial macroeconomic conditions were of crucial importance for the 
required economic reform package. In the longer perspective, structural fea-
tures of a particular economy played a decisive role. Th e fi rst stage of econom-
ic transformation can be investigated both in the context of macroeconomic 
analysis and in the context of microeconomic adjustments of companies and 
households to the new economic environment [Kowalski & Janc 1999; Gorynia 
& Jankowska 2005]. An important analytical context, useful for describing both 
phases, is provided by the new institutional economics [Williamson 2000; Pal-
dam & Grundlach 2008].
In the second phase of transition, qualitative factors and conditions began to 
prevail. Th e most important were: consistency and determination in the process 
of reforms, fl exibility, privatization of the economy, ability to improve the busi-
ness environment quality and innovation potential. Except for Ukraine, consist-
ent implementation of the European Union’s acquis communautaire, stemming 
from EU membership aspirations also played an important regulatory and mod-
ernization role in economic development of the studied countries. Th ese condi-
tions and factors, together with objective structural constraints, have infl uenced 
economic growth and the feasible scale of improvements in living standards. It 
is useful to analyze long-term aspects of transformation in the context of growth 
theory and shift s in international competitiveness.
4.1.1.  Macroeconomics and institutional conditions in the 
CECs at the stabilization phase
At the end of the 1980s, there was no normative theory for the transformation of 
a centrally planned economy into the market-driven economy based on private 
ownership. At the time, the source of inspiration could have been experiences 
related to the consecutive failures of the stabilizing programs implemented un-
der the auspices of the International Monetary Found (IMF) in South Ameri-
can economies [Rodrik 2011]. J. Williamson’s “Washington Consensus” became 
a general recipe containing conditions for eff ective market reforms [William-
son 1990]. Th e “Washington Consensus” was developed in a context that diff ered 
greatly from the transition economies in Central Europe. Th e South American 
countries were basically market economies but with defi cient regulatory and po-
litical institutions [Wojtyna 2008a].
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In Poland in 1989, the general conviction of the necessity of deep institutional 
reform was accompanied by an awareness of the geopolitical barriers of the time. 
Th e basic problem was designing a macroeconomic stabilization framework (see 
Section 4.1.2). Th e scale of the problem stemmed from deep domestic and ex-
ternal disequilibria, a spread between the offi  cial and the market currency ex-
change rate, fl ight from the zloty, hyperinfl ation, biased price structure, entirely 
monetized budget defi cit, near lack of a commercial banking sector, “tradition” 
of a negative real interest rate, and administrative credit regulations.4
In the case of each particular country, macroeconomic stabilization and con-
stitutional reforms required designing and implementing a new institutional envi-
ronment (qualitative policy). At the same time, the new authorities had to design 
and implement specifi c instruments of quantitative policy. All of this had to be 
accomplished under fragile new social and political conditions.
4.1.2.  Transformation vs. growth theory and 
competitiveness
Th e former centrally planned economies were not only cut off  from autonomous 
market-based international relations. Th eir capital allocation mechanism was 
biased towards resource-oriented sectors. Th e main long-lasting hindrance to 
growth has been, however, either destruction (as in the case of e.g. Ukraine) or 
underdevelopment (as in the case of other Central European, less controlled by 
the then Soviet Union countries) of market institutions and market-based rules 
of thumb. Together with generally insuffi  cient social capital, these elements of 
institutional infrastructure and quality of economic governance determined the 
starting point of market transformation and continued to exert strong impact 
on the growth pace of new Central European market economies. Th is way of in-
terpreting impediments to development are refl ected in a modern generation of 
growth and comparative studies [Rapacki & Próchniak 2012; Ahlerup,  Olsson 
& Yanagizawa 2009; Jong-A-Pin 2009; Rapacki 2009; Acemoglu & Johnson 2005; 
Malaga 2004; Campos & Coricelli 2002; Havrylyshyn 2001].
Any international comparisons of economic performance and growth re-
quire a consistent tool of analysis and appraisal. Th e main focus in this Chapter 
centers on the pace of development since the introduction of market reforms in 
1989/1990. Th us, a growth model based on a Cobb-Douglas production function 
seems to be a suitable tool for comparative static and dynamic analyses. Follow-
ing Gylfason and Hochreiter [2010, pp. 7–10] and assuming constant returns to 
scale, real GDP – Y is a function of (4.1):
 4 At the end of 1989, the free market exchange rate (at ‘bureau de change’) was four times 
higher than the offi  cial rate of the NBP, and about 80% of household cash holdings were kept 
in US dollars and German Marks [Kowalski & Stawarska 1999].
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 Y = AHaKbNcL1–a–b–c, (4.1)
where:
 A – total factor productivity (TFP),
 H – human capital,
 K – fi xed capital,
 N – natural capital, including land,
 L – labor,
 a, b, c – GDP elasticities of growth factors.
By dividing both sides of equation 4.1 by L we express output per head (4.2) 
as a function of total factor productivity A, human capital per head H/L, fi xed 
capital per head K/L and natural capital per head N/L:
 
a b cY H K NA
L L L L
? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?
. (4.2)
Basically, in all CECs under investigation labor growth was low or even de-
clined. It was due to institutional and technological changes that made some la-
bor redundant. With natural capital playing in the European context and under 
globalization a lesser role, the main contemporary driving forces of growth are 
total factor productivity, which means general effi  ciency improvement – A, real 
capital per head – K/L and human capital per head – H/L. Following Gylafson 
and Hochreiter [2010, pp. 8–9] and assuming for simplifi cation c = 0 and output 
elasticity of fi xed capital is 1/3 and output elasticity of human capital is 2/3 equa-
tion 4.2 can be now expressed as follows (4.3):5
 
1 1 1 1.51
a b
b b
bY H K K HA A
L L Y Y L
? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
.  (4.3)
Total factor productivity6 (TFP) – A represents a part of economic output 
which is unexplained by inputs of labor (hours worked) or capital used. Th us 
TFP summarizes various institutional and technological sources co-determining 
growth paths of modern economies.7 First of all they encompass the impact of 
 5 Th is simplifi cation is used in relevant literature: [Mankiw, Romer &Weil 1992, quoted 
aft er Gylafson & Hochreiter 2010; see also Rapacki & Próchniak 2012].
 6 Also called multifactor productivity (MFP) [see: Shackleton 2013, p. 3].
 7 It is worth emphasizing that in the standard approach to production function analysis, 
parameter A represents unit technology eff ectiveness. As such it indicates a certain moment 
in time and can be used in particular in a comparative static approach. I owe this clarifi cation 
to W. Jurek.
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the most important building blocks of globalization (see Chapter 1), which are: 
implemented technological and organizational innovations and economies of 
scale and scope, stemming from openness and various forms of trade, including 
intra-industry trade and trade in tasks [Rynarzewski & Zielińska-Głębocka 2006; 
Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg 2008; Kellman & Shachmurove 2012].
Typically TFP also refl ects social capital understood as a broad institutional 
development and incorporates relationships and rules that create a societal frame-
work of interactions. Th is framework, when well developed, facilitates coordi-
nation and cooperation and thus general economic governance (see Chapters 5 
and 6). Economic governance is a broad concept covering the quality of main 
market reforms and then the economic policies that followed (see Chapters 2 
and 3). Th ese qualitative factors played a major role in the path of Poland’s and 
other CECs development and are still a reservoir of potential effi  ciency reserves. 
Th ey also are important in the context of South European EU member states and 
Turkey. Th ese countries, in comparison to the UE core countries, were latecom-
ers to the global economy and as such had to begin a delayed process of catching 
up. Consequently their general effi  ciency was and still is lower than Northern 
EU countries. Th is is why the South European EU members and Turkey can be 
used as a reference point for Poland and Central European countries in their 
catching up process and also their reactions to the global fi nancial crisis (see 
Chapter 6).
Human capital per capita – H/L may be quantifi ed in terms of the number of 
schooling years or other measures of education development. Following Gylaf-
son and Hochreiter [2010, pp. 9–10] quantifi cation of the K/Y relationship8 may 
be expressed as in equation (4.4):
 Kt = It + (1 – δ)Kt–1.  (4.4)
Where It stands for gross investment in year t, and δ represents rate of deprecia-
tion. Dividing (4.4) by Y, denoting rate of growth of Y and K by g, and rearrang-
ing we have equation (4.5) [Gylafson & Hochreiter 2010, p. 10];
 
1K g I
Y g δ Y
? ??? ? ??? ?
.  (4.5)
Denoting investment ratio I/Y by s and substituting equation (4.5) into (4.3) we 
have:
 1.5 1Y g HA s
L g
? ?? ? ?? ? ? ? ?? ? ?? ?δ L
.  (4.6)
 8 K/Y is assumed to be proportional to the investment rate I/Y.
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Equation (4.6) conceptually generalizes factors determining evolvement of 
output per head. Assuming that the rate of depreciation – δ is similar in the com-
pared countries, their output per capita depends on total factor productivity, 
human capital per head, rate of growth of capital – g, and investment ratio – s. 
Th erefore, equation (4.6), bringing together all major groups of growth factors, 
creates a sound conceptual framework for an international comparative static and 
dynamic analyses of Poland and the Central and South European economies in 
their course of catching up.
Th e fundamental objectives of macroeconomic stabilization and liberal insti-
tutional reforms in CECs were high sustainable growth based on improved inter-
national competitiveness. In general, analysis and assessment of competitiveness 
of a given economy can be based on two approaches. Th e fi rst is founded on the-
oretical and empirical models of the scale and variations of deviation of the real 
eff ective exchange rate (see Chapter 2) from the equilibrium exchange rate [see: 
Egert 2004; Marrevijk 2004; Rubaszek & Serwa 2009].
Th e international cost and price contexts of the CECs competitiveness are 
the best outlined in the Balassa-Samuelson framework [Balassa 1964; Samuel-
son 1964]. Following De Grauwe and Schnable [2005, pp. 538–541] and using 
a two-factor Cobb-Douglas function for production conditions in the tradable 
sector, T and nontradable NT sector we have [Kowalski, Kowalski & Wihlborg 
2007, pp. 80–81]:
 1( ) ( )
i iγ γi i i iY A K L ??   0 < γi < 1  i = T, NT. (4.7)
Marginal producvtivity of labor calculated from (4.7) is expressed as in (4.8)
 (1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) (1 )
i i
i i
γ γi i i i i i
ii i
Y Yγ A K L γ γ Q
L L
?? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?
, (4.8)
where:
i
i i
YQ
L
? .
In the competitive conditions the marginal productivity of labor (4.9) corresponds 
to real wage in the respective i sector, where real wage is the ratio of W/P in the 
tradable and the nontradable sectors:
 (1 )
i i
i
i i
Y Wγ
L P
? ? , (4.9)
where:
 W i – the nominal wage rate in the i-sector,
 P i – respective price levels.
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Assuming that WT = WNT = W and following equation (4.9) we obtain (4.10):
 
(1 ) (1 )
(1 )(1 )
T
T
T T NTT T
NT NT NT T
NT
NTNT
Y Wγ γ Q PL P
WY γ Q Pγ PL
? ?
? ? ?
??
. (4.10)
Replacing 
(1 )
(1 )
T
NT
γ
c
γ
?
?
?
 in (4.10) and rearranging (4.10) we get (4.11):
 
T NT
NT T
Q Pc
Q P
? . (4.11)
Assuming for the CECs that their EMU partners tradable prices, PET, are exog-
enous and constant and that purchasing parity holds, we can express the CEC 
price level of tradables, PCT, as in formula (4.12):
 /
T T
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where: 
/
T
C
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E
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P
?  – the CEC exchange rate against the euro. 
Substituting PT in (4.11) by the RHS of formula (4.12) we obtain expression 
(4.13) showing the Balassa-Samuelson eff ect framework, and thus integrating all 
major cost and price determinants of CEC international competitiveness. More-
over, formula (4.13) shows a diffi  cult interrelation between real sector develop-
ments, namely productivity developments, and monetary policy (infl ation and 
exchange rate) challenges in the course of Poland’s and other CECs future EMU 
membership
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Th e second approach to measuring international competitiveness is based on 
comparative analysis of primary statistical data such as GDP per capita, infl ation 
rate, unemployment rate, exports growth rate, etc., leading to compound indi-
ces such as those published by the World Economic Forum (WEF) or Institute 
for Management Development (IMD) [see: World Economic Forum 2013; IMD 
2013]. Th ose compound indices are composed on the basis of a sample of pri-
mary statistical data characterizing given economies and subjective measures of 
their business and institutional environment quality.
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Th is approach was pioneered by M. Porter [1990], who brought and applied 
his methodology initially set for evaluation of companies’ competitiveness to the 
macroeconomic level. At present, in this commonly used framework, the competi-
tive advantage of a particular economy is derived from comparative advantages 
both at a company and a sectoral level. Porter’s approach distinguishes four groups 
of national competitiveness determinants [Gorynia 2007, pp. 93–95; Kowalski 
2012, pp. 25–26]: resource supply, demand factors, sectoral cooperation network, 
and fi nally factors contributing to the business environment. Transformation of 
these potential determinants into an actual set defi ning a competitive advantage 
of a particular country requires favorable but oft en only temporary exogenous 
conditions and an adequate economic policy aimed at triggering autonomous ad-
justment processes [Gorynia 2007, p. 93]. Th is general competitiveness concept 
is, aft er some adjustments, used for example in Global Competitiveness Reports 
(GCR). Th e recent GCRs are based on twelve pillars of competiveness (Table 4.1).
Th e pillars of competitiveness used in the GCRs apparently refer to mecha-
nisms and models of the contemporary international economics [see: Rynarze-
wski & Zielińska-Głębocka 2006; Krugman & Obstfeld 2006; Carbaugh 2013]. 
Th e GCR distinguishes three main and two interim phases of development and 
competitiveness (see Table 4.2). Two criteria are used to allocate countries into 
particular stage of development namely [GCR 2012–2013, p. 8]:
 – level of GDP per capita at market exchange rates and
 – share of exports of mineral goods in total exports of goods and services.9
 9 It is assumed that countries whose mineral products exports surpass 70% of their total 
exports (measured by a fi ve-year average) are factor-driven [GCR 2012–2013, p. 9].
Table 4.1.  Twelve pillars of competitiveness and main stages of development 
according to GCR
Basic requirements Institutions Factor-driven economies
Infrastructure
Macroeconomic stability
Health and primary education
Effi  ciency enhancers Higher education and training Key for effi  ciency-driven 
economiesGoods market effi  ciency
Labor market effi  ciency
Financial market sophistication
Technological readiness
Market size
Innovation & sophistication 
factors
Business sophistication Key for innovation-driven 
economiesInnovation
Source: Global Competitiveness Report [World Economic Forum 2011–2012, p. 8].
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Table 4.2 shows how GCR rankings are constructed: for countries falling be-
tween two stages, the weights change smoothly allowing for gradual transition to 
the next stage of development [GCR 2012–2013, p. 9]. Th e WEF country rank-
ings strongly accentuate social and human capital factors (Table 4.1); among ba-
sic requirements, institutions, infrastructure and macroeconomic stability can 
be considered aspects of social capital, whereas such effi  ciency enhancers like 
health primary, education and higher education, and training represent human 
capital. Effi  ciency of markets, sophistication, technological readiness and innova-
tion (innovation and sophistication factors) can be viewed as products of both 
social and human capital.
4.2. The fi rst phase of the transformation process 
in the CECs
4.2.1. Initial conditions in Poland and in selected CECs
Initial political and social conditions in Poland were relatively favorable for re-
forms (see Section 4.1). Round Table talks and proceedings paved the way for par-
liamentary elections and for election victory of the reforming group – the Civic 
Committee led by Lech Wałęsa. Th e government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki could 
count on the support of the Civic Parliamentary Club and of the other parties 
of the Sejm – Poland’s parliament. Polish society demonstrated a relatively high 
level of self-organization achieved on the basis of the rise and evolution of the 
Solidarity trade union during 1980–1981. In this area, the case of Poland and its 
Table 4.2. GCR subindex weights and income thresholds for stages of development
Criteria and weights
Stages of development
stage 1: 
factor-
-driven
transition 
from 
stage 1 to 
stage 2
stage 2: 
effi  ciency-
-driven
transition 
from 
stage 2 to 
stage 3
stage 3: 
innovation-
-driven
GDP per capita criterion, 
US$
<2,000 2,000–2,999 3,000–8,999 9,000–
17,000
>17,000
Weights for basic require-
ments subindex
60 40–60 40 20–40 20
Weights for effi  ciency en-
hancers subindex
35 35–50 50 50 50
Weights for innovation and 
sophistication subindex
5 5–10 10 10–30 30
Source: Global Competitiveness Report [World Economic Forum 2011–2012, p. 9].
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group of political and trade union activists that had taken power as a result of 
the election was unique.10
Th e major macroeconomic conditions on the threshold of the transition pro-
cess are presented in Table 4.3. Th e Czech Republic was in the best initial mac-
roeconomic situation. Th is refers to its GDP growth dynamics and industrial 
production of the time and also to the infl ation rate and the budget situation or 
public debt (Table 4.3). Th e Czech Republic also had the lowest share of agricul-
tural production in the GDP structure and the highest GDP per capita by a clear 
margin (Section 4.4). Macroeconomic conditions in the Slovak Republic, together 
with the Czech Republic, which constituted one country at the time (Czechoslo-
vakia), were thus relatively favorable.
Table 4.3.  Macroeconomic Conditions in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, the 
Slovak Republic and Ukraine in 1989
Specifi cation Poland Hungary CzechRepublic
Slovak
Republic Ukraine*
GDP dynamics (%) 0.2 0.7 4.5 1.0 –4.0
Industrial production dynamics (%) –0.5 –2.1 1.7 –0.7 –0.1
Unemployment rate (%) 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
Infl ation rate (average annual %) 251.1 17 1.4 2.3 4.2
Budget balance (% GDP) –3.0 –1.2 –1.2 –0.6 ND
Currency reserves, excl. gold (US$ bn) 2.31 1.25 5.74 ND ND
Foreign debt/GDP (%) 49.3 65.8 11.4 10.3 ND
GDP per capita at PPP** 8,038 12,399 16,211 12,536 8,063
Share of industry in GDP (%) 44.1 43.7 ND 58.5 44.6
Share of agriculture in GDP (%) 11.8 15.6 6.3 9.4 25.6
Share of the private sector in GDP (%) 30 5 5 5 10
* Data for 1990; ND – no data. **PPP – Purchasing Power Parity (in US$ of 2005).
Source: EBRD, WDI Database and national Databases.
Th e remaining three countries faced more diffi  cult conditions. Th e worst mac-
roeconomic situation was in Poland, where the centrally planned economy had 
ceased to function, while the new mechanism, despite the highest share of private 
sector in the GDP creation, had not yet started to work properly. Poland was not 
 10 Polish democratic opposition, thanks to the broad social base and tradition of self-or-
ganization, was the best prepared to exercise power. Th e situation looked diff erent in the other 
countries. For example, J. Urban, one of the leading dissidents in Czechoslovakia, recalled in the 
Lettre Internationale in 1995 that, […] in 1989, the active opposition in the country amounted 
to about 60 people, and they could count on around 500 supporters. According to J. Urban, the 
existing opposition felt totally isolated and their contact with society was very diffi  cult.
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able to service its foreign debt, and along with the galloping infl ation, discontinu-
ity of supply of consumption and investment goods appeared. Poland and Ukraine 
had the lowest GDP per capita (Section 4.4). Ukraine had a very diffi  cult start to 
a market economy as well. It mainly stemmed from its links with other republics 
of the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the disintegrating Russian 
Federation’s economy, which were all falling into a deep economic crisis. How-
ever, the biggest problem for the Ukrainian economy and society proved to be the 
heritage of the Soviet system, that is underdevelopment and in fact destruction 
of social capital and the lack of tradition, experience, and institutions indispen-
sable for appropriate functioning of a market-led economy. As time has shown, 
Ukraine, and its political sector, was not able to handle these problems adequately.
4.2.2.  Stabilization programs and fi rst reactions of the 
CECs’ economies
Th e implemented stabilizing programs had to refl ect the specifi c situation of each 
particular country (Table 4.4). However, they all had some common features: re-
establishing of monetary policy signifi cance (both in the sense of nominal and 
real anchors) and targeting it at reducing infl ation, initial and step devaluations 
of the currency exchange rates, introduction of internal convertibility of curren-
cies for enterprises and limited external convertibility and implementation of 
hard budget constrains in state-owned fi rms and entities.11
Th e program that had been implemented in Czechoslovakia since January 
1991 was similar to the one introduced in Poland a year earlier (see Table 4.4). 
Th e countries diff er signifi cantly in the degree of determination and consistency 
of the authorities responsible for the shape and implementation of the stabilizing 
programs. Th e comparison of Poland’s and the Ukraine’s situations is an emphat-
ic example. In the latter case, the fi rst attempts at reforms were made in 1992.12 
However, the reforms were partial and the authorities’ actions lacked consisten-
cy. As a result of the worsening economic situation in Ukraine in 1994, another 
attempt at regulating the monetary, fi scal and exchange rate policies was made. 
Moreover, monetary reform was implemented in 1996 [Barisitz 1999]. Th ese ac-
tions also turned out to be ineff ective, and Ukraine can be viewed as an example 
of a reform failure caused by internal divisions and the inability of the political 
sector to work for the common good.
At the outset of economic transformation, countries reforming and stabilizing 
their economies also faced external negative supply shocks (rise in oil prices) and 
demand shocks (dramatic decline in eff ective demand for many exported goods 
 11 O.J. Blanchard, when analyzing the experience of the fi rst years of transformation, em-
phasizes the importance of implementation of hard budget constraint [Blanchard 1994].
 12 Ukraine regained its independence in 1991.
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and implosion of economies of the USSR and German Democratic Republic). 
Th ese factors, together with the objective path dependence in vast parts of the 
economy still controlled by state agencies, were responsible for transformational 
recession (Table 4.4).
Th e course of transformational recession diff ered in particular countries. Th e 
Polish recession, measured as the decline in GDP and industrial production, was 
the mildest among all Central European countries, and in Poland fi rst growth 
was reported already in 1992. Th e most diffi  cult situation was in post-soviet 
countries. In Ukraine (Table 4.4), GDP compared to the level achieved in 1989 
declined the most. Gradually, in the course of macroeconomic stabilization, the 
location of the prime problem – infl ation – was taken by high structural unem-
Table 4.4.  Stabilization programs and major initial conditions of transformation in 
Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Ukraine
Specifi cation Poland Czechoslo-vakia Hungary Ukraine
Launching the program January 1990 January 1991 continuum November 
1994
Monetary policy restrictive restrictive adaptive restrictive
Fiscal policy restrictive restrictive expansive restrictive
Incomes and wage rate policy restrictive restrictive moderate mild
Exchange rate policy devaluation devaluation crawling
devaluation
devaluation
Nominal anchor fi xed exchange 
rate and wage 
control
fi xed exchange 
rate and wage 
control
currency rate 
(periodically)
managed 
fl oating rate
Real anchor interest rate money supply 
and interest 
rate
money supply money supply 
and interest 
rate
Internal convertibility (for 
companies)
yes yes yes yes
Internal convertibility (for 
households)
yes restricted restricted restricted
External convertibility restricted restricted restricted very restricted
Main privatization method direct coupon direct coupon
Date of starting privatization 1990 1992 1990 1995
Launching the stock exchange 1991 1992 1989 1991
Year of the lowest level of GDP 1991 1992–1993 1993 1998
Scale of decrease (1989=100) 82.2 84.6–75.0 81.9 36.6
Source:  author’s own synopsis based on national data and also on: [Gros & Steinherr 2004; Hochreiter 
1999; Bennett et al. 2003].
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ployment (see Section 4.3.4.1). Th is had strongly infl uenced social perception of 
market reforms and political transition and also contributed to divergence of in-
come and wealth distributions.
4.3. Phase of growth
4.3.1. Population and human capital development
Th e new economic, social and political conditions in the CECs increased uncer-
tainty on one hand but, on the other they opened unprecedented new possibili-
ties for social and professional mobility, especially for young people. One of the 
most visible side eff ect of these processes were signifi cant population changes 
(Figure 4.1a, 4.1b, Table 4.5). Total fertility rates13 in Poland and the CECs were 
declining until 2003 (Figure 4.1a). At the outset of market transformation only 
Poland and Slovak Republic used to have the fertility rate higher than 2. In con-
sequence, in 1990–2005, all CECs, except Poland and the Slovak Republic, had a 
negative population growth (Table 4.5). Also SECs (Figure 4.1b), except Turkey, 
 13 Th e total fertility rate in a specifi c year in the number of children that would be born to 
each woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years (…) OECD Family Database.
Figure 4.1a. Total fertility rate in CECs in 1990–2011
Source: WDI Database
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had low total fertility rates. In the course of time even Turkey recorded declining 
fertility. However it maintained its position as the only country under investiga-
tion having a fertility rate higher than the replacement rate.
Ukraine showed the strongest negative dynamics of population growth. Th ese 
population trends, resulting from the decline in the birth rate and emigration, are 
a major challenge to economic policy.14 Th ey also had an eff ect on the age struc-
ture of the CECs and the development of GDP per capita (see Section 4.4). Th e 
direction of changes in the dynamics of population growth in CECs are contin-
ued (Table 4.5), and Poland and the Slovak Republic will also experience a nega-
tive population growth in 2005–2015.
 14 Poland during 2004–2006 had an emigration rate (the number of emigrants per 1000 in-
habitants), ranging from 0.1 in the group 55–64 years to 0.7 in the group 15–24 [see: Schreiner 
2008, p. 95].
Figure 4.1b. Total fertility rate in Poland and SECs in 1990–2011
Source: as in Figure 4.1a
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Negative average annual rate of population growth had been recorded in all 
countries of the region with no exceptions. However, at the same time, in all ex-
amined CECs except Ukraine, the average life expectancy (Figure 4.2a) increased 
signifi cantly when compared to 1990. As shown in Figure 4.2a, the biggest im-
provements in this measure of the quality of life, and of public health operations, 
were reported in 2010 in the Czech Republic (77.4 years) and Poland (76.2 years). 
It is also interesting that, during the transformation process, the diversifi cation 
of the measure increased. In 1990, the lowest value was 69.3 (Hungary) and the 
highest was 71.4 (Czech Republic); thus, the diff erence between the fi ve analyzed 
Table 4.5.  Annual average population growth rate in CECs in 1990–2005 and 
forecast for growth in 2005–2015
Country 1990–2005 2005–2015
Poland 0.0 –0.2
Hungary –0.2 –0.3
Czech Republic –0.1 –0.2
Slovak Republic 0.1 –0.1
Ukraine –0.6 –1.1
Source: [World Bank 2007].
Figure 4.2a. Average life expectancy at birth in CECs in 1990–2010
Source: WDI Database
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CECs was 2.1 years (Figure 4.2a). Aft er twenty years of transformation, in 2010, 
the lowest average life expectancy was 70.2 in Ukraine and the highest 77.4 (the 
Czech Republic), so the diff erence increased to 7.2 years. Th erefore, in this spe-
cifi c social rivalry, the Czech Republic (increase in life expectancy by 6.0 years) 
and Poland (increase in life expectancy by 5.3 years) experienced the greatest 
improvement amongst the CECs. Figure 4.2b shows average life expectancy at 
birth in Poland and SECs in 1990–2010. All SECs and Poland experienced a ris-
ing tendency, but the most signifi cant improvement was recorded by Turkey; it 
increased average life expectancy by 10.6 years reaching the level of 73.7 years in 
2010 (Figure 4.2b). Greece, Portugal and Spain continued to have visibly higher 
life expectancy than Poland and Turkey. In 1990–2010 Portugal and Spain gained 
5.0 and 4.8 years respectively.
Th e analyzed countries had achieved a relatively high level of primary school 
enrollment. Th is aspect of state activity and spending was not signifi cantly neg-
atively aff ected, even during the transformational recession. In 1991 secondary 
Figure 4.2b. Average life expectancy at birth in Poland and SECs in 1990–2010
Source: as in Figure 4.2.a
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school enrollment in Poland and Hungary continued at 87% and 86%, respec-
tively.15 In 2009, the level of enrollment reached 97% (Poland) and 98% (Hun-
gary). Also, in the Slovak Republic – 90% (2010), Czech Republic – 91% (2009) 
and Ukraine – 96% (2010), a high proportion of young people continued their 
education at the secondary level. Secondary school enrollment in Turkey in 
1990 was well below 50% and in Portugal it was 60% . Both countries improved 
their enrollments rates dramatically; Turkey surpassed 88% in 2003 and Portu-
gal reached the level of over 106%. Th e highest growth and its variability and also 
level of secondary school enrollment was recorded by Spain, where in 2010 this 
ratio was over 124.7%. At this background Poland’s situation was relatively good.
Th e situation in tertiary education was highly diff erentiated (see Figure 4.3a 
and 4.3b). Th e weakest initial conditions in CECs were in Hungary, the Slovak 
Republic, and the Czech Republic, where only 15%, 16% and 16%, respectively, 
of young people continued their education at the tertiary level. By the end of the 
analyzed period (Figure 4.3a) Hungary’s average tertiary school enrolment ratio 
reached a high level of 64% (a spectacular increase of 49 percentage points com-
pared to 1990), and Poland’s average ratio reached a level of 69% (improvement 
also by 49 percentage points).
 15 WDI 2012 Database.
Figure 4.3a. Tertiary enrollment rate in CECs in 1990–2010
Source: WDI Database
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Th e situation also improved signifi cantly in the Czech Republic (about 57%) 
and in the Slovak Republic (ca. 54%). Th e highest school enrollment ratios (Fig-
ure 4.3a) at the tertiary level of education were achieved by Ukraine (average 
level of 93%). Th e analyzed CECs, in particular Poland, considerably improved 
the availability of this level of education mainly through development of private 
education, focusing on the humanities and social sciences, rather than techni-
cal education.
Th e tertiary school enrollment ratio achieved in Poland and the CECs under 
examination was higher than in countries with medium income levels. Moreo-
ver, in the case of Hungary and Poland, the achieved level is similar to countries 
with the highest income per capita, and in Ukraine it was even higher. Quanti-
tative data shows that the development of human capital achieved by the end of 
the examined period was good. However, rapid growth in the number of students 
and their concentration in the humanities and social sciences contributed to the 
mismatch between qualifi cation supply and the actual demand for workforce. It 
Figure 4.3b. Tertiary enrollment rate in Poland and SECs in 1990–2010
Source: WDI Database
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also explains the frustration of the young generation and their readiness to emi-
grate in order to seek jobs in better developed European economies.
Figure 4.3b shows tertiary enrollment rates in Poland and the SECs in recent 
years. In 1990 Poland and Portugal used to have similar and low enrollment rates. 
Over the course of years the rates of tertiary enrollment in Poland, Portugal and 
Spain have converged. Since 1999, tertiary education in Greece had become al-
most universal (Figure 4.3b) reaching over 90%. Against this background Turkish 
tertiary enrollment, although increasing from 12% (1990) to almost 46% (2010) 
is low (Figure 4.3b).
Despite human capital development, CECs and SECs had persistent high un-
employment (Section 4.3.4.1). Th ese countries experienced modest increases in 
wages including minimum wage rates (Figure 4.4a, 4.4b).16 At the beginning of 
transformation Poland had the lowest statutory minimum real wage rate (Fig-
ure 4.4a). In the course of time the Czech and Slovak Republics and Hungary 
experienced a clear convergence of real statutory minimum wage rates. Later, 
Poland achieved the highest minimum wage rate in the CECs.
In Greece, Spain and Portugal, real statutory minimum wage rates were higher 
than in CECs. Turkey used to have the lowest wage rates in comparison to all an-
alysed countries. At the end of the period, Poland’s real statutory minimum wage 
rate achieved the level of the statutory rate in Portugal (Figure 4.4b).
 16 A minimum wage rate is not a perfect measure of prevailing pay conditions. Th e OECD 
Database is the only source covering all the CECs and SECs, except Ukraine.
Figure 4.4a. Real hourly minimum wages in CECs (US$, at PPP)
Source: OECD Database
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Real minimum wage rate developments in CECs and SECs refl ect the in-
stitutional framework of particular countries and a number of structural and 
transitory factors. Th e minimum wage rates are also typically used for social 
security policy purposes. Wage rates in CECs, and to a certain degree also in 
SECs signal one of their most important comparative advantages. On the other 
hand they refl ect a relatively low level of social productivity and the stiff  cost 
and price competition pressure prevailing in the current stage of globalization 
(comp. Chapter 1). Low wages and salaries and mismatch of supply and demand 
of qualifi cations and skills are the main causes of emigration from CECs and 
aft er 2009 from SECs.
4.3.2. Investments
Investments, particularly in fi xed assets, is the main driving factor of the increase 
in physical capital per capita (see Section 4.1.2). Figures 4.5a and 4.5b and Table 
4.6 indicate the pace of evolution of real fi xed investment annual growth from 
1990. Th e most striking tendency is the high changeability in annual growth rates 
Figure 4.4b. Real hourly minimum wages in Poland and SECs (US$, at PPP)
Source: as in Figure 4.4a
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Figure 4.5a. Real fi xed investment growth in CECs, percent change from a year earlier
Source: Global Insight (GI) Database
Figure 4.5b.  Real fi xed investment growth in Poland and SECs, percent change from 
a year earlier
Source: as in Figure 4.5a
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of real fi xed investment. In CECs, the highest variation was recorded in Ukraine 
and the Slovak Republic (Table 4.6). Interestingly, Poland’s real fi xed investment 
growth rate was relatively the most stable and on average, along with Turkey, the 
highest (Figure 4.5b and Table 4.6). In the SECs, the most dramatic fl uctuations 
were recorded in Portugal and Greece (Figure 4.5b and Table 4.6). Th e high stand-
ard deviation coeffi  cients signal the scale of dependence of real fi xed investment 
annual growth on external factors, exports developments in particular. Invest-
ment, capital fl ows and trade are main channels of globalization impact on na-
tional economies.
Figures 4.6a and 4.6b present the share of gross capital formation in GDP over 
1990–2011 in CECs and SECs respectively. In the fi rst phase of transformation, 
the share of total investment in GDP had fl uctuated signifi cantly. At the end of 
the period, there was convergence of gross capital formation shares in GDP. Po-
land, for most of the period, had the lowest share of total investment in its GDP 
(Figure 4.6a).
During the entire period, the average rate of total investment in Poland was 
about 21% of GDP – the lowest among all the countries included in the study 
(Figure 4.6a). In Hungary, this rate was higher by 2 percentage points, and in 
the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, it was higher by about 7 percent-
age points. All SECs used to have a higher than Poland gross capital formation as 
percent of GDP (Figure 4.6b). Detailed statistical parameters of the whole sample 
are presented in Table 4.7. In 1990–2011 Spain had the highest average share of 
gross capital formation in its GDP. Th e SECs displayed relatively high uniformity 
both in terms of average share and in terms of standard deviation and coeffi  cient 
of variability of gross capital formation.
Table 4.6.  Descriptive statistical parameters for real fi xed investment growth in 
CECs and SECs in 1990–2012
Country Maximum Minimum Range Average Standard deviation
Number of 
observa-
tions
Czech Republic 13.23 –11.39 24.63 2.08 5.63 17
Hungary 12.84 –10.98 23.82 2.01 6.35 21
Poland 21.90 –9.81 31.71 6.40 8.35 22
Slovak Republic 30.12 –27.33 57.44 0.82 13.49 23
Ukraine 27.40 –50,49 77.89 1.15 19.83 22
Greece 20.43 –20.75 41.18 1.14 9.85 23
Portugal 14.17 –13.75 27.91 0.59 6.80 23
Spain 11.33 –16.57 27.89 1.68 6.85 23
Turkey 30.54 –29.97 60.51 6.75 15.54 23
Source: own calculation based on GI Database.
Figure 4.6a. Gross capital formation in CECs in 1990–2011 as percent of GDP
Source: WDI Database
Figure 4.6b.  Gross capital formation in Poland and in SECs in 1990–2011 as percent 
of GDP
Source: as in Figure 4.6a
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Th e foundation of investment and a precondition for a long-term sustainabil-
ity of the macroeconomic equilibrium is an adequate supply of domestic savings. 
Domestic savings in Poland and the compared countries were lower than internal 
demand for funds. Th is meant that in the whole period (with temporary excep-
tion of Ukraine) these countries were net borrowers. Th is trend triggered struc-
tural current account defi cits (see Section 4.3.3).
Supplementary source of funds and an important element in the reconstruc-
tion and modernization of the economies was the infl ow of foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) (Figures 4.7a and 4.7b). FDI supplemented the domestic capabilities 
to invest [Drahokoupil 2008]. In CECs the infl ow of net foreign direct investment 
(net FDI) as a percentage of GDP was very high. Th e highest volatility of net FDI 
was registered in Hungary (Figure 4.7a). Also the Slovak Republic – a country 
with a signifi cant infl ow of large investments in the automotive industry [Stępniak 
1998] recorded signifi cant fl uctuations of net FDI (from 0.6% of GDP in 1997 
to almost 12% of GDP in 2002). During 1990–2011, the average scale of net FDI 
in Poland, Ukraine and the Czech and Slovak Republics was around 3% of GDP 
and it was signifi cantly higher in Hungary (9.0%) (Figure 4.7a). FDI infl ow was 
a crucial element in the reintegration of the countries with the European and 
global markets by aff ecting both the supply and demand sides of the transition 
economies. In SECs (Figure 4.7b) the fl uctuations of net FDI were visibly lower 
than in the CECs. Against this background Poland’s situation was much similar 
to the group of SECs than the CECs. Average net FDI was the lowest in Greece 
(0.84% of GDP) and Turkey (1.13% of GDP). Interestingly, over the entire period, 
Greece, Spain and Poland enjoyed relatively the most stable net FDI.
Table 4.7.  Descriptive statistical parameters for gross capital formation in the CECs 
and SECs in 1990–2012 (% of GDP)
Country Maxi-mum
Mini-
mum Range Average
Standard 
deviation
Coeffi  -
cient of 
variation
Number 
of obser-
vations
Czech Republic 33.77 21.75 12.02 27.51 2.82 10.26 22
Hungary 27.65 15.51 12.14 22.83 3.20 14.03 22
Poland 25.26 14.41 10.85 20.74 3.16 15.26 21
Slovak Republic 34.28 19.89 14.39 27.47 4.10 14.91 22
Ukraine 36.29 17.06 19.23 24.14 5.42 22.44 22
Greece 26.53 14.53 12.00 22.38 3.04 13.59 22
Portugal 28.71 17.43 11.29 24.22 2.87 11.83 22
Spain 30,98 20.87 10.11 25.29 3.09 12.20 22
Turkey 26.62 14.94 11.68 21.21 3.07 14.47 22
Source: own calculation based on WDI Database.
Figure 4.7a. Foreign direct investment in the CECs, net infl ows as % of GDP
Source: WDI Database
Figure 4.7b.  Foreign direct investment in Poland and the SECs, net infl ows 
as % of GDP
Source: as in Figure 4.7a
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4.3.3. Foreign trade liberalization
4.3.3.1. Openness of the economies
As already noted in Section 4.1 and 4.2, liberalization of foreign trade was com-
mon for stabilization programs implemented in all countries. Already on the 
threshold of market transformation, the importance of exports and imports of 
goods and services was diversifi ed. Largely, it was a function of domestic market 
size, availability of resources, and the competitive capacity of exports. Gradually, 
the structure of foreign trade changed, mainly due to the infl uence of FDI (see 
Section 4.3.2 and Kellman, Shachmurove [2012]). Th e ratio of the export value 
of goods and services to GDP is given in Figure 4.8a and 4.8b. In 1990 in Poland, 
the Slovak Republic, Ukraine and Hungary, the share of exports of goods and 
services in GDP was at a similar level of around 30 percent, while the Czech Re-
public started at a level around 40 percent.
Th e years of market transformation saw high volatility in the share of exports 
in GDP. Th is was a result of both changes in the value of exports and the volatility 
of GDP dynamics in the countries in transition. Th e highest variation appeared 
in Ukraine (Figure 4.8a). It resulted from a strenuous search for diversifi cation in 
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Figure 4.8a. Exports of goods and services in CECs as % of GDP
Source: WDI Database
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the geographical structure of exports and the limitation of the dependence upon 
the market of the former Soviet Union.
In the case of Poland and the Czech Republic in 2004, the eff ect of trade crea-
tion appeared as an increase in the share of exports in GDP by 4.2 and 8.3 per-
centage points, respectively. In general, all countries signifi cantly increased their 
ratio of exports to GDP (Figure 4.8a) Th e increase in export capacity can be in-
terpreted as evidence of the ability of the countries to meet strong competition in 
the Single European Market.17 Th e relatively smaller increase for Ukraine refl ects 
the already high, as for such an economy, trade exposure at the outset of trans-
formation and turbulences in trade with the former Soviet republics.
In SECs (fi gure 4.8b) trade exposure was lower and more stable than in CECs. 
In 1990–2011 on average it varied from 21% for Turkey to 24–28% for Spain and 
Portugal respectively. Since 2009, all SECs recorded higher trade exposure, mainly 
due to contraction in their GDP. Poland’s export performance deserves special at-
tention. Already in 2001–2002 its share of exports of goods and services in GDP 
began to grow signifi cantly, surpassing all SECs, including Spain – an economy 
of similar size of the domestic market. Th is trade creation eff ect of general mod-
ernization and FDI and then EU membership in 2004 is probably the most vis-
ible proof of Poland’s ability to employ its comparative advantages and to cope 
with stiff  competition on the Single European Market.
4.3.3.2. Exports of high-technology products
Typically, the share of high-technology products in manufactured exports (Fig-
ures 4.9a and 4.9b) is seen as a major indicator of economies’ innovativeness and 
competitiveness. Figure 4.9a indicates that the initial situation of Polish exports of 
 17 Th e countries (with the exception of Ukraine) export over 65% of their goods and ser-
vice exports to the market of the EU-27.
Figure 4.8b. Exports of goods and services in Poland and SECs as % of GDP
Source: as in Figure 4.8a
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Figure 4.9a.  High-technology exports as per cent of manufactured exports in CECs 
in 1992–2010
Source: WDI Database
Figure 4.9b.  High–technology exports as per cent of manufactured exports in 
Poland and SECs in 1992–2010
Source: as in Figure 4.9a
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high technology was disadvantageous. Th is was due to both longstanding neglect 
and relatively low spending on research and development and the predominant 
signifi cance of inter-industry trade, based on the relatively rich endowment of raw 
materials and labor resources. Th e low share of high technology products in manu-
factured exports in the fi rst half of the 1990s was also characteristic of other coun-
tries of the region (Figure 4.9b). Over time, as a result of FDI (see Section 4.3.2), 
the fi rst signifi cant modernization of the export structure and an increase in the 
value of high-technology exports took place in Hungary and the Czech Republic. 
Th e biggest success was achieved by Hungary with an increase from 4.2% in 1992 
to an average for 2004–2010 amounting to 25%. Th e Slovak Republic and Poland 
were less successful; in 2004–2010 they attained an average share of high-technol-
ogy products in manufactured exports of over 6 and 4 per cent respectively (Fig-
ure 4.8a). Th is is an interesting outcome because the quality of human capital in 
Hungary (see Section 4.3.1) did not diff er positively from that in Poland or Slovakia.
4.3.4.  Structural changes triggered by economic growth, 
transformation and globalization
So far, based on the fi ndings presented in Section 4.1, the focus has been on 
identifi cation and assessment of the most important initial conditions and fac-
tors determining the course of transition from a centrally planned to a market-
Figure 4.10a.  Annual consumer price infl ation in CECs in 1990–2012 (% change 
from a year earlier)
Source: GI Database
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led economy. At the beginning of market transformation, infl ation was the most 
diffi  cult negative externality (Figure 4.10a and 4.10b).
All CECs except Ukraine introduced modern, consistent with the EU acquis 
communautaire, legislation guaranteeing political and functional independence 
of their central banks [Hochreiter & Kowalski 2000]. First it facilitated the re-
duction of infl ation expectations and then the actual infl ation (see Chapter 2). In 
fact it took CECs almost ten years to reduce it to one digit levels. Th e best per-
former in this respect was the Czech Republic (Figure 4.10a). Poland was able to 
reduce its infl ation from almost 600% in 1990 to 7.3% in 1999. Generally, except 
for Ukraine, CECs infl ation converged to low and stable levels. Th e same was true 
for SECs except for Turkey (Figure 4.10b). In 1999 Greece, Portugal and Spain, 
preparing for the EMU membership, reduced their CPI infl ation to 2.6%, 2.3%, 
2.3% respectively. Th ey continued to have their CPI at relatively low trajectory 
but still it was higher than in the EMU northern countries having negative im-
pact on their relative international competitiveness.
Paralell to sucsesful anti-infl ation eff orts other vital structural challenges un-
veiled. Th ey constrained development and were a result of interplay of globali-
zation and path dependence of CECs. Due to the specifi c situation in Poland, 
Figure 4.10b.  Annual consumer price infl ation in Poland and the SECs in 
1990–2012 (% change from a year earlier)
Source: as in Figure 4.10a
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structural unemployment has been considered the main side eff ect of market 
transformation. Moreover, in order to emphasize features of the Polish transi-
tion, attention should be paid to the specifi c role of agriculture in the employment 
structure. Unemployment, the very low employment rate and the specifi city of 
Polish agriculture had a signifi cant impact on the growth of income divergence 
and social inequality and the general assessment of Poland’s achievements and 
failures in 1990–2012.
4.3.4.1. Unemployment
Open unemployment (Figures 4.11a, 4.11b and Table 4.8) was unknown in the 
centrally planned economies. Nevertheless, the actual scale of wasted labor re-
sources in the form of overemployment was high. Th e fact of being formally em-
ployed obfuscated the perception of the majority of the citizenry of the actual 
status quo. Implementing the hard budget constraint at company level and trade 
liberalization led to the emergence of unemployment. Th is phenomenon became 
the most socially severe side eff ect of the transition process.18 As clearly indicat-
ed by the data in Figure 4.11a, at the very beginning of transformation there was 
 18 When examining the practice of stabilization programs (Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2), it is easy 
to notice that the main eff ort and attention was focused on fi ghting infl ation, which undoubt-
edly, especially in Poland, jeopardized the foundation of the economy. However, it quickly be-
came clear that structural unemployment was the serious ballast of the transformation process.
Figure 4.11a. Unemployment rate in CECs
Source:  author’s calculations, based on [EBRD 2008] data and 2012 WDI Database
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an increase in the unemployment rate in each analyzed country; the scale and 
pattern of the increase varied considerably (see Figure 4.11a). It depended on 
structural and cyclical factors such as the enterprises’ speed and scope of adjust-
ment to global market signals, degree of workforce mobility, and its supply and 
demand structural mismatches. In Poland, important factors behind the growth 
and durability of unemployment were the circumstantial solutions regarding ac-
cess to benefi ts for loss of employment and to provision of health care. Th e path 
and scale of unemployment in Poland and in the Slovak Republic were similar 
(Figures 4.11a and Table 4.8). Without doubt, in Poland and the Slovak Repub-
lic, average unemployment rates were the highest in CECs and thus constituted 
the most nagging side eff ect of their transformation process19. At the end of the 
period, the unemployment rate in the countries most severely aff ected by this 
 19 Th e relatively mild course of the labor market adjustment process in Ukraine is worthy 
of attention. It resulted from the long-term state dominance in the economy and the lack of 
genuine company restructuring. Th e price of this status quo was a low, and sometimes nega-
Figure 4.11b. Th e unemployment rate in Poland and SECs
Source:  author’s calculations based 2012 WDI Database
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phenomenon began to decrease. Th is process was the result of a combination of 
favorable conditions: pre-2008 prosperity in major EU trading partners and in 
the world, FDI’s results and migration opportunities aft er May 1, 2004 [see for 
example: Sinn & Werding 2001].
Unemployment has also been a major structural problem in SECs (Figure 4.11b 
and Table 4.8). Th e most severe was in Spain, where the average unemployment 
rate in 1990–2011 reached 16%. Both Portugal and Spain used to have the highest 
in the SECs variation coeffi  cients with 33.73 and 31.49 respectively (Table 4.8). 
In Poland the unemployment rate began to decrease in 2002 (Figure 4.11b). Th e 
global fi nancial crisis hit both CECs and SECs. However, Poland’s unemployment 
rate in 2011 was lower than in SECs.
4.3.4.2. Changing role of agriculture
In the period directly preceding the reforms and market transformation, the 
share of agriculture in GDP was highest in Ukraine (FigureS 4.12a and 4.10b). 
A relatively high share of this sector in GDP was also characterizing Hungary (ca. 
15%). In Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics, agriculture accounted for less 
than 10% of their GDP in 1990 (Figure 4.12a). As the years went by, strong ten-
dencies in diminishing share of agriculture in GDP occurred. Th is process was 
particularly visible in Ukraine, where the share of agriculture in GDP decreased 
by 22 percentage points (see Figure 4.12a). During this period, the signifi cance 
of agriculture decreased in Poland and Hungary to a level of approximately 4% of 
their GDP and in the Czech and Slovak Republics to less than 3% of their GDP 
tive, economic growth rate and the expanding gap between Ukraine and the other analyzed 
countries in transition.
Table 4.8.  Descriptive statistical parameters for unemployment rate in the CECs 
and SECs in 1990–2012
Country Maxi-mum
Mini-
mum Range Average
Standard 
deviation
Coeffi  -
cient of 
variation
Number 
of obser-
vations
Czech Republic 8.8 2.3 6.5 6.2 1.86 29.81 20
Hungary 12.1 5.7 6.4 8.4 1.99 23.68 20
Poland 19.9 7.1 12.8 13.5 3.78 28.00 20
Slovak Republic 19.3 9.6 9.7 14.4 2.90 20.13 19
Ukraine 11.6 5.6 6.0 8.6 1.84 21.37 17
Greece 17.7 7.0 10.7 8.9 2.16 21.83 22
Portugal 12.7 3.9 8.8 6.6 2.24 33.73 22
Spain 23.9 8.3 15.6 16.0 5.03 31.49 22
Turkey 14.0 6.5 7.5 9.2 1.88 20.43 22
Source: author’s calculation based on WDI Database.
Figure 4.12a. Share of agriculture in GDP in CECs (value added as % of GDP)
Source:  WDI Database
Figure 4.12b.  Th e share of agriculture in GDP in Poland and the SECs (value added 
as % of GDP)
Source:  as in Figure 4.12a
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(Figure 4.12a). In Portugal and Spain,20 the pattern of changes in the agricultural 
role in GDP creation was similar to Poland. Th ere was a visible convergence of 
these countries with Poland, at the end of the period, which still had a slightly 
higher share of agriculture in GDP than the two countries from the Iberian Pen-
insula (Figure 4.12b). Th e Turkish GDP creation structure signifi cantly diff ers 
from that in Poland, Portugal and Spain. Since 1997 the role of agriculture in 
Turkey began to diminish, but in 2011 it was still about three times higher than 
in Portugal and Spain.
During the transformation process, the reduction in the share of agriculture 
in GDP was accompanied by a reduction in the share of employment in agricul-
ture in total employment (Figures 4.13a and 4.13b). It stemmed from the ration-
alization of production triggered by the withdrawal of government subsidies to 
this sector of the economy as well as trade liberalization.
Th e highest share of employment in agriculture in 1989–1990 took place in Po-
land, Ukraine and Hungary – over 25%, 19% and 18% respectively (Figure 4.13a). 
In 1993–1994 in the Slovak and Czech Republics it was about 10% and 8% respec-
tively. Aft er 20 years of a new economic environment, the share of agricultural 
employment in total employment stabilized in the Czech and Slovak Republics 
to about 3% and at over 4% in Hungary. In 2009–2010 this share for Poland was 
 20 No data for Greece is available in the WDI Database.
Figure 4.13a. Employment in agriculture in CECs (% of total employment)
Source: WDI Database
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still about 13% and for Ukraine (the last available data for 2007–2008) it was still 
about 16% (Figure 4.13a). On the one hand the relatively slower decline in the 
share of agriculture in the total employment in Ukraine and Poland, created some 
protection against a substantial infl ux of an oft en low-qualifi ed workforce to cit-
ies; on the other, it led to the continuation of low productivity of the workforce in 
this sector.21 Th e share of agricultural employment in total employment in SECs 
countries displayed similar trends (Figure 4.13b). In all respects the situation in 
Turkey was specifi c: in 1990–1991 the agricultural employment reached over 47%, 
but over twenty years it dropped by 24 percentage points to about 23%. Portu-
guese and Spanish agricultural employment also declined (Figure 4.13b). Th ere 
were similarities between Greece and Poland, where aft er years of the diminish-
 21 In Poland the retention of employment in agriculture at a relatively high level prevent-
ed social tensions in cities. Th ese tensions could have occurred if an infl ux of people seeking 
employment in industry and services had accompanied the low dynamics of job creation in 
those sectors.
Figure 4.13b.  Employment in agriculture in Poland and the SECs (% of total 
employment)
Source: as in Figure 4.13a
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ing role of agriculture in employment its share in total employment in 2010 was 
12.5% and 12.8 respectively.
Relatively high levels of agricultural employment in total employment have 
their negative impact on total social productivity. Th is stems from the fact that 
generally agricultural productivity per employed worker is much lower than in 
manufacturing and services. Figures 4.14a and 4.14b show the situation in both 
groups of countries. Th ere were two clear regularities in the analyzed group of 
countries. Th e fi rst is stable and low productivity in Ukraine (from about US$1,200 
to 2,500 per employee), in Poland (from about US$1,600 to 3,000) and in Tur-
key (from about US$2,200 to about 3,700). Productivity in Portugal was higher 
than in these three countries but was growing at a similar pace (Figure 4.14b).
Th e second regularity is the emergence of a group of other countries, whose 
productivity of employment in agriculture was much higher and had higher 
volatility and higher growth dynamics. Th is was particularly visible in the case 
of Spain and Hungary, where the value added per employee in agriculture was 
about seven and three times higher respectively than in Poland during 2009 and 
2010. Th e Czech and Slovak Republics were able to improve their productivity 
in agriculture per worker more than Poland: in 1993 Polish agriculture value 
added per worker was at the level of 35% (of the Czech Republic) and 44% (of 
Figure 4.14a.  Value added in agriculture in the CECs per employee (in constant US$ 
of 2000)
Source:  WDI Database
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the Slovak Republic), in 2010 it was still only 35% of the Czech and dropped to 
30% of the Slovak level.
Th is feature of agriculture in Poland, to a considerable extent, was the result of 
agrarian and production structures and stemmed from overemployment in this 
sector. Excessive employment in agriculture was oft en a consequence of the lack 
of adequate job opportunities in urban areas located within the vicinity where 
agricultural workers lived. Low labor productivity in agriculture infl uences both 
the distribution of income in Poland and drags its GDP per capita (see Sections 
4.3.4.1 and 4.4).
4.4. GDP per capita and competitiveness
While assessing the overall course and results of market transformation in Po-
land and CECs, one should take into consideration globalization (Chapter 1), the 
general economic policy background at that time (Chapters 2 and 3) and domes-
Figure 4.14b.  Value added in agriculture in Poland and the SECs per employee 
(in constant US$ of 2000)
Source: as in Figure 4.14a
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tic circumstances that accompanied this process (see Sections 4.1 and 4.2). It is 
clear that some had a unique, specifi c nature; others represented a set of common 
characteristics. Given the inheritance of centralized, totalitarian systems (with 
its milder variant in Poland and Hungary) and the opportunities these countries 
could have used in the phase of growth, it can be concluded that the comparative 
advantages which Poland used to have on the threshold of the transition process 
seem to have eroded rather quickly.22 Furthermore, the transformation process 
of the CECs continued under stiff  international competition magnifi ed by both 
globalization and the implications of EU membership, including functioning of 
the Single European Market. Th ese processes reduced room for maneuver of na-
tional economic policies and enhanced the role of autonomous adaptation capa-
bilities at the micro level.
 22 Th is refers to social mobilization and the ability of society to self-organize themselves 
(Solidarity trade union). Poland could benefi t not only from the Commercial Codes existing 
since the interwar period, but also from an established culture of entrepreneurship and the 
experience of the relatively large private sector.
Figure 4.15a. Real eff ective exchange rates in CECs. 1990 = 100
Source: [Darvas 2012a]
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As mentioned in Section 4.1.2, real eff ective exchange rate (REER) can be 
seen as the simplest general indicator of shift s in national competitiveness. Fig-
ure 4.15a and 4.15b and Table 4.9 show the pace of changes in REERs over the 
years 1990–2011 assuming 1990 level = 100. Th e REERs capture a whole range 
of objective and subjective factors. As emphasized in Chapter 2 and in Section 
4.1.2, on one the hand it refl ects developments in the supply side of economies, 
namely diff erent productivity dynamics in tradable and non-tradable sectors, 
and on the other – eff ectiveness of infl ation control by central banks monetary 
policy and the exchange rate regime. It needs to be stressed that in case of CECs, 
their initial price level gap in comparison to the European market economies – 
their major trade partners mattered very much. Th e main subjective factor is the 
markets’ perception of a particular economy and the quality and sustainability 
of its economic governance and policy.23
All CECs except Ukraine recorded signifi cant appreciation of their curren-
cies. In terms of comparative static analysis (t0 – tn) the highest increase in REER 
was in the Slovak Republic, Poland and the Czech Republic (Figure 4.15a and 
Table 4.9). Th ese three countries also used to have the most volatile REERs. 
Ukraine, disregarding its fi rst years of unsuccessful reforms, recorded relatively 
stable and low REER.
 23 Any comparative analysis is sensitive to the choice of the t0 point.
Figure 4.15b. Real eff ective exchange rates in Poland and SECs. 1990 = 100
Source: as in Figure 4.15a
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In SECs, REER developments were much less intense than in the CECs, repre-
sented by Poland (Figure 4.15b). Th e case of Spain’s REER deserves special atten-
tion: apart from 1991–1992 and 2008–2009, in comparison with REER1990 = 100, the 
Spanish economy maintained its real exchange rate below the initial level. Portugal 
and Greece had a similar pattern of REERs changes (Figure 4.15b). Th e Turkish 
real eff ective exchange rate aft er 1999 displayed appreciation trend.
Th e long-term average REER was the lowest in Spain (93.52). Th e other SECs 
also had a relatively low average REER. Portugal, Spain and Greece benefi ted 
from the relatively low variability of their REERs (Table 4.9).
Figures 4.16a, 4.16b and Table 4.10 show data on GDP per capita. Th is mac-
roeconomic category takes into account the eff ects of GDP growth, as well as 
the infl uence of diff erences in price levels between countries, and of changes in 
population (see Section 4.3.1). Both fi gures show that in comparative static terms 
Poland did exceptionally well in 1990–2011. It had the mildest transformation 
recession and was the only country of the CECs and SECs which avoided nega-
tive growth in 2008–2011. In order to better compare the transformation results 
achieved in Poland to these recorded in the CECs and SECs, Poland’s GDP was 
expressed as a percentage of GDP of the countries (Table 4.10).
As table 4.10 shows, the relative level of Polish GDP per capita in 1990 was 
comparable to that of Ukraine in Turkey. It was only equivalent to approximately 
62% and 64% of the GDP per capita in Hungary and Slovakia respectively. Poland’s 
GDP per capita was only half of the GDP per capita in the Czech Republic. Th e 
gap between Poland and Portugal, Greece and Spain was even larger: 51%, 47% 
and 41% respectively. Th ese fi gures clearly show the signifi cant size of the initial 
economic gap between Poland, the CECs and SECs, except Ukraine and Turkey.
Table 4.9.  Descriptive statistical parameters for REER in CECs and SECs in 
1990–2011. 1990 = 100
Country Maxi-mum
Mini-
mum Range Average
Standard 
deviation
Coeffi  -
cient of 
variation
Number 
of obser-
vations
Czech Republic 274.00 93.43 180.56 182.11 55.74 30.61 22
Hungary 214.59 100.00 114.59 158.21 34.46 21.78 22
Poland 296.11 100.00 196.11 217.00 47.38 21.83 22
Slovak Republic 308.26 95.79 212.47 187.63 69.36 36.97 22
Ukraine 100.00 6.32 93.68 32.81 18.42 56.13 22
Greece 131.49 100.00 31.49 115.92 9.63 8.31 22
Portugal 124.57 100.00 24.57 114.76 6.33 5.52 22
Spain 102.48 83.30 19.17 93.52 6.44 6.89 22
Turkey 159.63 79.07 80.56 116.15 23.00 19.80 22
Source: author’s calculation based on: [Darvas  2012a].
Figure 4.16b.  Annual real GDP per capita growth in Poland and SECs (US$, 
1990 = 100)
Source: own calculation based on GI Database
Figure 4.16a. Annual real GDP per capita growth in CECs (US$, 1990 = 100)
Source: own calculation based on GI Database
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During the fi rst years of transformation in Poland, its GDP per capita was 
growing faster than in the neighboring countries. In 2000, the gap in relation to 
Hungary and the Czech Republic decreased by about 20 percentage points and 
against Slovakia by about 28 percentage points. Interestingly, Polish GDP per 
capita at PPP increased more than threefold (Table 4.10) compared to Ukraine. 
Aft er 1999–2000, the relative levels of Polish GDP per capita deteriorated (the 
Slovak Republic started to develop faster than Poland). Th e global fi nancial cri-
sis of 2008–2009 unveiled Poland’s comparative strength. Th is was refl ected by 
a faster narrowing of the GDP per capita gap (see Table 4.10). Comparing the 
relative levels of this macroeconomic category achieved in Poland in 2011 with 
initial values recorded in 1990, the scale of progress is clearly visible. However, 
structural constraints and un-seized development opportunities arising from in-
suffi  cient determination of consecutive Polish governments to implement further 
economic and institutional reforms prevented even higher growth.24
Th e World Economic Forum (see Section 4.1.3) provides a detailed measures 
of country competitiveness positions. Th e CECs and SECs did not belong to the 
most competitive economies of the world. None of the countries was ranked in 
the top twenty of the most competitive economies in 1998–2012 (Table 4.11). 
During most of the years, Spain maintained its relatively superior position with-
in CECs and SECs. Th e Czech Republic was also perceived as a relatively com-
petitive economy – it was never ranked lower than third. Ukraine was the worst 
performer.
In 1998–2012 in the GCR rankings, Poland did not do well. Between 1998–2007 
Poland’s relative competitive position was seen as rather low and only Ukraine, 
Greece and Turkey were perceived as having lower competitiveness. In 2008, 
 24 During this period, Poland had the lowest rate of employment among the EU-25 [Gorynia 
& Kowalski 2008, p. 73].
Table 4.10.  Poland’s GDP per capita, at PPP, as percent of GDP per capita of each of 
CECs and SECs
Country 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009 2011
Hungary 62 68 73 81 85 86 81 82 81 83 88 100 105
Czech R. 50 52 58 58 66 68 66 67 65 65 66 71 75
Slovak R. 64 76 82 83 86 92 88 88 83 84 81 86 87
Ukraine 100 114 191 270 313 318 280 246 247 243 239 290 284
Greece 47 44 48 53 57 58 56 56 57 57 59 66 80
Portugal 51 45 50 53 54 56 57 62 64 68 70 78 84
Spain 41 38 41 44 46 47 47 49 50 52 55 62 66
Turkey 101 94 103 104 109 119 127 124 120 127 125 143 133
Source: author’s calculations based on 2012 WDI Database.
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within the group, the relative position of Poland had improved and since 2009 it 
had been ranked second and third in the analyzed group of countries (Table 4.11).
Th e following observations are also worthy of attention: the stable and rela-
tively high position of the Czech Republic, the improvement of the Slovak Repub-
lic, and the worsening position of Hungary (Table 4.11). Hungary is an example 
of a country that had been a leader in implementing reforms for many years but 
which had lost this position due to a lack of will and ability to solve diffi  cult fi scal 
policy problems. It was also perceived as an economy with a deteriorating qual-
ity of its institutional environment.
Th roughout the period, Greece and Ukraine were ranked lowest among the 
countries, and the gap between these two countries and the leaders of the group 
had been increasing. Ukraine is a country that has not been able to seize the op-
portunities that opened to all the countries of the region aft er 1989 [Tiffi  n 2006]. 
Th e case of Greece shows that the EU and EMU membership, if not supported by 
genuine and consistent reforms unleashing private sector adaptive abilities can 
lead to national economic and institutional failure.
Competitiveness ratings are sometimes criticized for their simplifi cations and 
diagrammatic view of economies. However, assessments derived from the GCR 
are rather consistent with the general picture of transformation that emerges from 
our analyses. Th e methodology used in the rankings shed light on the course of 
the transformation processes and enable identifi cation of major problem areas 
inhibiting the process of catching-up with the developed countries.
Closing remarks
In Poland, as in the other countries of the region, recent economic history con-
tinues to cause emotions. Moreover, it is instrumentally used by populists to at-
tack the founders of reforms and those who took the risk of managing processes 
of the institutional and market reconstruction. In the light of this analysis, it fol-
lows that Poland and Hungary were best prepared for the transition from a cen-
tralized economy to a market-led economy in terms of their social capital. In the 
case of Poland, this was a result of a strong tradition of social self-organization 
and the existence, even in a period of dominance of a centralized system, of al-
ternative pathways of social capital development. However, as already empha-
sized, the initial economic situation of Poland was very unfavorable. Th is refers 
to the stagnation of the 1980s and, above all, to the structural characteristics of 
the Polish economy.
Th e relative abundance of natural resources and a centralized system of re-
source allocation shaped the country’s production capacity structure that was 
outdated and thwarted the pace of catching up with innovation-driven Europe-
an developed economies. Additionally, the low propensity and actual ability to 
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generate domestic savings and relatively low investment level, together with high 
employment in agriculture led to a low level of the capital-labor ratio and, more 
generally, to relatively low social productivity. Th is feature of the Polish economy, 
combined with a low employment rate, hampered progress in the realization of 
social aspirations. Another impediment to growth is still the insuffi  cient devel-
opment of a business support infrastructure and ineff ective functioning of state 
agencies, low quality of law making and law enforcement.
Despite these barriers arising from the structural and institutional specifi cs 
of the Polish economy, in comparison to other countries, results achieved aft er 
the institutional breakthrough of 1989–1990 should be highly valued. Poland has 
improved its position, measured by the most synthetic measure – the gross do-
mestic product per capita, against all analyzed countries.
While thoroughly evaluating Poland’s transformation process it needs to be 
emphasized that many opportunities for an even more rapid reduction of the 
economic and social development gap have not been seized yet. Th e most im-
portant of them are:
 – unsatisfactory economic policy response to one of the lowest employment 
rate in Europe,
 – failure to fi nalize privatization, and
 – a slowdown in fi scal reforms that could facilitate the ability of the Polish econ-
omy to meet the requirements of euro area membership and allow Poland to 
further improve its competitive position.
Th e reforms stalled because any deeper changes became politically sensitive 
and the democratic process is unable to create stable liberal majority.
An important test for sustainability of economic results in the CECs and their 
adaptability was the way they responded to the global fi nancial crisis. Poland has 
so far proved its ability to stand this particular crash test. Th is encouraging result 
should not conceal Poland’s need to further reform its public sector and to im-
prove its institutional and regulation frameworks in order to release reserves of 
effi  ciency and to facilitate innovation-driven sustainable growth.
5
PRIVATIZATION. THE CASE OF POLAND
Since the outset of market transformation, privatization has triggered fervent ide-
ological, political and economic debates. From the theory of economics point of 
view both the necessity of and benefi ts stemming from relinquishing state control 
and power over companies are no longer considered controversial. Th is is partic-
ularly true in the case of companies operating in sectors exposed to stiff  competi-
tive pressure. Th e privatization of businesses in the energy, telecommunication 
and public utilities sectors is not such a straightforward case. Th eir privatization 
should be preceded by diligent preparatory work in devising regulations protect-
ing the market against the risk of new owners taking advantage of the dominant 
position achieved prior to the privatization process. Additional diffi  culty lies in 
the fact that the ownership structure preceding market transformation was shaped 
by arbitrary state decisions dating back to the post-WWII political climate.
Th is Chapter1 has been divided into three Sections and Conclusions. Th e fi rst 
contains a brief review of privatization theory. Th e second is devoted to a presen-
tation of the role of privatization in the Polish political and economic reforms of 
1989/1990. Th e third Section discusses the nature of Polish privatization.2 A Con-
clusion sums up the Chapter.
5.1. Introduction to the theory of privatization
Privatization was a crucial element of globalization (see Chapter 1). It was at the 
core of liberal reforms in Britain dating back to the 1980s. Th e British experience 
served as inspiration for governments of other market economies. Th ey also trig-
 1 Th e Chapter draws on my conference paper and Kowalski [2011d]. Its fi rst English ver-
sion was published as a WP_2013, no. 8.
 2 According to the Act of August 30, 1996 on Commercialization and Privatization (Jour-
nal of Laws 2002, no. 171, item 1397 with subsequent amendments) privatization in Poland 
was done in a direct and indirect mode. Th e Act of August 30, 1996 defi nes municipalization 
as a transfer of State Treasury property to local government units (see Table 5.4).
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gered the interest of academic economists studying privatization from various 
perspectives, including management, micro and macroeconomic perspectives. 
Based on empirical data indicating low productivity of state-owned companies 
and referring to the relevent literature [Leibenstein 1978; Vickers & Yarrow 1991; 
Shleifer 1998; Bartel & Harrison 1999; Sheshinski & Lopez-Calvo 2003; OECD 
2010], the following universal aims of privatization can be formulated:
 – improvement of resource allocation and general growth in their productivity,
 – strengthening of the private sector,
 – improvement of public fi nance situation,
 – unlocking public funds and enabling their allocation to other, more useful 
public areas.
Th e fi rst two aims are of a normative nature and concern the microeconomic 
dimension. Th ey place emphasis on potential positive eff ects that follow pri-
vatization and comprise a depoliticizing of current and long-term decisions 
at the level of businesses. Th e next two aims have a macroeconomic nature. 
Th ey indicate potential benefi ts in public fi nance; infl ow of privatization-re-
lated revenue, withdrawal (aft er completion of privatization) of subsidies, as 
well the possibility of higher corporate tax revenues. A general improvement 
in the public fi nance situation reached by the aforementioned means extends 
the room to maneuver of fi scal authority, which may either reduce public debt 
and/or change the structure of expenditure, e.g. by increasing expenditure in 
infrastructure or research.
In general, expectations connected with privatization in the microeconom-
ic sphere amount to an increase in effi  ciency and optimization of inputs. Con-
sequently, among the anticipated eff ects of privatization a higher rate of return 
from capital and increased pay rates are key elements.3 Empirical data concern-
ing such changes requires case studies and is available in the literature [see for 
example Shleifer 1998; Sheshinski & Lopez-Calvo 2003]. Th e macroeconomic 
assessment of privatization is more complex and diffi  cult than a case study ap-
proach. Th e diffi  culty lies in the fact (see Section 5.2) that deep institutional and 
economic reforms accompanied privatization. Th e reforms were linked with the 
liberalization and deregulation of, among others, foreign trade and capital fl ows. 
In the newly changed economic and social environment, any separate measure-
ment of infl uence of privatization in isolation from the infl uence of other quali-
tative policy measures is virtually an impossible undertaking.
 3 As a rule, before privatization, state-owned fi rms used to have both obsolete capital 
and over-employment. Th us, immediately aft er privatization new owners tended to reduce 
employment to a rational level. Th is necessity was even magnifi ed when they had to face stiff  
competition and were thus forced to implement new technologies and a new range of pro-
duction.
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5.1.1. Microeconomic approach
Th e basic focus of the privatization debate might be characterized by referring 
to the concept of an ideal economy. Th is ideal economy is based on a number of 
assumptions such as: existence of numerous companies, exogenous prices for all 
economic agents, equal access to information and complete contracts. In such 
conditions, the form of ownership is insignifi cant.
In the real world, the assumptions listed above do not hold. Th us, market fail-
ure justifi es state/public ownership of companies. State/public ownership of com-
panies refl ects the so-called social view of a company and is in fact a reaction to 
market defi ciencies.4 Within the social view, it is assumed that government (the 
public owner) takes account of the social marginal cost, i.e. the social condition-
ing of management, in devising its aims and taking decisions.
Th e social view in Europe implying public ownership in infrastructure and 
public utilities sectors has evolved under the infl uence of American solutions, 
globalization pressure and the already mentioned British practice of the 1980s 
(see Chapter 1 and 2). Gradually, an opinion began to prevail that implementa-
tion of appropriate regulations, as well as liberalization of market entry condi-
tions, would allow not only for an adequate level of protection against a dominant 
market position by natural monopolists to date, but would also be conducive to 
creation of competition in markets, hitherto considered closed. In order to achieve 
this, subcontracting of public sector work to the private sector or privatization 
were used [Sheshinski & Lopez-Calvo 2003; OECD 2010]. It led to a decrease in 
importance of the social view. In the period of stiff  global competitive pressure, 
this tendency was additionally strengthened by implementation of best practic-
es to the hitherto public fi rms and by technological progress. In the European 
context this drive was also supported by implementation of the Single European 
Market and by deregulation of public utilities and the rule of the third party ac-
cess (TPA) that followed.
As part of the microeconomic approach, a perspective based on the agency 
view is also found. Th e agency view perspective also brings arguments in favor of 
private ownership. Its pro-privatization recommendations are drawn from anal-
ysis focused on the nature of company goals and constraints [Leibenstein 1987; 
Shleifer 1998; Sheshinski & Lopez-Calvo 2003; OECD 2010]. Within the agen-
cy view, it is emphasized that state company managers oft en pursue goals other 
than those recognized in private companies. In extreme cases, they have their 
prospective careers on their minds when reporting to politicians. Th e possible 
 4 In Europe, state ownership used to comprise practically all kinds of infrastructure and 
public utilities (water and sewage, gas, public transportation, telecommunication and post, 
etc.). Moreover, public ownership was typical for some strategic companies, especially in the 
defense industry. In US practice other solutions prevailed and only water and sewage services 
were in state/public hands. See: Case and Fair [1996, p. 433].
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political bias of company aims may stem from the fact that a political loss due to 
state-owned company closure could be bigger than the political cost of keeping 
it afl oat with public, that is taxpayers’ money.5
Within the agency view, the nature of public enterprise constraints is emphasized. 
In comparison with private companies, they have soft  budget constraints and their 
possible bankruptcy does not pose a real threat to their boards. Since such compa-
nies are by defi nition not listed on stock exchanges, there is no shareholder pres-
sure and thus there is no risk of a hostile takeover. Th ese characteristics, together 
with weak ownership monitoring performed by a state agency led to low manage-
ment effi  ciency in public companies. As a result, a state-owned company has sub-
optimal eff ectiveness. Such a combination of features and negative interrelations 
justifi es privatization as an obvious way of improving public company effi  ciency. It 
is well worth mentioning that the eff ects of a well conducted municipalization may 
be similar to those stemming from privatization. Th e main advantage of munici-
palization over a state/public company is the improved quality of locally performed 
monitoring and the possibility of a local internalization of positive externalities.
In light of microeconomic approach, a number of its general implications 
may be formulated concerning the choice of ownership form of a company [Sh-
leifer 1998, p. 21]:
 – under the same market conditions, state-owned companies are usually less 
eff ective than private,
 – privatization of a state-owned company functioning in a competitive market 
usually improves its effi  ciency,
 – under the same market conditions, fully privatized companies are more eff ec-
tive than those partially privatized,
 – market pressure and a new aim structure of a privatized company lead to 
changes in the use of resources and rates of return from production factors.
5.1.2. Macroeconomic perspective
As mentioned while discussing the universal aims of privatization in its macro-
economic approach, the possibility of improving the state of public fi nance and 
consequently changing the structure and direction of public expenditure indicates 
the benefi t of privatization. Moreover, the improved condition of public fi nance 
and lower credit needs of government might infl uence interest rates and, in the 
long-term, the rate of investment.
In practice, the pace of the privatization process in Poland as well as in other 
countries of the region varied to some degree. Apart from the aforementioned 
debates of a political and ideological nature, an important factor impacting the 
scale of privatization was the state of public fi nance. A clear pattern might thus 
 5 Th e EU common competition policy codifying the rules and scale of public support had 
reduced the danger of the permanent bias of public company goals.
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be singled out; the better the budget situation of a particular country was, the 
slower the privatization6. In Poland, the speed increased and the perseverance 
tended to gain momentum alongside a worsening fi scal situation.
In popular belief, there is a cause and eff ect relationship between privatization 
and an increase in the unemployment rate. Objectively speaking, a reduction in 
the employment in the fi rst stage of privatization was a necessity from the per-
spective of the state of the economy. Within a new form of ownership, resource 
decisions and possible reorientation of company aims established grounds for 
the continuing existence of the enterprises in question. Employment alterations 
indirectly infl uenced public fi nance. In the short term, privatization did not 
have an immediate negative impact on the level of employment, bringing profi t 
to the State Treasury. It was due to social contracts oft en accompanying privati-
zation involving foreign capital. In the middle term, alongside the termination 
of employment guarantees and the modernizing of manufacturing equipment, 
the macroeconomic rate of unemployment rose, increasing public expenditure 
due to the activation of unemployment benefi ts. In the long term, privatization, 
by strengthening foundation of the economy, improves job market and public fi -
nance prospects. Th e phenomena outlined herein, as well as the recommended 
macroeconomic interrelations accompanying privatization are to a great extent 
dependent on the particularities of a given economy.
Taking a fi nal look at considerations to date, the following major implications 
of a macroeconomic perspective on privatization can be presented:
 – there are no simple methods of singling out the macroeconomic eff ects of pri-
vatization, as they may also be due to parallel reform-related activities under-
taken in Poland and in other countries going through market transformation,
 – privatization positively infl uences the public fi nance condition,
 – privatization positively impacts development of the fi nancial intermediation 
sector, especially the capital market,
 – privatization has a diversifying eff ect on employment, income and wealth al-
location.
5.2.  Importance of privatization in political and 
institutional reforms of 1989/1990
5.2.1. Stability pact and market reform agenda
Assessment of the process and economic outcome of the Polish transformation, 
and especially privatization, requires application of an appropriate theoretical 
and methodological context. For this reason, it has been assumed that the Polish 
 6 A good example is Slovenia, where the private sector share in GDP was 70% in 2010.
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market transformation period can be divided into two sub-periods. Th e fi rst in-
volves restituting macroeconomic stability and introducing pro-market institu-
tional reforms. Th e second (1992–2012) comprises longer-term economic growth 
uninterrupted by recessions – a phenomenon unique in European conditions (see 
Chapter 3). Th is stage witnessed manifold structural changes, among which pri-
vatization was of crucial importance.
In 1989–1991, the opening adverse macroeconomic conditions and inherited 
structural characteristics of the economy, such as resource availability and gross 
domestic product structure, were of major importance. Th is stage might well be the 
focus of research both in terms of macroeconomic and microeconomic analyses 
and a new institutional approach [Page 2006; Janc & Kowalski 1996; Williamson 
2000; Paldam & Gundlach 2008]. In particular, the new institutional econom-
ics approach is vital to understanding the constraints of market transformation.
In the second stage of transformation qualitative factors of growth became very 
important. Th ey included perseverance and determination in market reform and 
privatization alongside improvement of the business environment. Innovation 
absorption capability and the ability to implement the acquis communautaire be-
came necessary conditions for European Union membership. Th ese factors were 
of primary importance in terms of releasing actual potential, enabling departure 
of the economy from the biased path-dependence of past behavior and alloca-
tion decisions practiced for years.
Due to a multitude of factors, the transformation process may be researched 
both in terms of growth theory and mechanisms of economic competitiveness 
(Chapter 3). As a matter of fact, both approaches supplement each other. Th ey 
enable the ability to identify and quantify factors conducive to growth and mod-
ernization, as well as impediments to development. Th is context also creates 
a useful framework for international comparisons.
At the end of the 1980s, there was no normative theory of transforming cen-
tralized economies into market economies based on private ownership (see Chap-
ter 3). However, in academic literature there was a number of publications with 
correct diagnoses of sources of ineffi  ciency of the centralized system [Balicki 1979; 
Kornai 1985; Wilczynski 1991]. Th e experience drawn from subsequent failures 
of stabilization packages introduced in the economies of Latin America under 
the auspices of the International Monetary Fund served as a natural source of 
inspiration for Poland and consequently for the rest of the region. Th ey formed 
a foundation for the Washington Consensus formulated by J. Williamson [1990]. 
Th e recommendations following the Consensus, for many years constituted ref-
erence grounds, as well as a set of indispensable necessary conditions for liber-
al market reforms. Naturally, they provoked ideological and economic debates 
[Wojtyna 2008a].
In Poland, as of 1989, the acceptance of the necessity of implementing deep 
institutional reforms was accompanied by awareness of the geopolitical con-
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straints of the era. Th e major concern was, however, to design the framework 
for macroeconomic stability (see Chapter 3). Gradually, in the course of devel-
oping macroeconomic stability, the increase in structural unemployment re-
placed infl ation as the major concern to settle. Th is phenomenon, oft en linked 
to privatization, had a major impact on the social perception of the market and 
political transformation as a whole, also contributing to the increase in income 
and wealth diversifi cation.
Th e set of regulations devised under the supervision of L. Balcerowicz and 
put forward by T. Mazowiecki’s government, apart from regulating the matter of 
macroeconomic stability, created conditions conducive to systemic ownership 
transformation of the economy. Privatization in Poland commenced in 1990. As 
Table 5.1 shows, in Poland and Hungary, direct privatization prevailed. Th e for-
mer Czechoslovakia implemented a voucher method. Th e re-launching of the 
stock exchange (Table 5.1) was treated as one of the preconditions to improving 
the mechanism of capital allocation and privatization facilitation. At the thresh-
old of transformation Poland, due to the nature of its farming as well as small 
manufacturers and services, had a much bigger share of the private sector in GDP 
creation as compared with Hungary and Czechoslovakia (Table 5.1).
Table 5.1.  Privatization in the stabilization packages of the fi rst stage of economic 
transformation
Methods and timing of privatization Poland Czechoslovakia Hungary
Main method of privatization Direct Voucher Direct
Privatization scheme date of commencement 1990 1992 1990
Launching stock exchange 1991 1992 1989
Share of the private sector in GDP (%) 20 5 5
Source: [Kowalski 2009b, pp. 259 and 261].
Th e second stage of transformation, as previously mentioned (Chapter 3), 
can be seen in the light of growth theory [Campos & Coricelli 2002]. Due to the 
already emphasized signifi cance of institutions in the process of eff ective mar-
ket transformation, the standard growth theory framework is complemented by 
institutional aspects and quality of management [Rodrik 2007; Wojtyna 2008a; 
Kowalski 2011c]. In such circumstances, growth, expressed as changes in GDP 
per capita, can be considered as a combination of four factors: social capital per 
capita, production capital per capita, natural resources per capita, as well as pro-
ductivity in its broad sense. Th e latter is connected with management quality, 
technological advancement in terms of creating and incorporating innovation, i.e. 
positive changes linked with privatization. It was also expected that these changes, 
accelerating modernization, would contribute to increased specialization and the 
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economies of scale due to intra-industry trade and would thus enable the econ-
omy to participate fully in the international division of labor.
5.2.2. Attitudes to privatization
Privatization in Poland, as well as in other countries of the region, became the 
core of dispute and polemics (Figure 5.1). Th e diff erences in opinion and gen-
erally low public support (Figure 5.1) were due to many reasons. Th e most 
important involved society’s lack of awareness of the scale of technology and 
civilization gap evident at the outset of market transformation. Th e general pub-
lic did not comprehend inevitable consequences of the actual market economy 
based on competition leading to an increase in income and wealth diversifi ca-
tion. People did not understand objective diffi  culties of pre-privatization asset 
appraisal. Furthermore, a man in the street continued to have excessive expec-
tations, typical for the centralized system, to the new state. Some of the negative 
sentiments towards privatization per se stemmed from delays in this process. 
It created a number of pathologies such as ‘spontaneous’ and illegal or shadowy 
enfranchisement of old guard management on assets of state owned companies 
under their control. Th is was particularly seen in Ukraine and Russia but accu-
sations of such procedures were voiced in all transition countries, including the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Polish public attitudes towards privati-
zation (Figure 5.1) changed depending on the intensity of action taken, its out-
comes in relation to employment and pay conditions and the general economic 
situation (see Chapter 3).
Figure 5.1. What is the impact of privatization on the Polish economy?
Source: [CBOS, BS/133/2009, p. 2]
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Reluctance towards privatization is not only typical for Poland. General lack 
of trust and emotions surrounded privatization in all transition economies [Meg-
ginson & Netter 2001]. Data, based on a survey in 28 European and central Asian 
countries, supporting this view is provided by EBRD [2007b] and [Denisova et al. 
2012]. Table 5.2 shows interesting results for the analyzed transition economies, 
Russia and the sample average. Unconditional acceptance for the privatization 
status quo was the highest in the Czech Republic, Poland and Russia; 24.6, 20.0 
and 18.5 per cent respectively (Table 5.2). General, unconditional and condition-
al, approval of privatization (the sum of column two and three) was recorded the 
highest in the Czech Republic (75.2%), Hungary (65.2%), Poland (57.2%) and 
Slovakia (57.0%). 50% of respondents were in favor of privatization in Russia and 
in the Ukraine only 44.5% (Table 5.2). Return to nationalization and state control 
was seen as a remedy for privatization failure by as many as 43% of Ukrainian re-
spondents. Such a move was supported by 36.7% of Russians, 34.2% of Slovaks and 
over 22% of Hungarian and Polish participants of the EBRD survey (Table 5.2). 
Polish respondents distinguished themselves by indicating their support for re-
privatization using a transparent process (20.4% of answers).
In the whole sample of 28 European and Central Asian transition econo-
mies 19.4% supported the privatization status quo, 34.8% supported it condi-
tionally; thus 54.2% of all respondents were in favor of privatization status quo. 
Negative attitudes towards hitherto privatization procedures and outcome were 
expressed by 29% of respondents and 17% of respondents declared that they 
would like to see re-nationalization and then a transparent re-privatization (Ta-
ble 5.2). Th is pro-state ownership sentiment may stem from two parallel reasons 
Table 5.2.  In your opinion, what should be done with most privatized companies? 
Th ey should be… (per cent of answers)
Countries
Left  in the hands 
of current owners 
with no change
Left  in the hands 
of current own-
ers provided that 
they pay
Renationalized 
and kept in state 
hands
Renationalized 
and then re-pri-
vatized using a 
transparent pro-
cess
Czech Republic 24.6 50.6 13.0 11.8
Hungary 13.3 51.9 24.6 10.2
Poland 20.0 37.2 22.4 20.4
Slovakia 17.1 39.9 34.2 8.7
Ukraine 12.6 31.9 43.0 12.5
Russia 18.5 31.5 36.7 13.3
Total of 28 
countries
19.4 34.8 29.0 16.7
Source: [Denisova et al., 2012, p. 47].
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[Denisova et al. 2012]: ideological – state property and control may be taken for 
granted as superior to private one, and individualistic – where one could person-
ally benefi t from moving property to state hands.
Survey results refl ect a diff erentiated picture of attitudes towards privatiza-
tion procedures and outcomes in transition economies. Th ey show the lack of 
trust in privatization procedures, social and economic disappointment related to 
the actual outcome but also a high scale of frustration stemming from an inad-
equate level of economic knowledge and awareness of objective market mecha-
nisms. And fi nally it also indicates political constraints any government wishing 
to pursue structural reforms has to face… (see: Chapter 6).
5.2.3. Current progress of privatization
As was shown in Section 5.2.1, similarly to Poland, privatization in other coun-
tries of the region was also imbued with emotional disputes and social confl icts. 
It was pursued relatively well in the small and medium-sized business sectors (Ta-
ble 5.3). Moreover, it stemmed from the lower complexity of the preparation and 
asset appraisal process, as well as lower capital needed to conclude the transac-
tions. Th us, small and medium-sized business privatization was easier and usu-
ally did not provoke any strong emotions or political disputes. Not only Poland, 
but also other countries of the region (Table 5.3), reached the level typical of more 
advanced market economies, as far as this kind of privatization is concerned. Th e 
privatization of large businesses, including such sectors as infrastructure, min-
ing and raw material or energy, still attracts major political concern. In any given 
condition, they amount to the most diffi  cult cases. In Poland, they have also been 
burdened with former social responsibilities and infl uenced by multiple, oft en 
contradictory, interests of stakeholders, as well as trade unions.
Table 5.3.  Progress of privatization in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Hungary in 2010–2012
Countries
Share of the 
private sector in 
GDP formation 
(in %)
Companies
privatization progress
of restructuringlarge companies small companies
Poland 75 4– 4+ 4–
Slovakia 80 4 4+ 4–
Hungary 80 4 4+ 4–
Privatization progress indicators are within the range of 1 = no or insignifi cant change in relation to 
the conditions of central planning; 4+ = progress typical of industrial market economies. stands for the 
change direction.
Source: own study based on the 2010–2012 EBRD Transition Reports.
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5.3. Specifi c nature of Polish privatization
Th eoretical approaches to the issue of privatization enable a better understanding 
of both the rationale behind it and the complexity of actual privatization process-
es in Poland in 1990–2012. Th eir scale and diffi  culty level, especially in the fi rst 
stage, was unique, as well as a fact which may be a good explanation of some of 
the fl uctuations and errors registered in the period in question. In the Polish po-
litical and social context, subsequent governments rather tended to turn to a con-
ciliatory type of company privatization policy, which resulted in a multitude of 
aims and incredibly sophisticated privatization procedures.7
An outstanding trait of the privatization process in Poland in its fi rst stage of 
development was a high level of uncertainty as to ownership rights legislation. 
It stemmed on the one hand from WWII,8 and nationalization consequences on 
the other. Th is state of aff airs became even more complicated as a result of par-
tial reforms from the period before 1989. Th ey amounted to a decentralization 
of planning and the increase in public company autonomy. As a consequence, 
the position of nomenclature-related Boards and the industrial self-manage-
ment of the time became more powerful. Th ese two stakeholder groups acquired 
a prominent position just before the universal privatization was launched. Th us, 
the following stakeholders might be singled out, competing for the access to the 
company resources: the State Treasury, the municipal authority, company man-
agements, diff erent employee representative bodies, as well as previous owners. 
In such circumstances, fi nding a compromise respecting ownership rights and 
the best long-term interests of the company, region and country is a role of the 
state which is not to be underestimated.
Table 5.4 shows data on the pace of privatization over market transformation 
time in Poland. Th e complex historical and political situation and strong position 
of trade unions had led to very complicated, consensus-biased privatization pro-
cedures and methods [Rapacki 1995]. Although direct privatization and sales of 
shares prevailed, commercialization and liquidation of state-owned enterprises 
played an important role, especially in the fi rst years of Poland’s market trans-
 7 According to the Act on commercialization and privatization of enterprises (Dz.U. 2002, 
no. 171, item 1397, with subsequent changes) direct privatization could be realized in three 
main modes: via sale of an enterprise, by bringing in a fi rm into assets of a company and also 
through leasing. Indirect privatization was performed in seven modes: public off er, public bid, 
negotiations based on public invitation, publicly announced auction, sale of shares on a regu-
lated market, sale of shares through a system matching off ers of buy and sell, and fi nally from 
2005, based on an off er acceptance in reaction to a call.
 8 I mean shift s of Polish borders, migration of people who used to live in the former Pol-
ish eastern territories and new western parts of Poland that used to be a part of the Th ird Re-
ich, dramatic scale of the Holocaust amongst Polish citizens of Jewish origin and the unsolved 
and painful issue of fair material compensation for lost property.
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formation (Table 5.4). In fact, 1990–1996 were the most important in terms of 
numbers of privatized companies (Table 5.4). In the following years the pace of 
privatization was slower, but in terms of privatization revenue the record level 
was achieved in 2000.
Conclusions
Reluctant attitudes towards privatization prevail, to a large extent, in all post-soviet 
economies. Th is general stance varies in time, has strong individualistic content 
and is co-determined by the actual performance of particular economies and by 
a deeply-rooted ideological context. Dissatisfaction with privatization has been 
magnifi ed by a general, subjective perception of large scale illegitimate redistri-
bution of wealth that accompanied privatization.
From the effi  ciency point of view privatization can be treated as a way of re-
ducing the eff ects of government failure. Simultaneously, if the selection proce-
dure of the privatization method and the fi nal choice of a ‘winner’ was wrong in 
terms of its general welfare function, it used to increase the scale of the govern-
ment failure phenomenon.
Th e general public had a rather low level of business and economic compe-
tence to comprehend complicated processes of asset appraisal and the actual mar-
ket value that buyers were ready to pay for the privatized assets. Oft en successful 
privatization meant new capital investments accompanied by painful labor re-
structuring leading to better performance of companies. Th e post-privatization 
fi nancial successes of fi rms were seen as material evidence of fraud and ‘selling 
national assets for nothing’. Redundancies were an unavoidable negative external-
ity to privatization of overmanned companies. For individuals it meant declining 
returns on their human capital. It was particularly true for less skilled workers, 
who either lost their jobs or had to be retrained to be able to keep pace with new 
technologies installed in their former working place or had to move to entirely 
new places seeking for work.
In the short and medium term privatization contributed to an increase of the 
actual diversifi cation of income and wealth. Before the economic transformation, 
the diversifi cation had two dimensions: offi  cial and actual. Th e offi  cial level was 
relatively low and was biased due to political considerations and an apparent soci-
etal tendency, especially in the private and political sectors, to hide real affl  uence 
levels. Th e actual level of income and wealth dispersion was high but was not eas-
ily visible due to a specifi c culture of modesty. Economic transformation and its 
vital foundation – privatization – have changed supply and demand conditions 
for capital and labor. Th e very process of privatization openly restored a category 
of capital owners and a spectrum of seemingly new professions and highly paid 
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jobs, such as fi nancial analysts, advisors and stock exchange traders. Th e new 
market environment reshuffl  ed the former wage and salary structure in manu-
facturing and services refl ecting better labor knowledge, experience and skills.
From the perspective of over twenty two years of experience and international 
comparisons, Polish company privatization deserves a positive mark. Th is assess-
ment concerns mainly privatization in competitive market segments. Th e privati-
zation of quasi-monopolists (e.g. TPSA, the Polish telecommunications provider) 
must be assessed cautiously. Th e same applies to the lack of decision-taking and/
or postponing decisions on privatizing coal mines, shipyards and other compa-
nies from their supply chain.
In the current, fi nal stage of privatizing, remaining sectors such as mining, en-
ergy, network businesses and multiple function companies, each decision requires 
careful consideration as to its long-term eff ects. Th ese strategic sectors and com-
panies are politically sensitive and are everywhere diffi  cult to deal with. Th e recent 
global fi nancial crisis sheds new light on the role of market structure and cost and 
product fl exibility. Th erefore, both the extent of privatization and the way it has 
been implemented laid a foundation for Poland’s international competitiveness. 
Th e global and EU context requires that contemporary national economic policy, 
with its reduced fi scal room for maneuver and preconditions of future economic 
and monetary union membership has to be based mainly on qualitative policy. 
Both the regulatory and fl exibility dimensions of the policy should serve the na-
tional economy international competitiveness.
6
POLAND’S ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE COMPARED
Th e aim of this Chapter is twofold. Th e fi rst is to present and assess developments 
in the regulatory sphere in Poland. Th e quality of Polish institutional solutions, as 
well as functioning of the business environment has been consistently criticised 
by citizens, businesspeople and politicians alike. Th e relatively critical assessment 
of the quality of the institutional framework, both by Polish observers and foreign 
economic partners, negatively infl uences Poland’s international competitiveness.
Th e institutional sphere is also a major hindrance to growth and improvement 
of competitiveness in other CECs. Quality of the institutional environment and 
effi  cient functioning of state institutions can enhance total factor productivity 
(Chapter 4.1.2). Th erefore, EU membership and adoption of the aquis commu-
nautaire that followed, was expected to improve this situation.
In order to assess the evolvement of the institutional environment in Poland, 
own annual research was carried on a sample of managers between 1997–2012. 
Th e results were used to assess the perception of diff erent aspects of the business 
institutional environment across successive terms of democratic accountability. 
Th ese terms were then further compared and assessed against CECs and SECs 
in terms of macroeconomic performance.
Th e second aim of this Chapter is to compare the economic performance of 
Poland with Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Ukraine and with SECs 
during two crisis periods. Drawing on Chapter 3, the 1997 East Asian crisis 
and the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 were used as background of the analy-
sis. Th e nature and scale of these two external negative shocks diff er, but may 
be used as an interesting test for Poland’s sustainability and adaptability against 
CECs and SECs.
Th e Chapter is divided into four Sections and Conclusions. Th e fi rst Section 
is devoted to the political and institutional context of transformation in Poland. 
Section two presents and discusses results of research in changes in perception of 
the functioning of government agencies, lawmaking, law enforcement and gen-
eral uncertainty in these three areas in 1997–2012. Section three presents a com-
parative analysis of economic performance of consecutive terms of democratic 
accountability. Section four compares Poland’s economic performance during 
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the 1997 and 2008 crises against the CECs’ peers and the SECs. Th e Conclusions 
summarize the arguments.
6.1. Political and institutional context of transformation 
in Poland
An inadequate institutional business support infrastructure and defi cient func-
tioning of government agencies, lawmaking and law enforcement are among the 
major impediments to economic growth in Poland and the CECs (see Section 
4.1.2). A developed and effi  cient institutional business support framework and a 
general institutional infrastructure can enhance total factor productivity. Th ese 
qualitative factors are especially important in the context of a globalized econo-
my where there is reduced scope for national discretionary fi scal and monetary 
policies (Chapter 2). In most of the CECs, coalitions able to form governments 
were fragile. Th is is why the pace of modernization of the state apparatus and 
economic liberalization was typically lagging behind the objective needs. Delayed 
and oft en fractional reforms were not only typical of Poland or other CECs. Th e 
situation revealed by the global fi nancial crisis proves a similar defi ciency in most 
of the EMU countries.
6.1.1.  The Polish political scene and parliamentary 
elections1
Fundamental pro-market reforms and transformation in the political system were 
possible due to the political compromise reached on April 5, 1989 as part of the 
Round Table negotiations. It paved the way for semi-free elections in June 1989. 
Th e “Contract Parliament – Sejm”2 that emerged and the reactivated Senate were 
elected in two rounds of voting on June 4 (62.7% attendance) and June 18 (25% 
attendance). Only 35% of the seats in the new Sejm were fi lled as a result of free 
elections, while the entire Senate was elected completely democratically. Th e re-
sults of the elections of June 1989 and the composition of parliament were a great 
success for Solidarity and the Civic Electoral Committee headed by Lech Walesa. 
Th e “Contract Sejm”, despite the pre-determined domination of the PZPR3 and its 
then allies, passed key reformist legislation prepared by the government of Tade-
usz Mazowiecki and Leszek Balcerowicz. Th is Sejm, during its shortened term, ap-
pointed two consecutive cabinets – that of T. Mazowiecki, and led by J. K. Bielecki.
 1 Th is section draws on and develops my earlier publications: [Kowalski 2011c].
 2 Lower chamber of Polish parliament.
 3 PZPR – Polish United Workers Party.
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Th e next parliamentary elections were held on October 27, 1991. As no elec-
toral threshold was applied, both the Sejm and Senate which emerged aft erwards 
were highly fragmented (see Table 6.1). Because of the fragmentation, parliament 
was unable to function effi  ciently or provide support for any stable government. It 
appointed three consecutive cabinets – that of J. Olszewski, W. Pawlak and H. Su-
chocka. Its fate was fi nally sealed aft er a political crisis stemming from charges 
and accusations concerning the past of major fi gures in the state.4 Th e term of 
the second parliament was also cut short in May 1993.
New elections, under a changed system,5 were held in fall. Th e newly elected 
Sejm and Senate, were for the fi rst time capable of functioning for a full parlia-
mentary term (see Table 6.1). Th e biggest groupings were the left -wing coalition 
SLD6 (20.4%) and the peasants’ party PSL7 (15.4%). Th e negative side eff ect of the 
new threshold-based election system was such that a sizable part of the elector-
ate was unrepresented in parliament. During the 1993–1997 parliamentary term, 
there were three changes of cabinets in Poland (of W. Pawlak again, J. Oleksy and 
led by W. Cimoszewicz).
Th e 1997 fall elections gave way to a new Sejm and Senate which also served the 
full constitutional term. For the fi rst time in the new political system, a relatively 
stable political base was formed for the four-year term of J. Buzek’s centre-right 
government (see Table 6.1). Th is cabinet’s initially high level of popular support 
gradually eroded. Th e main reasons were internal divisions, reform fatigue, op-
position accusations regarding the pace, scope and method of privatization (see 
Chapter 5), and fi nally charges of corruption.8
Th e 2001 elections were a clear victory for the left  (see Table 6.1). In spite of the 
gradual decrease in popular approval rate,9 the left  remained in power until the 
end of its statutory term. Th e parliament endorsed two consecutive cabinets (of 
L. Miller and M. Belka). Th ese cabinets were engaged in European Union mem-
bership negotiations and were responsible for intensive harmonization of domestic 
law with the acquis communautaire. Th ese actions culminated in Poland’s acces-
sion to the EU (with nine other countries) in May 2004. In spite of this success 
and the relatively good macroeconomic situation (see Section 6.3), the second half 
of this term was overshadowed by accusations and actual charges of corruption 
against representatives of the highest levels of the state and political establishment.
Centre right groupings won the 2005 fall elections amidst growing anti-
corruption rhetoric and opinions about the need to revive and strengthen the 
 4 Including the then President, L. Wałęsa.
 5 Electoral thresholds were introduced of 5% for parties and 8% for coalitions.
 6 SLD – Democratic Left  Alliance.
 7 PSL – Polish People’s Party.
 8 Aft er years of investigation most were found unjustifi ed and unproven.
 9 One reason was the corruption scandal involving the creation of the media act.
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state.10 Th e largest share of votes was unexpectedly gained by the Law and Jus-
tice party (PiS, see Table 6.1), which fi nally formed a coalition government with 
two smaller parties (the right-wing nationalist LPR11 and the populist SRP12). 
As a result of scandals within the coalition, accusations of corruption were once 
again leveled, including prominent representatives of SRP. PiS lost its ability to 
 10 In June 2006 a new state agency – Central Anticorruption Bureau was established. Soon 
it became highly controversial due to its politicization and methods of “controlling activities”, 
including lavish high-cost active provocations.
 11 LPR – League of Polish Families.
 12 SRP – Self-defense of the Republic of Poland.
Table 6.1. Elections and major parties in Poland in 1991–2012 (in %)
October
27, 1991*
September 
19, 1993*
September 
21, 1997
September 
23, 2001
September 
25, 2005
October 
21, 2007*
October
09, 2011
Attendance 43.2 52.1 47.9 46.3 40.6 53.9 48.92
KLD 7.5 –2 –3
KPN 7.5 5.8 –3
NSSZ ‘S’ 5.1 –2 –6
PC 8.7 –2 –3
PL 5.5 –2 –3
PSL 8.7 15.4 7.3 9.0 7.0 8.9 8.36
SLD 12.0 20.4 27.1 41.0 11.3 13.17 8.24
UD 12.3 10.6 –4
WAK 8.7 –3
BBWR –1 5.4 –3
‘Ojczyzna’ –1 6.4 –3
UP –1 7.3 –2 –2 –3
AWS** –1 –1 33.8 –2 –3
UW –1 –1 13.4 –2 –2, 5
LPR –1 –1 –1 7.9 8.0 –2
PiS –1 –1 –1 9.5 27.0 32.1 29.89
PO –1 –1 –1 12.7 24.1 41.5 39.18
SRP –1 –1 –1 10.2 11.4 –2
RP# 10.02
* Early election. 1 – not existing; 2 – below threshold; 3 – disappeared; 4 – reformed & continued as UW; 
5 – reformed and renamed as Democrats.pl; 6 – disappeared as a political party; 7 – coalition of SLD and 
Democrats.pl. # Ruch Palikota – a popular liberal movement.
** Solidarity Election Action.
Source: author’s synopsis based on Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza data on elections in Poland.
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govern. Early elections were called for fall 2007. Th ese were decisively won by 
the Civic Platform (PO; see Table 6.1). Th e number of parties and coalitions 
passing the electoral thresholds was further reduced.13 During the new term 
the Sejm endorsed a cabinet led by D. Tusk.
Th e next statutory elections were organized in fall 2011 (Table 6.1). For the 
fi rst time in the post-1989 history, the same party, i.e. PO, maintained popular 
support and won. It created the same coalition (with PSL) to continue to run the 
government. Th is coalition had to cope with severe repercussions of the global 
crisis that began in the US in 2007 (see Section 6.4.2).
In 1989–2012, typical of each subsequent election (with two exceptions in 
1993 and 2007) was relatively low and falling attendance (Table 6.1). Th is was 
caused by an interplay of historical, social and economic conditions (see Sec-
tion 4.1 and 4.2). Th ere was a declining quality in public debate and an increas-
ing verbal aggressiveness of political rivalries, oft en involving backward-looking 
insults. Society, bearing the inevitable costs of economic transformation, was 
driven by excessive expectations towards the state (see Chapters 2 and 4). Ob-
jective limits to the state’s ability to eff ectively fi ght unemployment or rapid so-
cial stratifi cation bred frustration and a climate for radicalizing attitudes and 
populism. In such conditions a party or political grouping’s life cycle became 
relatively short.14 From the 1991 elections onwards (with the exception of the 
2011 election) not a single governing party or coalition managed to continue 
into a second term of offi  ce.
Discontinuities in work on legislation, a clash between speedy changes in the 
global economy and the actual procrastination and oft en insuffi  cient level of pro-
fessionalism amongst members of parliament, politicization of the civil service 
and aggressive rivalries between parties and politicians caused the entire politi-
cal class to lose its esteem. In fact, the political class became perceived mediocre, 
especially in comparison to the development of a private business sector.
Against this background, the newly created legislation (see Section 6.2), which 
was frequently amended, was negatively assessed by business people and pro-
fessionals. It contributed to the general conviction that state institutions were 
malfunctioning. Th ere were similar opinions regarding lawmaking and law en-
forcement mechanisms (Section 6.2).
 13 Th e second placed grouping was the PiS party, which received 32.1% of the votes. Th is 
increase (compared to the elections of September 2005) was largely the result of the absorp-
tion of the electorate of the Self-defense Party (SRP) and the League of Polish Families (LPR). 
In the 2005 elections, these three parties received a combined total of 46.4%, while in the early 
elections in 2007 only 34.9%. Both Self-defense (1.5%) and LPR (1.3%) failed to cross the elec-
toral threshold.
 14 Only two parties – the left -wing SLD and peasant PSL – were present in parliament dur-
ing every term (see Table 6.1).
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6.1.2. Pace of lawmaking in 1990–2012
Th e new political system and market transformation had to be based on a new 
legal foundation. Th at meant the need for high legislative activity to work out a 
large number of acts of law, regulations and international agreements (Figures 
6.1a, 6.1b and 6.2).
Th e pace of lawmaking varied considerably. Figure 6.1a shows that the total 
annual number of acts of law and international agreements varied from 80 in 
1992 to as many as 369 in 2004. From the point of view of businesses, what mat-
tered most was the number of major acts of law; in the most legislatively active 
years of 1991, 2001, 2004 and 2010 numbered 100, 120, 110 and 159 respectively 
(Figure 6.1a). Data in Figure 6.1b also indicates a legislative eff ort beginning in 
1998, connected with the requirements and preparations for EU membership15 as 
 15 Already in his fi rst speech in parliament, Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki declared 
the Pro-European and Pro-NATO direction of the new government. In February 1990, a Pol-
ish ambassador to the European Communities was appointed, and in May Poland submitted 
an offi  cial application to enter into association negotiations. Th is was concluded with the sign-
ing of the Association Agreement (Europe Agreement) in December 1991 [cf. Konopacki 2009, 
p. 35].
Figure 6.1a. Number of acts of law enacted in Poland in 1990–2012
Source: author’s estimation based on Lex Database
0
100
200
300
400
500
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Number of major acts of law
Number of major international agreements
Regulations
 6.1. Political and institutional context of transformation in Poland  165
well as (the 1997–2001 term) with reforms in education, local government, health 
service and pension system. Aft er 2004 lawmaking activity faded (Figure 6.1b). 
It was criticized by the EU Commission for a still insuffi  cient level of acquis com-
munautaire implementation in Poland. Typically, opposition parties kept criti-
cizing consecutive governments for the lack of stamina and procrastination. In 
this myopic political atmosphere there were no good conditions for genuine de-
velopment of citizenry and better comprehension of objective and autonomous 
mechanisms of globalization and the vanishing role of national discretionary 
economic policy that followed. Considering the current features of globalization 
and EU membership implications, it is apparent how important the quality and 
eff ectiveness of an institutional framework is for sustainable growth and com-
petitiveness of national economies.
When analyzing parliament’s legislative activity, it is worth noting its shift ing 
dynamics. Figure 6.2 shows dynamics changeability correlated with results of elec-
tions and particular parliamentary majorities able to form governing coalitions 
Figure 6.1b.  Average number of acts of law enacted in successive terms of 
parliament
Source: author’s calculation based on Lex Database
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(see Table 6.1). Th us, except in 199416 and 200817 every post-election year (1998, 
2001 and 2005) saw a distinctive drop in the intensity of lawmaking, in particu-
lar in the area of major acts of law (see Figure 6.2). Another visible regularity was 
high and growing dynamics of lawmaking of major acts of law, beginning in the 
second years of regular terms of parliament and then accelerating through the 
fi nal years of the term (Figure 6.2). Th is cycle took place in 1996–1997, 2000–
2001 and 2003–2004.18
In 2005–2007 there were decreasing dynamics in the lawmaking of major 
acts of law, in particular those having a key impact on the business environment 
(Figure 6.2). Th is was, on the one hand, a result of the then existing balance of 
power in parliament and political climate, and, on the other, it could show both 
a saturation eff ect and be an outcome of business sector pressure. One of 2007 
 16 In 1993, when early elections were held, both houses were dissolved during the period 
May 31 – September 19. Th is explains greater legislative activity in 1994 than in 1993.
 17 Th e term of offi  ce begun aft er the elections in 2005 was cut short in its second year, 
which disrupted the dynamics of lawmaking in 2008. In addition, aft er EU accession, there 
was a slowdown in the transposition of the EU directives into the Polish legal system.
 18 In the second half of the Sejm’s 4th term (and the Senate’s 5th), the government could no 
longer count on majority support, which limited its legislative ability in the fi nal year of the term.
Figure 6.2. Dynamics of legislative output in Poland in 1990–2012 (in per cent)
Source: author’s calculation based on the Lex Database
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election topics was a call for a reduction in red tape and overregulation. As a 
consequence, a special parliamentary commission was established.19 Its aim was 
an assessment of existing law in order to propose its simplifi cation and stream-
lining with the purpose of reducing legislative burden and thus to improve Po-
land’s competitiveness.
Considering the number of laws passed and put into force, it should be re-
membered that they usually were accompanied by hundreds of interpretational 
documents and lower level executive acts. Such a number of new regulations and 
amendments, oft en introduced in a haphazard way, added up to a major burden on 
the business sector, felt particularly severely by small and medium-sized enterprises.
Insuffi  cient quality and instability of law leads to low respect for the law and 
the state apparatus. With higher complexity and even contradictions in regula-
tions some stakeholders of public agencies can try to speed up the procedures by 
using money illegally to pay civil servants’ for their services [Kowalski & Wihlborg 
2010]. It can also be conducive to cronyism and creates incentives for circum-
venting regulations (Figure 6.3).
 19 Th e 2007 election resulted in the appointment of “Friendly State Committee for mat-
ters relating to the reduction of bureaucracy” in the Sejm (Act of 20 December 2007). Among 
others, the Committee has to (para 2, section 1 of the Act) “review and analyse laws regulat-
ing social, economic and administrative issues in order to reveal regulations that are unclear, 
incoherent, ineff ective, unnecessary or excessively regulatory”.
Figure 6.3.  Quality of institutional environment and 
governance vs. transaction costs
Source: based on Kowalski and Wihlborg [2010, p. 27]
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In its extreme form, it can produce various shades of corruption; low-level 
corruption might lead to grand corruption and even state capture. Finally, poor 
quality of governance and institutional environment leads to higher transaction 
costs and increases uncertainty at all levels of business activity (Figure 6.3).
6.2. Perception of institutional evolvement in Poland
6.2.1. Sample and questionnaire
Figure 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6 show evolving perceptions of the functioning of public 
institutions, lawmaking and law enforcement in 1997–2012. In order to collect 
information, the Borner, Brunetti and Weder [1995, pp. 172–178] questionnaire 
was used [Borner, Brunetti & Weder 1995, pp. 172–178]. Th e study was done an-
nually in 1997–2012.20 At the end of each year, a non-random sample of about 
140, middle and top-level managers, representing diff erent professions and hold-
ing at least a bachelor’s degree, was asked the same questions regarding subjective 
assessment of the functioning of public institutions, lawmaking and law enforce-
ment in Poland in a particular year.
 20 Data for 2002 and 2003 were estimated by interpolation.
Table 6.2. Assessment of public institutions and the functioning of law in Poland
Symbol Question Answer variants
I.1 Please evaluate the following quotation in relation to your country: ‘Laws 
and regulations are so complicated, unclear and sometimes even contradic-
tory that it is impossible to adhere to them on a regular basis. Th erefore, 
civil servants can always fi nd ways and means to give you a hard time (long 
delays, arbitrary decisions).’ Th is happens:
 – never 1
 – rarely 2
 – sometimes  3
 – frequently 4
 – mostly 5
 – always 6I.2 Assume that you are confronted with clearly unfair procedures or outright 
demands for bribes by a civil servant. Would you try to resist and fi ght back 
by appealing to their superior, or to an administrative court? You would 
(...) fi ght back:
I.3 Please evaluate the following quotation in relation to your country: ‘As an 
entrepreneur you are always afraid of committing a small ‘error’ here and 
there in the eyes of the regulatory bodies because these ‘errors’ can be abused 
by civil servants in order for them to gain a position of power (and con-
struct a case to blackmail you).’ Th is is (...) the case:
I.4 If you know the civil servant you have to deal with personally, can this 
speed up the procedure? Knowing the civil servant personally will (...) 
speed up the procedure:
I.5 If you know the civil servant you have to deal with personally, can this in-
fl uence their decision (e.g. amount of taxes, issuing a business license)? Th is 
will (...) infl uence the decisions of civil servants:
Source: based on: [Borner, Brunetti & Weder 1995].
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Th e fi rst group of questions concerns managers’ perception of their dealings 
with public institutions (Table 6.2). In this part, the questionnaire had a form of 
questions or statements to which respondents agreed or not to a given degree. Ta-
ble 6.2 shows the gradation of answers and numerical grading assigned to them.
Th e second area of the survey covers managers’ perception of lawmaking in 
its broad sense (Table 6.3). Survey questions (M.1 – M.4) in Table 6.3 are formed 
in order to grasp a perception of ambiguity regarding legislative procedures. Any 
potential uncertainty as to the rules of the game can lead to a permanent increase 
in costs of running businesses and can thus contribute to a decline in actual in-
vestment and, as a result, to inhibition of general economic growth. As in the 
case of institutions, graded answers with their grading marks were assigned to 
each question (Table 6.3).
Th e third part of the survey covers an assessment of perception of law en-
forcement in Poland (Table 6.4). Th is is an area of concern in all CEC countries 
and is regarded as one of the most neglected fi elds when compared to developed 
economy standards [cf. Kowalski & Wihlborg 2010]. Low effi  ciency of the judi-
cial system which leads, among others, to lengthening of the adjudication pro-
cess and high judicial discretion, are typical weaknesses of new market economies 
[cf. Schwab 2010].
In the questionnaire respondents were also asked to assess the evolvement 
in uncertainty in the three areas of the institutional framework in Poland (Ta-
ble 6.5). Answers provided by respondents refl ected their perception of changes 
in uncertainty level within the last ten years. Th erefore, perceptions expressed in 
1997 referred to the period of 1987–1997 and those in 2012 to 2002–2012. A ten-
Table 6.3. Assessment of lawmaking
Symbol Question Answer variants
M.1 As an entrepreneur, do you regularly have to cope with un-
expected changes in laws and/or policies which could seri-
ously aff ect your business? Changes in laws and policies are:
 – completely predictable 1
 – highly predictable 2
 – fairly predictable 3
 – frequently unpredictable 4
 – mostly unpredictable 5
 – completely unpredictable 6
M.2 As an entrepreneur, are you offi  cially or unoffi  cially in-
formed (through press, business association etc.) about new 
laws and/or plans to change existing laws or policies? You 
are (...) informed:
 – never 1
 – rarely 2
 – sometimes  3
 – frequently 4
 – mostly 5
 – always 6
M.3 In case of important legal changes aff ecting your business, 
can you voice your concerns (…) indirectly and/or are you 
directly consulted. You are (...) consulted:
M.4 Do you expect the government to stick to announced major 
policies (e.g. a new tax law, an infrastructure project, a budg-
et goal)? Th e government’s announcement is (...) credible:
Source: as in Table 6.2.
170 6. Poland’s economic performance compared
year-long moving average determined in this way can refl ect long-term trends in 
business people’s perception of uncertainty in Poland’s institutional framework.
6.2.2. Discussion of results
Th e survey results were aggregated and assessed in the context of the election cal-
endar and Polish parliamentary practice (see Section 6.1). Since elections were 
typically held in fall and it took time to build a majority coalition and then to 
form and swear into offi  ce a government, it is assumed that a given parliamenta-
ry composition, and any cabinet appointed on its foundation, can be realistically 
fully accountable for its legislative output in the period beginning in the calen-
dar year following the election up to the next election year inclusively. Th erefore, 
the following four subperiods of democratic and legislative accountability (see 
Table 6.1) were distinguished:21
 21 Due to the oft en short offi  ce terms of governments in Poland (see Section 6.1), it would 
not be reasonable to assess the performance of consecutive governments. Th is is why account-
ability periods of particular compositions of parliament are assessed instead.
Table 6.5. Perception of uncertainty in the institutional framework
Symbol Question Answer variants
I Do you think that during the last 10 years uncertainties 
in dealing with government agencies have (...)?
 – increased 1
 – remained about the same 2
 – decreased 3M Do you think that during the last 10 years uncertainties 
in law making have (...)?
E Do you think that during the last 10 years uncertainties 
in law enforcement have (...)?
Source: as in Table 6.2.
Table 6.4. Law enforcement
Symbol Question Answer variants
E.1 Imagine a private confl ict is brought into court with the evidence being 
very clearly in your favor. Do you have confi dence that the assigned judge 
will enforce the law objectively? Courts can (...) be trusted to enforce the 
law objectively according to transparent rules:
 – never 1
 – rarely 2
 – sometimes  3
 – frequently 4
 – mostly 5
 – always 6
E.2 Please consider the following quotation in relation to your country: ‘Th e 
party who pays more (e.g. bribes or better lawyers) will win the case. Even 
if the evidence is clear, money can change the result.’ Th is is (...) the case:
E.3 Is it irrelevant which individual judge decides on a case? Is it advanta-
geous to know the assigned judge? If you know the assigned judge per-
sonally, this will (...) infl uence the procedure and result:
E.4 If you were treated unfairly in court (i.e. because of bribery demands or a 
decision you do not deem ‘correct’) would you fi ght this by going to a high-
er court? You would (...) appeal:
Source: as in Table 6.2.
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 – 1998–2001 (government of J. Buzek – AWS),
 – 2002–2005 (two consecutive coalition governments SLD-PSL),
 – 2006–2007 (coalition government of PiS-LPR-SRP),
 – 2008–2012 (two coalition governments of PO and PSL).
Th e last period diff ers from the others because the same coalition continued 
to run the country aft er the 2011 election. Th is is why this subperiod covers both 
terms; the fi rst – 2008–2011 and extends to 2012 – the last year the collected data 
could cover.
6.2.2.1. The functioning of public institutions
Figure 6.4 shows data aggregated for the consecutive accountability periods. 
Trends in the perception of aiding and abetting (question I.4) signal a cultural 
distance between practice in Poland and the standards of North European devel-
oped economies. Irrespective of the particular parliamentary term and cabinets 
that followed, respondents acknowledged that knowing a civil servant person-
ally could oft en speed up proceedings with their case (Figure 6.4). Th is apparent 
regularity was accompanied by the perception of relatively high arbitrariness in 
Figure 6.4.  Perception of institutions and law functioning in successive democratic 
accountability periods in Poland in 1997–2012
Source: author’s calculations based on own survey results for 1997–2012
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decision-making (Figure 6.4, question I.1). It needs to be noticed, however, that 
since 2006–2007 onwards respondents declared their growing readiness to resist 
dishonest behaviour by civil servants (Figure 6.4, question I.2). Comparing the 
consolidated results for the accountability periods it has to be noticed that this 
area of institutional framework was relatively better perceived in 1998–2001 and 
2008–2012 than in 2006–2007 and 2002–2005.
However, irrespective of the accountability period, the perception of public 
institutions and their functioning continue to be rather disadvantageous; nei-
ther parliaments nor governments managed to signifi cantly change for the bet-
ter manager perception of this part of the institutional framework. It persisted 
despite mobilization of public opinion, an anti-corruption crusade and the pow-
erful rhetoric of some political parties.22
6.2.2.2. Perception of lawmaking
Figure 6.5 compiles perceptions of lawmaking across the four accountability pe-
riods. In all periods respondents signalled that changes in law were frequently 
 22 Existing control institutions and criminal prosecution bodies were strengthened as part 
of this activity. In June 2006 the Central Anticorruption Bureau was established. Th e Bureau 
soon became a subject of controversy and criticism aft er the politicization of its operations 
and its use of active provocation methods.
Figure 6.5.  Perception of lawmaking in successive accountability periods in Poland
in 1997–2012
Source: author’s calculations based on own survey results for 1997–2012
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unpredictable (Figure 6.5, question M1). Since 2006–2007, the situation in this 
area has slightly improved. Th e perception of frequent unpredictability of changes 
in law collides with the aggregated answers for the second question (Table 6.4), 
where respondents consistently declared they were frequently informed about 
changes in law (Figure 6.5). Irrespective of the accountability periods, respond-
ents kept indicating that the public consultation mechanism (question M.3) was 
insuffi  cient. Interestingly, government credibility was assessed as better, especially 
in the two last subperiods (question M.4). However, even in this case, government 
public announcements were only sometimes regarded as credible (Figure 6.5). 
Comparing the consolidated results for lawmaking, the relatively most favourable 
perception was attained in 1998–2001. Th en followed the 2006–2007, 2002–2005 
and 2008–2012 accountability periods.
6.2.2.3. Perception of law enforcement
Figure 6.6 shows evolving trends in manager perception of law enforcement in 
Poland in 1997–2012. On average, the perception of courts as well as confi dence 
in them and judges’ objectivity was not very high (Figure 6.6, question E1). 
Th e perception of the infl uence of money on court rulings (question E2) was at 
a similar level, in 1998–2001, 2006–2007 and 2008–2012. Manager perception 
of the infl uence of connections on a judge’s rulings (question E3) was practically 
the same during the three successive periods (Figure 6.6, 3E). According to re-
spondents, appealing to higher courts (question E.4) was a common reaction to 
Figure 6.6.  Perception of law enforcement in successive accountability periods in 
Poland in 1997–2012
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unfairness in court procedures. Th is readiness and, in fact, trust in the judicial 
system was favourable and stable (Figure 6.6). Th e level of perceived determina-
tion and confi dence in appealing to higher courts stands in a certain contradic-
tion to the manager reservations regarding court objectivity (E.1, E.2 and E.3). 
Comparing the four accountability periods, relatively the best law enforcement 
perception was recorded in 1998–2001 and then in 2006–2007. Th en followed 
2008–2012 and 2002–2005.
6.2.2.4. Perception of uncertainty evolution
Figure 6.7. shows a ten-year moving average perception of uncertainty concern-
ing public institutions, lawmaking and law enforcement in Poland. In the fi rst 
accountability period of 1998–2001 (the government of AWS), the mean level of 
uncertainty in lawmaking was 1.93, regarding public institutions and law func-
tioning – 1.84, and law enforcement – 1.72 (Figure 6.7 and Table 6.5). 2002–2005 
(two consecutive cabinets of the SLD-PSL coalition) were characterised by a per-
ception of increasing uncertainty in all three areas (Figure 6.7). Th e next two ac-
countability periods – 2006–2007 (PiS-LPR-SRP) and 2008–2012 (PO and PSL 
coalition) witnessed a signifi cant reduction in the perception of uncertainty in 
all three areas of the institutional framework in Poland.
Th e analysis of data gathered using a questionnaire shows that building institu-
tional foundations of a market economy and removing gaps in basic areas of law 
Figure 6.7.  Perception of uncertainty regarding public institutions, lawmaking and law 
enforcement in successive accountability periods in Poland in 1997–2012
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proved to be diffi  cult and call for diligent continuation. In the 1990s and 2000s 
Poland was preparing for accession to the European Union. Th is is why, paral-
lel to the liberalisation of the economy, EU membership aspirations required an 
implementation of the acquis communautaire. It was a long and complex task. It 
involved both the direct adoption of EU regulations and indirect implementa-
tion of EU directives through national legislative procedures. Such a lawmaking 
load, necessarily spread over time, was one of the sources of perception of the 
instability of the institutional framework and business environment, as well as of 
its generally low quality. Th e lack of the continuity of governments, relatively fre-
quent changes of cabinets, shortening of parliament’s terms of offi  ce and the fact 
that within the whole transformation period (1989–2012) only one party coali-
tion managed to win two subsequent parliamentary elections created additional 
factors that intensifi ed such a perception.
6.3. Comparative analysis of economic performance of 
democratic accountability terms in Poland
As the analyses in Chapter 4 imply, the course of Polish market transformation 
between 1990–2012, as compared with its peers from the CECs and South Eu-
ropean countries (SECs), may well be considered a success story. Poland, com-
pared to Ukraine and Turkey, increased its advantage as measured in GDP per 
capita. As far as other analyzed states are considered, the Polish economy con-
siderably decreased the initial gap, and even exceeded Hungary’s GDP per capita 
level. Th ese results are highly respected, particularly from a foreign perspective 
or among economists well acquainted with the initial condition of the Polish 
economy and with the challenges stemming from the speedy processes of glo-
balization (Chapter 1). Undeniably, any assessment of over twenty years of mod-
ern economic history of Poland calls for inclusion of the negative side eff ects of 
the indispensable liberalization (Chapter 2). Th e course of legal, institutional 
and economic transformation in the CECs was bound to be more complex and 
tumultuous than it was the case in Portugal or Spain in the 1970s. Th e major ob-
stacle for Poland was an economic structure skewed by years of a non-market re-
source allocation mechanism. Polish transformation was also hindered by most 
not conducive initial macroeconomic parameters – extreme internal disequilib-
rium and very high infl ation rate.
Th e systemic choices and subsequent course of transformation of the turn of 
1989 and 1990 are still subject to emotions and fi erce ideological disputes. In Sec-
tion 6.2, an attempt to expose the perceptive evolution of institutional changes in 
Poland was made through the means of several-year long survey research. Th e 
revealed results attest to a high level of criticism of business people towards state 
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institutions, lawmaking and law enforcement in the years of 1997–2012. Th ey also 
confi rmed the scale of diffi  culty accompanying this system transformation and 
the role of path dependence, as well as mentality and systemic culture.
Th e emotions and ideological disputes mainly concern the scale and justifi -
cation of shock therapy (Chapter 4), privatization methods (Chapter 5) and its 
social consequences. Irrespective of the subject matter, the disputes – internal in 
particular – gained an aggressive character aft er 2005 (see Section 6.1). For these 
reasons, this Section aims to assess the economic performance of successive demo-
cratic accountability periods (see Sections 6.1 and 6.2).23 Economic performance 
recorded in each of the accountability periods in Poland was compared with the 
economic performance of CEC peers and of SECs. Following Chapter 2’s con-
siderations, it has been assumed that international comparative analysis should 
cover major economic policy targets: unemployment rate (Figures 6.8a and 6.8b), 
infl ation rate (Figures 6.9a and 6.9b), current account balance (Figures 6.10a and 
6.10b) and real GDP per capita growth rate (Figures 6.11a and 6.11b). Th e fi rst 
four macroeconomic variables are typically called a quadrangle of economic pol-
icy goals.24 In order to enhance comparative analysis, the following variables were 
also compared: fi scal balance (Figures 6.12a and 6.12b), inward FDI performance 
(Figures 6.13a and 6.13b) and fi nally exports of goods and services performance 
index (Figures 6.14a and 6.14b). Fiscal balance refl ects both tensions in fi scal pol-
icy stemming from path dependence regarding the structure of mainly welfare 
state type budget expenditure, and the fading ability of modern states to impose 
higher direct taxation. Th e next two macroeconomic compound indices, on the 
one hand signal the specifi city of the scale of domestic market (big vs. small open 
economy), but on the other are standard measures of country’s competitiveness 
– namely its ability to attract FDI and develop exports of goods and services.
Figures 6.8a and 6.8b show unemployment rate across all six accountability 
episodes in Poland in 1990–2012, as compared with the situation in the CECs 
(Figure 6.8a) and SECs (Figure 6.8b). As the data comprising the whole period 
of 1990–2012 shows, unemployment, as compared with CECs, presented a sig-
nifi cant challenge for all subsequent governments in Poland. Only in two of the 
subperiods (1998–2001 and 2008–2012) was the Polish economy not a negative 
leader in that respect (Figure 6.8a). Against the background of SECs (Figure 6.8b), 
Poland fared slightly better; only in the periods of 2002–2005 and 2006–2007 was 
the unemployment rate comparatively highest. In other accountability subperi-
ods, Spain registered a higher unemployment rate.
 23 Due to the short-life cycles of most cabinets aft er 1990 (Section 6.1), comparative per-
formance analysis concerns the six singled out accountability episodes.
 24 For the sake of feasibility, choosing these particular targets for the comparative macro-
economic performance analysis, we disregarded background business cycle conditions in the 
other CECs and SECs.
Figure 6.8a. Unemployment rate in CECs
Source: author’s calculation based on the GI Database
Figure 6.8b. Unemployment rate in Poland and SECs
Source: as in Figure 6.8a
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Figures 6.9a and 6.9b show average consumer price infl ation (CPI) in Poland 
against the background of CECs and SECs. In 1990–1993 Poland had the second 
worst (aft er Ukraine) record of average CPI (Figure 6.9a). Th en, due to a suc-
cessful national central bank disinfl ation policy (see Chapter 2), CPI declined. In 
consecutive subperiods (2002–2005; 2006–2007 and 2008–2012) CPI in Poland, 
in comparison with CECs, was among the lowest (Figure 6.9a). Th e Polish CPI 
comparison across the accountability periods with SECs looks even better (Fig-
ure 6.9b); even in the worst period, at the beginning of transformation (1990–
1993), its average CPI was lower than in Turkey. In the course of time, especially 
in 2002–2005; 2006–2007 and 2008–2012, Polish CPI converged with SECs (ex-
cluding Turkey). In fact it was a remarkable achievement; especially in the con-
text of the Balassa-Samuelson eff ect (see Chapter 4.1.2).
While infl ation and unemployment may indicate domestic disequilibrium, 
current account defi cit (CAD) is typically seen as an indicator of external (dis)
Figure 6.9a. Consumer price infl ation in CECs
Source: author’s calculation based on GI Database
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equilibrium (see Chapter 2). Figures 6.10a and 6.10b show the evolvement of CA 
defi cits in Poland against the background of CECs and SECs. Th e fi nal period 
(2008–2012) notwithstanding, Polish CA, as compared with other CECs’ situa-
tion, signaled a comparatively good external balance (Figure 6.10a). Th e external 
balance of Polish economy and its capacity to meet the requirements of interna-
tional competition is best demonstrated when compared with SECs’ performance 
(Figure 6.10b). As the segment data breakdown in Figure 6.10b indicates, Poland 
boasted of the highest economic growth rate without a signifi cant deterioration 
in CA, especially in comparison with Portugal and Greece.
From the comparative perspective in relation to SECs, the best accountability 
periods were 2006–2007 and 2008–2012. A comparative analysis of Poland and 
SECs, i.e. Spain, Portugal or Greece in particular, allows for a better understand-
ing of the benefi ts and drawbacks stemming from adopting a common currency.
Th e list of standard economic policy goals closes real GDP per capita growth 
rate (see Chapter 2). Figures 6.11a and 6.11b show the performance of successive 
Polish parliaments and cabinets against the background of performance in CECs 
Figure 6.9b. Consumer price infl ation in Poland and SECs
Source: as in Figure 6.9a
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Figure 6.10a. Current account balance in CECs (% of nominal GDP)
Source: author’s calculation based on GI Database
Figure 6.10b. Current account balance in Poland and SECs (% of nominal GDP)
Source: as in Figure 6.10a
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and SECs. As the data in Figure 6.11a implies, Poland scored best in the CECs 
group in this most important category in three periods: 1990–1993; 1994–1997 
and 2008–2012. Th is outcome can signal the superiority of the initial solutions 
implemented in Poland by the Mazowiecki-Balcerowicz cabinet, as well as to the 
scale of success achieved at the time of global crisis (see Section 6.4). Data in Fig-
ure 6.11a also makes it evident that the high growth rate obtained in 2006–2007 
was only the third best result as compared with other Central European countries 
(with Poland losing to Slovakia and Ukraine). Polish performance in this most 
remarkable competition is even more telling when confronted with SECs’ growth 
dynamics (Figure 6.11b). As data shows in Figure 6.11b, in four democratic ac-
countability periods (with six periods singled out in total), Polish real GDP per 
capita growth rate surpassed results in all SECs.
Th e economic performance analyzed so far in subsequent accountability peri-
ods is rather diversifi ed. It shows both achievements as well as failures of particular 
cabinets formed in the accountability periods. While assessing any macroeconom-
Figure 6.11a.  Real GDP per capita growth in CECs (in US$, per cent change from 
the year earlier)
Source: author’s calculation based on GI Database
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ic performance, one needs to take account of the fact that all the four variables 
standing for economic policy aims are only indirectly infl uenced by governments. 
Furthermore, at the contemporary stage of globalization, they are to a large extent 
co-determined by powerful autonomous economic processes, as well as one-off  
temporary events. What also ought to be taken into consideration are time lags 
in economic policy.25
Yet another selected variable included in comparative analyses of economic 
performance is fi scal balance as percent of GDP (Figure 6.12a and 6.12b). Th is is 
not an economic policy goal per se (Chapter 2) but in recent years it has gained 
special attention (see Chapter 3). In modern economic policy analyses, fi scal bal-
ance signals sustainability of economic policy. Th is performance measure captures 
a number of factors as being beyond the control of a particular government; e.g. 
current demographic structure (see Chapter 4) and under the direct or indirect 
control of the parliament and cabinets. It needs to be stressed that fi scal balances, 
especially in their expenditure side, are strongly path dependent.
As the breakdown in Figure 6.12a proves, in all singled out periods, Poland 
registered systematic fi scal defi cits. Even at times of a relatively high economic 
growth, subsequent cabinets had neither political will nor the actual capacity to 
 25 Th e time lags, to a limited extent, are taken into consideration here by means of shift ing 
the democratic accountability periods by one year forward.
Figure 6.11b.  Real GDP per capita growth in Poland and SECs (in US$, per cent 
change from the year earlier)
Source: as in Figure 6.11a
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Figure 6.12a. Fiscal balance in CECs as % of GDP
Source: author’s calculation based on GI Database
Figure 6.12b. Fiscal balance in Poland and SECs as % of GDP
Source: as in Figure 6.11a
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conduct systemic and sustainable reduction of public fi nance defi cit. Th is trait 
of Polish economy, even against the background of its Central European peers, 
brings to light the scale of problems to be solved in the fi eld of fi scal policy and 
public fi nance in general.
Figure 6.12b shows Polish fi scal performance compared with SECs. Th is com-
parison proves the scale of fi scal troubles, indicating dangerous similarities with 
the crisis driven SECs.
In order to enhance the picture of economic performance, comparative anal-
yses have been augmented by yet another two compound measures: inward for-
eign direct investment performance index26 – IFDI PI (Figures 6.13a and 6.13b), 
and exports of goods and services performance index27 – EPI (Figures 6.14a and 
 26 IFDI PI is defi ned as the relation between the share of a country’s IFDI in global IFDI 
in relation to the share of a country’s GDP in the global GDP. Th e bigger than 1 the IFDI PI 
is, the more attractive a particular country is as a host of international investment. Typically, 
especially if a country is a small open economy, high IFDI PI precedes high EPI.
 27 EPI is defi ned as the share of a country’s exports of goods and services in relation to a 
country’s GDP share in the global GDP. Th e more EPI exceeds 1, the more intensive (impor-
tant) the export is. EPI is also interpreted as an index of competitiveness and/or measure of a 
country’s trade exposure.
Figure 6.13a. Inward FDI performance indices in CECs
Source: author’s calculation based on UNCTAD Database
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6.14b). As data in Figure 6.13a shows, Polish economy, with the exception of the 
1990–1993 period, had the benefi t of IFDI PI of above 1. It signals investment 
attractiveness as measured by a larger share of IFDI than its share in global GDP. 
Average data for each period indicates, however, that Polish IFDI PI was signifi -
cantly lower than the IFDI PIs of the small open economies of Slovak and Czech 
Republic or Hungary (Figure 6.13a).
Starting from 2002–2005, Ukraine began to display a higher comparative 
capacity to attract FDI than Polish. Against the background of the SECs, Pol-
ish IFDI PI indicates a favorable tendency (Figure 6.13b). Especially interesting 
results become visible when Spanish and Polish IFDI PIs are contrasted. Both 
countries have similar size population serving as a specifi c approximation of the 
scale of domestic market.
Figures 6.14a and 6.14b show EPI in Poland compared with CECs and SECs 
across the accountability periods. As Figure 6.14a indicates, Polish export per-
formance indices are well below levels achieved in CECs. Lower fi gures of Pol-
ish EPI as compared with small open economies (SOEs) are hardly surprising. 
Higher fi gures being the share of Ukraine, however, are deserving the attention. 
On the one hand they reveal structural traits of this economy, appropriated for 
exports to the then USSR. On the other, however, they signal GDP stagnation 
(see Chapter 4). A comparison of Polish EPI with the results obtained by SECs 
points to a comparatively higher competitiveness level of Polish exports than that 
of not only Spain, but also SOEs (Figure 6.14b).
Figure 6.13b. Inward FDI performance indices in Poland and SECs
Source: as in Figure 6.13a
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Figure 6.14a. Exports performance indices in CECs
Source: author’s calculation based on UNCTAD Database
Figure 6.14b. Exports performance indices in Poland and SECs
Source: as in Figure 6.14a
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In order to summarize comparative analyses the economic performance meas-
ures presented above are grouped for the specifi c accountability periods in terms 
of the positions secured separately in relation to CECs peers as well as in relation 
to SECs (Table 6.6).
Table 6.6.  Ranking of accountability periods in comparison with the CECs 
and SECs
Figure Macroeconomic variable
1990–
1993
1994–
1997
1998–
2001
2002–
2005
2006–
2007
2008–
2012
Poland vs. CECs
6.8a Unemployment Rate 4 5 4 5 4 4
6.9 a CPI Infl ation 4 4 2 2 1 3
6.10a Current Account 2 1 3 2 3 5
6.11a GDP per head 1 1 3 5 3 1
6.12a Fiscal balance 3 2 2 4 4 4
6.13a IFDI PI 4 4 4 5 3 2
6.14a EPI 4 5 5 5 5 5
Score 3.14 3.14 3.29 4.00 3.29 3.43
PL ranking vs. CECs 1 1 2 4 2 3
Poland vs. SECs
6.8b Unemployment Rate 4 3 4 5 5 3
6.9b CPI Infl ation 4 4 4 1 1 4
6.10b Current Account 3 4 3 2 1 1
6.11b GDP per head 5 1 1 3 1 1
6.12b Fiscal balance 2 1 3 3 3 2
6.13b FDI PI 4 1 1 2 1 1
6.14b EPI 2 2 3 1 1 1
Score 3.43 2.29 2.71 2.43 1.86 1.86
PL ranking vs. SECs 5 2 4 3 1 1
Source: author’s calculation based on data in fi gures 6.8–6.14.
Hence, in the period 1990–1993, Polish infl ation was the lowest only when 
compared with the Ukrainian (Figure 6.9a); this means that for CPI in this pe-
riod Poland took 4th place. In the same subperiod, Poland enjoyed relatively the 
most favorable GDP per capita growth dynamics as compared with other CECs 
(Figure 6.9a) – consequently it took 1st place. Still in the same period, the value of 
Polish EPI was the lowest among CECs (data for Ukraine was unavailable) – this 
poor result was refl ected by 4th place. Consequently, a non-weighted summary 
measure of relative economic performance is calculated through summarizing 
comparative positions occupied within specifi c subperiods in relation to CECs 
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and SECs respectively and then by dividing the sums of ranking positions by 7 
(the number of variables taken into account in the comparative analyses).28
As the synopsis of comparative analyses (Table 6.6) shows in the context of 
CECs, the diff erences in economic performance between the democratic account-
ability periods were rather small. Th e best summary scores and thus top rank-
ings were achieved by the fi rst two: 1990–1993 and 1994–1998. Th e next place 
was taken again by two accountability periods of 1998–2001 and 2006–2007, the 
third place belongs to 2008–2012 and the last position was taken by 2002–2005 
(Table 6.6). Interestingly, the comparison of relative economic performance with 
SECs shows another order. Th e top position was taken by the last two account-
ability periods, namely 2006–2007 and 2008–2012. Th e next position was se-
cured by the 1994–1997 term, then 2002–2005. Th e last were 1998–2001 and 
1990–1993 (Table 6.6).
6.4. Comparative analyses of economic performance in 
the crises
6.4.1. East Asian crisis
In the second part of the 1990s Poland, Czech and Slovak Republics and Hunga-
ry worked towards EU membership. Th ey maintained their EU orientation both 
in terms of foreign trade and inward FDI. Th eir trade and capital relations with 
East Asian countries were negligible. Th e major indirect link with the Asian crisis 
of 1997 was the situation in Russia (Chapter 3). Typically, any confi dence crisis 
in a group of countries, at least a temporary one, is refl ected in nominal and real 
exchange rates throughout the same risk category economies. All data regarding 
economic performance of CECs and SECs is shown in Figures 6.15–6.21.
6.4.1.1. Real eff ective exchange rate
Real eff ective exchange rate (REER) serves as a basic price-based measure of inter-
national competitiveness [Egert 2004; Maarewijk 2004; Kowalski & Pietrzykowski 
2010]. In 1997–2001 Poland, as well as the ECEs and SECs, chose the fl exible ex-
change rate regime. In such a context, nominal rates fl uctuated daily under de-
mand and supply market conditions. Th e fl exible exchange rate system paved the 
way for central banks to run their direct infl ation targeting (DIT) strategies. It was 
a time of infl ation rate convergence.29 Real eff ective exchange rates underwent 
 28 If any accountability period/government in Poland were able to score the best positions 
in all variables, its summary score would be 1; if it were the worst its summary score would 
be 5.
 29 Except Ukraine in CECs and Turkey (SECs).
Figure 6.15a. Real eff ective exchange rate in CECs (CPI-based). 1997 = 100
Source: author’s calculation based on [Darvas 2012a]
Figure 6.15b.  Real eff ective exchange rate in Poland and SECs (CPI-based). 
1997 = 100
Source: as in Figure 6.15a
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two basic groups of impulses. Th e fi rst consisted of changeable transitory factors, 
mainly of a speculative nature. Th e second captured structural factors and led to 
appreciation pressure (Chapters 2 and 4). Figures 6.15a and 6.15b show REERs 
defl ated by CPI in 1997–2001. As Figure 6.15a shows there was a general conver-
gence amongst CECs countries with the exception of Ukraine, whose currency 
depreciated substantially. Th e inspection of the REER evolvement does not lead 
to any fi rm conclusion regarding links between currency disturbances triggered 
by the Asian crisis and currency developments in CECs. Th e currencies depreci-
ated in 1999 when we compare them with the pre-crisis level of 1997. Th e cur-
rency tendencies in the SECs displayed yet another pattern (Figure 6.15b). Th eir 
REERs were under the strong infl uence of domestic factors – independent of 
the Asian crisis turbulences. Th is is why there was a strong convergence trend in 
REERs of escudo and peso and a visible divergence trend of Polish and Turkish 
REERs in relation to Portuguese and Spanish currencies.
6.4.1.2. Trade
Figures 6.16a and 6.16b show annual changes in merchandise exports in CECs 
and SECs. In order to seize the possible impact of the Asian crisis on trade per-
formance, its patterns were compared with the situation in 1997. Again, there 
was a strong similarity in trade pattern evolvement between Poland, Czech and 
Slovak Republics (Figure 6.16a). Its dynamics faded in 1999 but then recovered, 
Figure 6.16a. Merchandise exports annual growth in CECs. 1997 = 100
Source: author’s calculation based on GI Database
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especially strongly in the Czech Republic. Interestingly, in the case of Hungary, 
there was no visible negative trend in trade growth development. Th e most vis-
ible negative tendencies were seen in the case of Ukraine, a country strongly con-
nected via trade and capital fl ows with Russia (Figure 6.16b). Trade development 
patterns in SECs diff ered from CECs (Figure 6.16b). For the three EU members 
(Spain and Portugal), it was fl at or declining, for Greece, merchandise exports 
growth, in comparison to 1997, was decreasing. In a certain sense the Turkish 
export pattern resembled the Polish.
Interesting results of the Asian crisis turbulences in emerging market econo-
mies might be noticed in CEC exports of goods and services share in GDP (Fig-
ure 6.17a). Th e share of goods and services export in GDP indicates the foreign 
trade signifi cance for an economy. It also implies risks connected with trade ex-
posure. Figure 6.17b shows the situation in SECs.
In the base year 2007, the most open CE economies were: Slovak Republic 
(56.3%), Hungary (55.4%) and the Czech Republic (49.8%). Poland was a less open 
economy (23.4%). In case of the CECs, the export share development slowed down 
Figure 6.16b. Merchandise exports annual growth in Poland and SECs. 1997 = 100
Source: as in Figure 6.16a
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Figure 6.17a.  Change in share of CECs exports of goods and services in GDP 
(in percentage points). 1997 = 100
Source: author’s calculations based on the WDI Database
Figure 6.17b.  Change in share of Poland and SECs exports of goods and services 
in GDP (in percentage points). 1997 = 100
Source: as in Figure 6.17a
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in 1999 and then increased sizably. Th e same pattern was seen in SECs in 1999. 
Th e Turkish economy diverged again and followed its specifi c trend (Figure 6.17b).
6.4.1.3. Industrial production and unemployment
Figures 6.18a and 6.18b show annual data on industrial production growth. In 
order to show the timing and scope of assumed adjustments triggered in par-
ticular CECs and SECs by the external shock, the data is set at 100 at the pre-
Figure 6.18a. Industrial production annual growth in the CECs. 1997 = 100
Source: author’s calculation based on GI Database
Figure 6.18b.  Industrial production annual growth in Poland and the SECs. 
1997 = 100
Source: as in Figure 6.18a
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crisis level of 1997. In 1997 growth rates in production varied in both groupings; 
from 11% (Hungary) to only 1.3% and 1.1% in Slovakia and Poland respectively. 
In the SECs, Turkey achieved the highest growth of 10.8%, and Greece saw the 
lowest at 1.9%.30 In comparison to the 1997 growth level, Czech and Slovak Re-
publics almost followed the same pattern (Figure 6.18a). Another pair of econ-
omies, namely Poland and Ukraine, continued along a similar growth pattern. 
Hungary distinguished itself by much higher growth rates in industrial produc-
tion based on signifi cant infl ows of FDI. In SECs, industrial production slowed 
down substantially in 1999. In Turkey and Greece, industrial production followed 
a more variable pattern with a visible negative correction in 1999. For the whole 
of 1997–2001, Turkey on average had, as the only country in the sample, a nega-
tive industrial production growth (Figure 6.18b).
Typically a strong negative external shock should have a substantially harm-
ful impact on the unemployment rate in particular economies. Figures 6.19a and 
6.19b show changes in unemployment rates (UR) in CECs and SECs in 1997–
2001 in comparison with the UR in 1997. Already in 1997, CECs had diversifi ed 
both the hysteresis and levels of their UR. In 1997 Poland continued its three-year 
decreasing UR pattern with UR at 11.0%. A downward trend was also visible in 
Hungary. UR developments aft er 1997 changed for the worse in the Czech and 
Slovak Republics, Poland and Ukraine (Figure 6.19a), while Hungary continued 
its downward trend based on FDI. Unemployment rates in Spain and Portugal 
continued their pre-1997 downward trends (Figure 6.19b). In 2001 the Spanish 
unemployment rate decreased by over 10 percentage points in comparison with 
 30 No data on industrial production for Portugal was available.
Figure 6.19a.  Changes in unemployment rate in CECs (in percentage points). 
1997 = 100
Source: author’s calculations based on WDI Database
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the 1997 level. Th e UR reduction in Portugal was smaller (3 percentage points). 
UR tendencies in Portugal and Spain were strongly infl uenced by structural fac-
tors and anti-unemployment measures taken in these countries. In this sense they 
were immune to the negative impact of the 1997–1998 East Asian crisis. Greece 
and Turkey recorded an increase in their URs in 1999.
6.4.1.4. GDP and fi scal balance
Real GDP annual growth is one of the most useful summary economic perfor-
mance measures (Figures 6.20a and 6.20b). Data in Figure 6.20a shows an evolve-
ment of economic growth in Poland and CECs. In terms of real GDP growth 
rate, data for Hungary and Poland does not imply any negative signs that could 
be linked to the Asian crisis. In 1997–2001 both Hungary and Poland experi-
enced strong growth. Th eir GDP increased in that period by about 16% (Figure 
6.20a). In comparison with 1997 growth of real GDP slowed down in the Czech 
and Slovak Republics and decreased in Ukraine in 1999. In 1997–2001 the high-
est average growth rate was achieved by Poland and Hungary (9.0% and 8.0% 
respectively). Ukraine had three consecutive stagnant years and on average grew 
only at the rate of 2.6%. In SECs, the growth of Portugal and Spain converged 
and Greece followed as well. Poland and Portugal had a very similar expansion 
path (Figure 6.20b). Against this background the case of Turkey is diff erent – it 
Figure 6.19b.  Changes in unemployment rate in Poland and SECs (in percentage 
points). 1997 = 100
Source: as in Figure 6.19a
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Figure 6.20a. Real GDP annual growth in CECs. 1997 = 100
Source: author’s calculation based on GI Database
Figure 6.20b. Real GDP annual growth in Poland and SECs. 1997 = 100
Source: as in Figure 6.20a
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suff ered a strong setback in 1999 and then followed a rather turbulent pattern of 
growth (Figure 6.20b).
Any crisis usually brings deterioration in public fi nance balance (Chapter 3). 
Typically it has a negative impact on the revenue side and exerts pressure on the 
expenditure side. Widening revenue-expenditure gap and currency depreciation 
makes it more diffi  cult and costly to fi nance a budget defi cit. Figures 6.21a and 
Figure 6.21a.  Change in fi scal balance in CECs as % of GDP. In percentage points. 
1997 = 100
Source: author’s calculation based on GI Database
Figure 6.21b.  Change in fi scal balance in Poland and SECs as % of GDP. In 
percentage points. 1997 = 100
Source: author’s calculation based on GI Database
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6.21b show changes in fi scal balances in CEC and SEC economies in 1997–2001. 
In 1997 all CECs had to struggle to reduce their fi scal defi cits. Th is is why their 
pattern of defi cits in the years that followed had a substantial hysteresis. Poland 
could be a good example; it was able to reduce the defi cits in consecutive years, 
but in 2000 the defi cit bounced up again (Figure 6.21a). Th e Slovak Republic fol-
lowed another path – its fi scal defi cit (compared to the 1997 level) widened siz-
ably again in 1999 and 2000. Th e case of Ukraine requires a special note: it began 
to fi ght its fi scal defi cit a number of years before 1997 – its fi scal balance pattern 
aft er 1997 was very much dependent on the domestic eff orts to fi x the budgetary 
problems. At the end of the 1990s, the Southern EU members converged fi scal-
ly in order to meet the EMU Maastricht criteria (Figure 6.21b). Th us their fi s-
cal balances were squeezed to below 3%.31 As data shows Poland’s fi scal balance 
path was close to that of Portugal and Greece and did not show any simple coin-
cidence with the Asian crisis.
Th e 1997/1998 crisis was a severe lecture for the East Asian Region (see Chap-
ter 3). It also contaminated other emerging economies, but its negative infl u-
ence on CECs, despite the situation in the Russian Federation, seems to be weak. 
CECs (except Ukraine) were rightly perceived as stable and their public fi nance, 
although in defi cit, was rather sound. In 1997 Poland introduced a new consti-
tution, a new public fi nance law and a new law on the central bank, securing its 
political and functional independence [Hochreiter & Kowalski 1999, 2000]. Other 
CECs, being on the future EU membership track, implemented similar regula-
tions. Th is is why, despite belonging to the same risk category of Emerging Mar-
ket Economies, they felt the Asian crisis repercussions mildly. At the end of the 
1990s, internationalization of the CEC economies was relatively low – this fact 
made them less vulnerable to external negative shocks. SEC economies (except 
Turkey) were fi rmly integrated with the EU. And as a result did not feel any major 
disadvantages. Poland, in comparison with Southern EU members, performed 
well in 1997–2001. In the light of the analyses, due to specifi c conditions in CECs 
(except Ukraine) and SECs (except Turkey), the Asian crisis was not a major set-
back for these economies.32 Undeniably the global fi nancial crisis of 2007/2008 
did have a strong negative impact on the current functioning and economic de-
velopment of CECs and SECs (see Section 6.4.2).
6.4.2. The global fi nancial crisis
Th e global fi nancial crisis erupted in the US in 2007 and sent shockwaves to the 
global economy. It aff ected fi rst of all the most developed economies of the North-
 31 Greece failed to meet this criterion and was not accepted in the EMU founding group.
 32 Th e (annual) data available and the magnitude of negative impulses released during the 
crisis do not allow for any successful quantitative causation analysis.
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ern Hemisphere and was propagated through multiple channels (see Chapter 3). 
Th e main channels were capital fl ow interconnectedness, exchange rates, trade 
and expectations. In 2007 CECs were already well integrated with the developed 
economies and since 2004 (except Ukraine) they were EU members. Th e CECs 
trade exposure increased enormously since 1997. In the case of Poland the increase 
was almost 18 percentage points, while the Slovak Republic recorded the highest 
jump of 30 percentage points to 87% of its GDP in 2007. CECs also liberalized 
capital fl ows; none of the CECs UE members requested any derogation in this 
respect. Th rough privatization,33 their fi nancial intermediation systems became 
extremely internationalized. Stock exchanges, at least in some central European 
countries, attracted signifi cant infl ow of capital. Since CECs continued to have 
fi scal defi cits, there was a signifi cant supply of Treasury bonds. In 2007 (except 
Hungary) CECs had relatively high real GDP growth rates. Th e stage was set for 
an external negative shock of a scale comparable only with the inter-war Great 
Crisis (see Figures 6.22–6.30).
6.4.2.1. Real eff ective exchange rate reaction
As highlighted in Chapters 3 and 4 real eff ective exchange rate is a useful com-
pound measure of international competitiveness. It becomes an especially help-
ful tool of analysis in the context of the new EU member states facing negative 
consequences of the productive gap (see Chapter 4.1.2). In the EMU context – 
for the Slovak Republic, Greece, Portugal and Spain, the ability to maintain both 
 33 See Chapter 5 for the case of Poland.
Figure 6.22a.  Real eff ective exchange rate in CECs (CPI-based). 2007 = 100
Source: author’s calculation based on Darvas [2012a]
80
100
120
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Poland
Czech Republic
Hungary
Slovak Republic
Ukraine
200 6. Poland’s economic performance compared
price and cost downward fl exibility,34 and thus competitiveness, is very important. 
Figures 6.22a and 6.22b show REERs defl ated by CPI (REERCPI). As Figure 6.22a 
shows, the REERCPI continued to appreciate in 2008.
In the following years in CECs (except the Czech Republic and Slovakia – an 
EMU member since 2009) the real eff ective exchange rates depreciated to a level 
well below that in 2007 (Figure 6.22a). Th us, in the case of Ukraine, Poland and 
Hungary lower REERs served as a shock absorber for the declining volume of 
their exports. As data in Figure 6.22b shows Greece as the only SEC country in 
2007–2011 which, due to relatively higher infl ation, recorded an appreciation 
of its REERCPI and thus lowered its position in international competitiveness. 
In 2007–2011 Portugal, Greece and Spain had relatively low variability of their 
REERs. Comparing the REERs in 2011 with the 2007 level (Figure 6.22b), it is 
clear that Spain maintained the original level and Portugal and Turkey improved 
their relative price and cost position leading to a 5 percentage points gap between 
the worst and best performers in the Southern EMU members in terms of price 
and cost competitiveness.
Cost competitiveness, especially in manufacturing, is better refl ected by the 
real eff ective exchange rate defl ated by nominal unit labor costs (ULC). As in the 
case of the REERCPI, a rise in the REERULC index means a loss of competitiveness 
(Figure 6.23a35 and 6.23b). In 2007–2011, on average, this measure of competi-
tiveness confi rmed the highest relative adaptability of the Polish and Hungarian 
 34 Also through ‘fi scal devaluations’ (see Chapter 2).
 35 No REERULC quarterly data for Ukraine was available.
Figure 6.22b.  Real eff ective exchange rate in Poland and SECs (CPI-based). 
2007 = 100
Source: as in Figure 6.22a
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Figure 6.23a.  Real eff ective exchange rates in CECs (ULC in manufacturing-
defl ated). 2007Q2 = 100
Source: author’s calculation based on Darvas [2012b]
Figure 6.23b.  Real eff ective exchange rates in Poland and SECs (ULC in 
manufacturing-defl ated). 2007Q2 = 100
Source: as in Figure 6.23a
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companies, and ultimately their economies (see also Table 6.7). Other central Eu-
ropean economies displayed relatively lower adaptability. In 2007–2012 Polish 
REERULC, however, displayed the highest variability (Table 6.7). Th e Hungarian 
and the Czech REERULC followed a similar pattern but were less variable.
Table 6.7. Descriptive statistical parameters for REERULC
Country Max Min Range Average Standard deviation
Variation 
coeffi  cient
Czech Republic 110.38 83.70 26.68 93.94 8.67 9.23
Greece 125.87 90.91 34.95 106.93 8.22 7.69
Hungary 110.52 77.11 33.41 92.23 8.00 8.67
Poland 117.59 69.80 47.79 88.69 14.59 16.45
Portugal 105.23 95.44 9.79 100.49 2.65 2.63
Slovak Republic 121.20 87.00 34.20 101.99 9.19 9.01
Spain 111.11 93.04 18.06 99.84 4.52 4.53
Source: author’s calculation based on: [Darvas 2012b].
It needs to be stressed that while the REERULC developments helped these 
economies to improve their competitiveness, on the other hand they showed how 
vulnerable are late comers participating in lower parts of European and global 
supply chains. Figure 6.23b shows Poland’s REERULC pattern against SECs coun-
tries which, being EMU members, had a lower macroeconomic ability to absorb 
the external shocks that fi nally unveiled their domestic vulnerabilities.
6.4.2.2. Trade
In Poland the autonomous reaction of nominal exchange rate and labor cost 
adaptation were captured by REERULC depreciation. It helped manufacturers to 
maintain and strengthen their competitive advantage. Th is was best refl ected in 
foreign trade developments in 2007–2011 (Figures 6.24a and 6.24b). Despite the 
fact that the crisis began in mid 2007 in the US, the European economy contin-
ued its growth in 2008. As a result of fi nancial and economic turbulences exports 
contracted sharply as late as 2009. Figure 6.24a shows the synchronized pattern 
of exports developments in the CECs stemming from a similar geographical ori-
entation of exports. Poland’s exports supported by real eff ective exchange rate 
depreciation displayed the mildest fl uctuations. Ukraine, due to its export com-
modity structure, suff ered the most turbulent shift s – the range reached over 58 
percentage points with a standard deviation of over 22. Figure 6.24b shows trade 
developments in Poland against the background of SECs. As illustrated in Fig-
ure 2.24b Polish and Turkish exports grew in line in 2007–2009. Since 2009 Pol-
ish exports began to grow faster. At the same time average trade dynamics was 
stagnant in Portugal (99.9%) and low but positive in Spain and Greece – 101.6% 
Figure 6.24a. Merchandise exports annual growth in CECs. 2007 = 100
Source: author’s calculations based on GI Database
Figure 6.24b. Merchandise exports annual growth in Poland and SECs. 2007 = 100
Source: as in Figure 6.24a
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and 104.7% respectively. In 2007–2011 Poland’s average growth of merchandise 
exports was the highest and reached 113.5%.
Turbulent trade developments and the contraction in domestic output were 
refl ected in the share of exports of goods and services in GDP. Figures 6.25a and 
6.25b show changes in trade share in GDP in CECs and SECs. Interestingly, Po-
land and the Czech and Slovak Republics recorded reductions in the share of ex-
ports in GDP. Th e most dramatic trade share reduction was in Slovakia (a drop 
of 16 percentage points) and in the Czech Republic (over 8 percentage points) 
(Figure 6.25a). Against this background the changes in trade share in GDP in 
Poland were modest. In 2007–2011 in the South European countries changes 
in the share of exports of goods and services in GDP were less variable than in 
CECs (Figure 6.25b). Insofar the Polish trade developments were very much in 
line with the South European EMU members (Figure 6.25b). Turkey’s share of 
trade was also rather stable, but contrary to other SECs and Poland it began to 
decline in 2010.
Th e current account (Figures 6.26a and 6.26b) summarizes developments in 
foreign trade and indicates a balance of factor income and cash transfers includ-
Figure 6.25a.  Change in share of exports of goods and services in GDP in CECs 
(in percentage points). 2007 = 100
Source: author’s calculation based on WDI Database
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ing remittances. In 2007–2011 all CECs economies (except Hungary) continued 
to run current account defi cits.36
Th e current account defi cits declined sizeably in 2009 mainly due to the con-
tractions of imports caused by depreciation of exchange rates and by lower do-
mestic absorption. SECs ran current account defi cits well before 2007. In 2007 
Spain’s and Portugal’s current account defi cits reached 10% of GDP and Greece 
ran an almost 15% defi cit. While these pre-crisis tendencies and the magnitude 
of the current account gap indicated unsustainable external disequilibrium, the 
crisis brought it only into a more pronounced perspective. Over time the defi cits 
 36 Th e Slovak Republic had its CA balanced in 2011.
Figure 6.25b.  Change in share of exports of goods and services in GDP in Poland 
and SECs (in percentage points). 2007 = 100
Source: as in Figure 6.25b
Figure 6.26a. Current account in the CECs in 2007–2011 (% of GDP)
Source: GI Database
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narrowed due to a combination of a number of factors, including contraction of 
domestic absorption and increase in exports. Against the background of SECs, 
the Polish current account developments were much more positive, indicating 
its higher ability to adapt to challenges in the Single European Market and the 
global economy. It needs to be stressed, however, that the adaptation in Poland 
was predominantly cost and price-based rather than innovation-driven. In the 
medium and long-term the innovation based adaptation at the micro and macro 
level will be required to successfully compete in the European and global markets 
with agile and low cost newly developed Asian economies.
6.4.2.3. Production and unemployment
Figures 6.27a and 6.27b illustrate developments in industrial production in 2007–
2011. In the case of CECs the similarity of industrial production evolution is 
almost as strong as in changes in trade dynamics (Figures 6.25a and 6.25b). 
Figure 6.27a already shows slow growth or its decline in 2008 with a trough in 
2009. Aft erwards, industrial production in the Czech Republic and Hungary al-
most recovered to the 2007 level and in Slovakia and Poland signifi cantly sur-
passed their pre-crisis levels. Polish industrial production growth slowed down 
in 2009, but generally, throughout the whole period, displayed a relatively high 
growth. Ukrainian industrial output (as in the case of exports) was dominated 
by steel and heavy industry production, therefore it suff ered considerably dur-
ing the global crisis. Figure 6.27b shows developments in Poland compared to 
Figure 6.26b. Current account in Poland and the SECs in 2007–2011 (% of GDP)
Source: as in Figure 6.26b
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SECs, showing its relatively high stability when compared to these economies. 
All three EMU members recorded a downward trend in industrial production 
growth. None of them was able to adapt their unit costs to improve their manu-
facturing competitiveness and a fi ve-year period apparently was too short to use 
Figure 6.27a. Industrial production annual growth in CECs. 2007 = 100
Source: author’s calculation based on GI Database
Figure 6.27b. Industrial production annual growth in Poland and SECs. 2007 = 100
Source: as in Figure 6.27a
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an active innovation-driven strategy. Turkey, aft er 2009 contraction, returned to 
growth and continued at a pace similar to Poland’s.
Unemployment rate (UR) developments in CECs and SECs countries (Fig-
ures 6.28a and 6.28b) were correlated with changes in exports and industrial 
production, but the range of changes in UR compared to the pre-crisis level was 
relatively small. Figure 6.28a shows that in CECs the UR in 2008 was at a rela-
tively low level. In all Central European countries (except Poland) it increased 
in 2009 in comparison to 2007. While the higher unemployment rate continued, 
Figure 6.28a.  Change in unemployment rate in CECs (in percentage points). 
2007 = 100
Source: author’s calculations based on WDI Database
Figure 6.28b.  Change in unemployment rate in Poland and SECs (in percentage 
points). 2007 = 100
Source: as in Figure 6.28a
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Poland’s situation was relatively good (Figure 6.28a). Moderate UR moves could 
refl ect at least two factors; the fi rst was probably the prevailing perception that 
the crisis was external and temporary. Th e second factor refl ected (especially in 
the case of Poland) tight labor market conditions stemming both from emigration 
and the mismatch of labor skills supply and demand (see Chapter 4). In these cir-
cumstances companies chose to hoard labor in order not loose qualifi ed special-
ists and be ready to quickly respond to any new orders. Unemployment in SECs 
was much higher than in CECs. It is easily seen in Figure 6.28b, which compares 
Poland’s performance with SECs. In 2006 and 2007 the unemployment rate in 
Spain was at a record low. It began to increase as early as 2008 and continued un-
til 2011 when it returned to the level of over 20%, recorded in 1992–1993. With 
a one year delay Portugal and Greece followed Spain and in 2011 hit their record 
high unemployment rates (Figure 6.28b). By 2011, in comparison with the pre-
crisis level, the unemployment rate in Greece increased by over 9 and in Portugal 
by about 5 percentage points respectively. Th e pace of changes in unemployment 
rates in Turkey was, in comparison with other SECs, moderate – its unemploy-
ment rate returned to the pre-crisis level by 2011 (Figure 2.28b).
6.4.2.4. GDP and fi scal balance developments
Real GDP evolvement captures domestic absorption and net exports develop-
ments (Figures 6.29a and 6.29b). In comparison with 2007, all CECs continued 
GDP growth in 2008, however with distinctive diff erences. Hungary recorded a 
growth rate of less than one percent while Poland grew at a rate of over 5%. In 
relative terms Poland’s GDP performance was impressive; it slowed down in 2009 
but continued to grow throughout the whole period of 2007–2011 (Figure 6.29a). 
Th e Slovak and Czech Republics recorded positive growth rates in the same pe-
riod, while Hungary and Ukraine contracted. Figure 6.29b shows GDP growth 
rates of SECs and Poland compared with their pre-crisis level. Poland, as was the 
case within CECs was the only country which did not suff er from negative growth. 
Although Turkey contracted the most in 2009, it strongly recovered GDP growth 
(Figure 6.29b). All three EMU members displayed downward GDP trends, with 
Greece suff ering the deepest decline. Th e South European EMU members suf-
fered not only a real economy setback. Th eir economic performance was severely 
infl uenced by the indebtedness of both public and private sector and the fi nancial 
problems that the global crisis unveiled.
Economic developments in the CECs and SECs triggered by the global fi -
nancial crisis found their severe repercussions in public fi nances (Figures 6.30a 
6.30b). In 2008 all CECs (except Hungary) increased their fi scal defi cits (Figure 
6.30a). Poland and the Slovak Republic recorded their deepest defi cits in 2009. 
Over time, both countries, due to discretionary expenditure reductions and fast-
er GDP growth were able to reduce their defi cits and stabilized them in a range 
of 3–5% of their GDPs. In pre-crisis years Hungary suff ered very much from ex-
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tremely high fi scal defi cits in some years reaching 7–9% of the GDP. Th e fi scal 
defi cits in Hungary were unsustainable – its anti-defi cit measures, with a delay, 
brought in a one-year fi scal surplus in 2011.
Fiscal balance developments triggered by the global crisis were even more tur-
bulent in SECs than in CECs. Th e crisis unveiled long-term structural problems in 
these EMU countries that were not addressed properly by their consecutive gov-
ernments. In 2005–2007 Spain was the only SECs economy with fi scal surpluses. 
With the strong contraction in GDP, public fi nance balance deteriorated, reaching 
its trough in 2009 (Figure 6.30b). Greece entered 2007 with a fi scal defi cit of over 
6% of its GDP. In the following years its defi cit widened. Turkey for a number of 
years used to have high fi scal defi cits. Since 2002 it successfully began to reduce 
the defi cits so that in 2007 its fi scal balance was close to equilibrium. Under the 
crisis infl uence the defi cit widened, but in comparison to Greece, Portugal and 
Spain remained relatively low and under control (Figure 6.30b).
In order to summarize comparative analyses of Poland’s and the CECs and 
SECs economic performance during the 2007–2011 crisis, results are shown in 
Table 6.8. As in Section 6.3, standard goals of economic policy are used to com-
pare the quality of performance. To better present the reactions of the economies 
fi scal balance and REERCPI are also used (Table 6.8). Rankings are arranged as 
follows: in 2011 in comparison with 2007 Turkish unemployment was the lowest 
amongst the nine countries, hence Turkey is ranked fi rst. Ukraine’s infl ation in-
creased the most in 2011 in comparison to 2007; this means that for CPI change 
Ukraine took 9th place (Table 6.8). In 2011 in comparison to 2007 Poland’s GDP 
increased the most as compared with CECs and SECs – consequently it took 1st 
Table 6.8.  Reaction of CECs and CESs during the 2007–2011 phase of the global 
fi nancial crisis. Comparative ranking position
Country UR CPI CA GDP FB* REERCPI Score
Rank-
ing
Czech Republic 3 4 7 4 3 9 3.33 4
Greece 8 5 4 9 9 7 4.66 7
Hungry 6 7 1 7 4 5 3.33 4
Poland 2 6 6 1 2 3 2.22 1
Portugal 7 1 5 6 7 4 3.33 4
Slovak Republic 5 3 3 3 5 8 3.00 3
Spain 9 2 2 5 8 6 3.55 5
Turkey 1 8 9 2 1 1 2.44 2
Ukraine 4 9 8 8 6 2 4.11 6
Notes: UR – unemployment rate; CPI – consumer price index; CA – current account as % of GDP; GDP – 
real GDP growth; FB – fi scal balance 2012; REERCPI – real eff ective exchange rate defl ated by CPI.
Source: author’s calculation based on data in Figures 6.22, 6.26, 6.28–630.
Figure 6.29b. Real GDP growth in Poland and SECs. 2007 = 100
Source: as in Figure 6.29a
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Figure 6.29a. Real GDP growth in CECs. 2007 = 100
Source: author’s calculation based on GI Database
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Figure 6.30a.  Change in fi scal balance in CECs as % of GDP. In percentage points. 
2007 = 100
Source: author’s calculations based on EBRD and GI Database
Figure 6.30b.  Change in fi scal balance in Poland and SECs as % of GDP. In 
percentage points. 2007 = 100
Source: author’s calculations based on GI Database
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place. Consequently, a non-weighted summary measure of relative economic per-
formance of successive countries is calculated through summarizing their com-
parative positions (in the rows of Table 6.8) and then by dividing these sums by 
the number of economic variables (6).37
As the synopsis in Table 6.8 shows, in the context of both CECs and SECs, 
Poland performed best (score 2.22). Th e next place was taken by Turkey (score 
2.44), the third place belonged to the Slovak Republic (score 3.00), the fourth to 
the Czech Republic and Portugal (score 3.33) and the next positions were taken by 
Spain (3.55), Ukraine (4.11) and fi nally by Greece (4.66) respectively (Table 6.8).
In 2012, in comparison to 2007, only Poland and Turkey improved their GCR 
ranking (Table 6.9). Aft er 2007 Poland was the only country that in all succes-
sive years recorded higher rankings. Th e most dramatic ranking drops (Table 6.9) 
were in Greece (2012 deterioration by 31 notches in comparison with 2007 level), 
Slovak Republic (2012 by 30 positions), Ukraine (2010 drop by 16 notches) and 
Hungary (2008 drop by 15 notches).
Th e crisis that began in the United States in 2007 fi rst of all contaminated 
developed economies. It unveiled a number of structural problems in EU de-
veloped economies and also functional and governance challenges at the EMU 
level. Th rough fi nancial and trade interconnectedness the crisis showed its nega-
tive impact on new EU Member States. It was, and still is, a demanding crash test 
 37 If Poland was able to score the best positions in all six variables, its summary score would 
be 1; if it were the worst its summary score would be 9.
Table 6.9.  Th e 2007 global fi nancial crisis vs. ranking position of Poland and CECs 
and SECs in GGRs in 2007–2012
2007 Th e year of biggest ranking change 2012
29. Spain 2010 (–13) 36. Spain
33. Czech Republic 2012 (–6) 39. Czech Republic
40. Portugal 20012 (–9) 41. Poland
41. Slovak Republic 2012 (–30) 43. Turkey
47. Hungary 2008 (–15) 49. Portugal
51. Poland 2010 (+12) 60. Hungary
53. Turkey 2008 (–10) 71. Slovak Republic
65. Greece 2012 (–31) 73. Ukraine
73. Ukraine 2010 (–16) 96. Greece
Source: author’s synopsis based on GCRs.
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for Poland and other CECs. At the outset of the 2007 crisis internationalization 
of CEC economies was already high – this fact made them more vulnerable to 
external shocks. Th e economies of Greece, Portugal and Spain were fi rmly inte-
grated with the EU and became EMU members. As a result, for years they bene-
fi ted from private capital infl ows and structural funds. Th ese infl ows made them 
dependent on external fi nance and in fact reduced their capability to care more 
about autonomous and sustainable growth factors.
Poland, in comparison with both Southern EU members and Turkey and 
CECs, performed well in 2007–2012. It benefi ted from cautious monetary, fi -
nancial regulatory and fi scal policies. High domestic absorption supplemented 
the main driving factor which was exports. Th e crisis became a strong warning 
signal for all developed economies forcing them to reconsider their political and 
domestic economic governance.
Conclusions
Implementation of numerous new acts of law and adaptation of the pre-1989 reg-
ulations to the requirements of market economy proved to be a long and com-
plex process in Poland and other CECs. Th e institutional transformation had to 
simultaneously include the introduction of the “acquis communautaire” covering 
both the direct adoption of EU regulations and the indirect implementation of 
EU directives via domestic legislative procedures. Such accumulation of neces-
sary legislative actions was perceived by economic agents as a factor contributing 
to instability of the institutional environment. Recurrent changes in governments 
and frequent lack of political continuity reinforced this perception. In Poland, in 
the entire post-1989 period, only one party coalition succeeded in winning two 
consecutive parliamentary elections.
Th e survey results analyzed in the Chapter showed slow improvement in the 
institutional environment in Poland since 1997. As a matter of fact, none of Pol-
ish governments was able to signifi cantly improve the quality of general institu-
tional framework of the economy and Poland continued to be seen as an economy 
with relatively weak legal institutions, where confi dence in public administration 
and state institutions is relatively low. Such insuffi  cient development and quality 
of institutional framework hampers total factor productivity and hence reduces 
Poland’s GDP growth.
Against this background Poland’s solid economic performance throughout 
the recent global crisis needs special notice. Th e comparative analyses in the 
Chapter proved Poland’s ability to overcome negative external shocks not only 
better than its Central European peers or Turkey, but also better than the more 
developed economies of Greece, Portugal or Spain. Th ese positive results were 
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achieved despite unsatisfactory developments in the institutional framework. Suc-
cessful modernization of the institutional business environment and improved 
governance standards in public administration and state institutions became ma-
jor prerequisites for enhancing the growth potential and further improvement of 
Poland’s competitiveness.
AFTERWORD
Th e current development stage of globalization is based on the speedy diff usion 
of technological progress and innovation. Th e entrance of PRC and other low cost 
developing countries has increased competitive pressure and changed both the 
global supply and demand pattern as well as the political landscape. Th e world, 
in all respects, has become multi-polar with a signifi cant rise of the role of East 
Asia. Th e global fi nancial crisis originated in the United States in 2007 and sent 
shockwaves particularly to the developed, interdependent economies and under-
mined their position. Th e major consequences of the crisis, such as a signifi cant 
increase in money supply and public debt, have contributed to greater uncertain-
ty. Th is, in consequence, is and continues to be refl ected in slower growth rates 
of the developed economies. 
Th e post-2007 global economic and political environment requires coordinat-
ed, multilateral eff orts to redesign a global fi nancial security infrastructure. Th is 
should mean both a new consent on fi nancial data collection and spread, fi nan-
cial precursory regulations and their global enforcement and last but not least an 
international framework for the coordination of economic policy actions in the 
face of major fi nancial shocks. Th is higher global uncertainty can be alleviated at 
regional levels such as the EU and EMU. If enhanced and properly managed they 
can provide nations and corporations with a number of important regional pub-
lic goods, including currency stability and predictability of the common market.
Political and economic transformation in Poland and other CECs became feasi-
ble in 1989/1990 – a time when liberalization and globalization began to dominate 
both as an intellectual background of economic policy making, as well as business 
every day practice. Th e indispensible shift  towards pro-market and democratic 
reforms had to be implemented in an environment of speedy technological de-
velopment and the reduced effi  ciency of discretionary economic policy of mod-
ern states. Th e pace of technological and institutional changes, and in Europe, 
deepening of integration, on the one hand unveiled all the structural defi ciencies 
of CECs and on the other made their economic and institutional reconstruction 
more diffi  cult. Countries and all sectors of the economy found themselves un-
der stiff  cost and price competition from China and East Asian low cost coun-
tries. Th ese objective external conditions are oft en disregarded by critics of the 
transformation. Critics typically do not take notice of specifi c initial conditions 
and the structural barriers accompanying market reforms in Poland and CECs. 
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Poland, as with other countries of the region through trade and capital rela-
tions, became deeply integrated with the core European economies, which aft er 
the 2007 crisis experienced slower growth. Th is interconnectedness on the one 
hand, and globalization pressure on the other, create a number of challenges that 
have to be addressed at the national level. Poland, being a small open economy, 
integrated with the EU (and in future with the EMU) has limited room for ma-
neuver in terms of quantitative instruments of economic policy. Th is is why a 
qualitative economic policy and high standard institutional framework becomes 
of utmost importance. Th ey can, through reduction in uncertainty as well as in 
transaction costs, become foundations for higher and sustainable growth. Th e sec-
ond major problem requiring improvement is innovation readiness. In the global, 
and in particular East Asian context, technological convergence became one of 
the major feature of the current stage of globalization. Th is is not yet a dominant 
characteristic of the Polish economy. Any systemic failure in this area will thwart 
economic and social advancement and force the economy to hold at lower lev-
els of global supply chains, forcing companies to compete permanently with low 
cost countries. It will contribute to the reinforcement of a dual economy; modern, 
creative and competitive tradable sectors, and sectors locked in low technologies 
and productivity. Th e third area concerns negative demographical trends and the 
economy’s inability to create jobs and attain a high and sustainable level of em-
ployment.  Th is disadvantage contributed to a signifi cant outfl ow of people to 
developed European countries magnifying even more the negative demographic 
tendencies. To solve these structural problems there needs to be consistent and 
long-term policy focused on signifi cant improvement in the institutional frame-
work of the state and business environment, combined with a reduction in the 
fi scal costs of labor. Poland in particular, but also other economies of the region, 
successfully reintegrated with the European and global economy. Th e next chal-
lenge these economies face is to fi nd ways to close the still existing development 
gap and to attain a high sustainable level of productivity and prosperity.              
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